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Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basm Özeti TIME DerOBER 14,2002 • J~. l CQULDINSPECTIONS ALONE DO THETRICK? THE WHITE HOUSE IS CERTAIN THAT REnewed U.N. inspections won't end the threat of Saddam continuing to accumulate weapons of mass destruction and that only his demise will do the trick. Former U.N. inspectors tend to agree. In eight years .of policing the country, they found and destroyed sizable quantities of his weapons of mass destruction, but not all of the ones he was known to have. Since inspections broke off in 1998, Saddam is widely believed to have retooled and restocked chemical and biological agents and brought his nuclear program back into high gear, while vastly improving his capacity to hide it all. His history of deception aridgame playing makes a fresh attempt to root out the arsenal in this way difficult. Saddam, says former inspector David Kay, "will always defeat a U.N.-type of inspection made up of 100 to 300 people in a country as large as Iraq." Nevertheless, almost everyone outside the most committed hard-liner thinks inspections should be given one last chance. Bowing to that reality, the Administration's fallback is to demand that the U.N. prescribe a new regime for unfettered inspections that is so in Iraq's face that it might work. And if it doesn't, as the Administration frankly would prefer, it would give the U.s. a legitimate pretext for war. In its view, either inspectors would find something that would trigger action, or they would be blocked by Saddam: either would be cause for green-lighting the bombers. Much ofWestem Europe and the Arab world clings to the hope that war can still be avoided if unhindered inspections expose and destroy Saddam's arsenal. But they agree that Iraq gives way only when under dire threat. The issue has come down to how tough a new r~solution on inspections the Security Council will write. There's an emerging consensus that stringent new rules are needed. The U.S.-British '.J ' .. ".; TIME, DerOBER 14,2002 64
Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basm Özeti ., .1 draft proposes tough terms calling for Iraq to comply in 30 days, opening everything, including Saddam's highly suspect presiqential compounds, giving the inspectors armed guards to facilitate searches-and, ,most importan~ authorizing force if Iraq makes a misstep. , Washington says only such a definite promise of force could make inspections work. Critics see these terms as ones that no mie could accept. France and Russia, with veto power in the council, are leading the campaign to tone down the terms enough to give inspections a chance. Both balk at writing in an advance approval for war; France wants to reserve that for a second resolution, in the event Iraq fails to fulfill the first. The Administration now seems resigned to working out a program that most of the council-the U.S. needs' nine yeses, no vetoes-can live with. But no matter what the U.N. does to disarm Iraq, it would be extraordinary if the U.S. were to pause in its push to depose Saddam. In very few instances has the Bush Administration allowed the international community to change a core U.S. policy. 2HOW BADLYDOESTHE U.S. NEm THE U.N.? THE BUSH TEAM SAYSIT VERY MUCH wANTS U.N. support but that it will go to war alone if it has to. This is both true and a negotiating posture. The Administration believes only the fear that the U.S. will act •alone can squeeze approval out of the Se- ,curity Council. But if the U.S. does not get , a resolution that fits Bush's criteria, the , Administration means it when it says it will go to war anyway. As .a practical matter, the U.S. wants :and needs allies. U.N. approval confers legitimacy that even a superpower, can't .claim by itself, and such approval is essen- . tial in the Middle East. Nations such as ,Saudi Arabia might not agree to serve as staging bases without U.N. backing, and Bush can't place all the troops hell need for the war on aircraft carriers. Other friendly Arab nations like,Jordan, Egypt and Qatar need U.N. cover to deflect accusations that they are party to an attack on a brother Arab country. With U.N. sanction, it will be easier to convince ordinary Arabs that the war is legitimate and the fault is Saddam's. If the U.N. doesn't come through, the Administration is instead preparing to lead a "coalition of the willing." Italy, Australia, Poland, Spain, Qatar, Kuwait and, of course, best-pal Britain might all agree to take part in military action without a Security Council mandate. ' 3 1FIT'SWo, WILLSADDAM COUAPSEQUICKLY? , THE ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS THE FIGHTing should produce a swift, relatively painlessvictory, with Saddam gone in weeks. That's based largely on the presumption that his power is brittle, large segments of his army will surrender and his command will be decapitated before he can unleash his weapons of mass destruction. While outside experts say the war will probably go well, given U.S. air and technological superiority, they warn that the U.S. can't assume easy success. Saddam lost about 40% of his conventional force in the 1991 Gulf War. His current 375,000-man army is of uneven quality, his air force mostly grounded and his navy nonexistent. The CIA says Re can't , project his power very far ,and has trouble moving his tanks and artillery swiftly. Does that mean Iraq will crumble on impact? Not necessarily. ''You have to anticipate the worst-case scenario-that it will be a vicious, ferocious fight," says Nebraska's Re-, publican Senator Chuck Hagel, a Vietnam veterap. The outcome probably turns on how vigorously the 60,000-strong Republican Guard fights. Most experts say it would be foolhardy to write off Saddam's most loyal, best-trained troops, especially if the fighting comes to the streets of Baghdad. The dollar costs, meanwhile, will be pretty steep. The Congressional Budget Office (cao) last week estimated it would cost $9 billion to $13 billion to deploy forces, $6 billion to $9 billion a month to prosecute the war and then $5 billion to $7 billion to transport GIs back home. Add a peacekeeping mission that the cao estimates would cost $1billion to $4 billion a month, and the total for three months of combat plus five , years of occupation would be $272 billion. 4WHAT ARE THE ODDS OF HIS RGHlING DIRTY? ' IN THE LAST WAR, SADDAM GUARANTEED his survival by refraining from using his weapons of mass destruction. But in a war aimed directly at killinghim off, he would have no incentive to play nice. He'lllose if he doesn't use them. Pentagon war plans assume that precision air attacks with smart bombs can find and safely destroy hidden caches of biochern agents that inspectors have failed to uncover. The plans also presume that this can be done before Saddam unleashes any of those weapons. The bombers also need to take out Saddam's 20 to 30 Scud missiles (which they were not able to do in 199Ü before he can fire warheads loaded with conventional explosives or perhaps chenucal agents at Israel or his Arab neighbors. Even if all these pre-emptive measure~ are taken, Saddam could still try a crude pÎ'e-emptive strike ofhis own, using chern or bio agents against U.S. forces as they gather. But chemical weapons are hard to control on the battlefield; shifting winds could blow them back on Iraqi soldiers. U.S. forces will go , into battle in full protective gear. And the Administration says it plans to warn Iraqi generals and colonels who mi$t order the 'use of bio-chem weapons that they will be _1 65
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