Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

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18 Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de laPrensa-Basm Özeti u.s. predicts ~oup if Iraq By Wal~erPincus _-IS atta~l7"~~--. TheWashingtonPost . ~1\.~u.. thorized covert plan ruld only a small WASHINGTON: Senior intelligence chance of working unless accompanied experts inside and outside government by outside militaryaction, 0;1' at.least by have reached a consensus that Presi. convincing the Iraqis that suth action dent Saddam. Hussein of Iraq would . was imminent probably be overthrown in à coup led Iraqi officers over by members ofhis inner circle in the final days or hours before U.S. forces watched Saddam or- the years have launched a major ground attack. der the shooting of Faced with an imminent, overwhelming U.S. assault and the choice for temporarily de- his own sons-in-law of either being Saddam's successors or fecting and the brutal being imprisoned orkilled in the fighting, top-ranking officers or a grOUp elimination of senior of military and other senior officials would take the chance to eliminate the Iraqi leader, several senior administration officials and intelligence experts said in recent interviews. "Someone will take action and cause it to happen," said a former high-ranking CIA officer with close ties to current thinking among intelligence officials. . ..It is unclear how widespread this view is within the administration. But with military preparations for a possible attack underway, senior officials, including Defense Secrëtary Donald Rumsfeld, have recently spoken publiclY about iraqls' eliminating Sadd8m themselves, either, through assassination or by sending him into exile. . The White House spokesman. Ari Fleischer, picked up the theme last week, encouraging a coup d'état or assassination in answer to questions. about the possible cost of a U.S.-led invaSion. "The cost of a one-way ticket is . substantially less than the cost ofwar," Fleischer said. "The cost of one bullet, ifthe Iraqi people take it on themselves, is substantially less than that." "SaddalIl Hussein could decide that his futU;~ 'isÙmitèda~d he'd like to leave," Rumsfeld told the House Armed' Services Committee last month. "Another way to do it would be to persuade enough people in Iraq" that "the world would be a lot better ifthat regime weren't there and they decided to change the regime." The "silver bullet" approach - Iraqis eliminating Saddam on their own - has long been central to the CIA's ef-' forts to end the Iraqi leader's dictatorship. Early this year, President George W. Bush directed the CIA to undertake a comprehensive covert program to topple Saddam, including the authority to use lethal force. n included instructions to increase support and contacts with Iraqi opposition groups and forces outside and inside Iraq. n also authorized expanded efforts to collect intelligence within the Iraqi government, military and intelligence service where pockets of anti- Saddam sentiment have been detected. The Washington Post reporteô in June that the director of central intelligence, . George Tenet, had briefed Bush and senior cabinet members that tqe newly au- colleagues based on rumors that they were disloyal. These officers "will have to be certain the Americans are coming with .. overwhelming force before they move,". a top government analyst said. "They have been hurt before." A former senior official in the Clinton administration agreed with this assessment, citing a failed CIA attempt employing Iraqi sénior officers to eliminateSaddam in 1996. «'It always has been the view of the intelligence community that there wasa low chance of success in the absence of the sound of military footsteps in Baghdad, " the official said. Several officials said one reason for their view that the inner circle in Baghdad would move against Saddam was the Bush administration's vocal, seemingly determined planning to launch a war - with the goal not just of eliminating Iraqi weapons of mass destruction but also of changing the country's leadership. Senior defense and intelligence officials have spoken openly of their conviction that many Iraqi military units would not defend Saddam in the event of a U.S. attack, or could be persuaded not to do so. . The assessment that a coup in Bagh-' dad would' be possible, if not probable; . may have helped shape some of the administration's thinking about planning for a post-Saddam Iraq. It has led many CIA and State Pepartmeilt officials, for example, to op-' pose recognition of the leaders of prominent Iraqi exile groups as a government in exile, arguing that they would never be accepted to head any new Baghdad government. . "The exiles would be seen as a U.S. quisling government," a senior analyst said, referring to the Norwegian who betrayèd his country to the Nazis in . World War II and then headed the government under Fascist occupation. Although U.S. officials have talked of instituting a democratic government in. Baghdad, many intelligence officials believe a military-led coup could help keep Iraq together and avoid moves toward separation that could come from its three major ethnic groups: the Shiite majority, Kurdish groups of the north and the Sunni minority that has dominated the country in recent times. A coup also would leave many of Iraq's upper- and middle-level bureaucrats in place, limiting the need for major rebuilding of the government, according to the intelligence community's thinking. . . _ One- of severaLclandestine_operations the CIA has undertaken in Iraq since the late 1990s has been to identify key officials around Saddam and 'find ways to contact:them, mostly through. intermediaries ... The object is to plant the seeds for an eventual coup or possible assassination, according to current and former U.S. officials. Promises of future power or wealth are among the rewards dangled in front of the Iraqis, sources said. Exiled Iraqi officers and political figures are being used by U.S. intelligence to keep in touch with former colleagues. There are continuing efforts, mostly unsuccessful, to approach and perhaps recruit Iraqis who travel outside the country, officials said. Saddam is aware of these activities and has regularly shaken up his top officer corps and others with access to him, including those in his own security force. "He came up through the security ranks of the Ba'ath Party and is obsessed with his own security," a senior analyst said. Saddam's closest aides are often the only ones to see him and he constantly is on the move, sources said. His public . appearances are almost never announced ahead of time and it is wellknown that he almost never sleeps in the same bed two nights in a row. The Special Republican Guard and other key security forces are run by Saddam's younger son, Qusay, and they include a large number of members from their tribe in Tikrit, the Iraqi leader's power base in northern Iraq. Even so, Saddam and his son constantly move key people around "just to keep them off balance," an intelligence official said. Another official said that these people are so identified with the Iraqi leader that his overthrow would probably include wiping out most ofhis tribe. "They have profited from the relationship and they know his death could . be theirs," an official said. "That makes them even more loyal." One of the more curious nuances in the administration's public pronouncements in rècent weeks is the idea of Saddam and his family and advisers being sent into exile. In his testimony to the House last month, Rumsfeld said that one choice Saddam had was "to take his family and key leaders and seek asylum elsewhere. Surely one of the ISO-plus countries would take his regime - possibly Belarus." . But most intelligence analysts said . they doubted Saddam would take that route. "He knows that if he is not in power, he's dead," one top analyst ofthe . Iraqi government said. "What country would take him and how could he be . sure he would be.safe?"
Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Baszn Özeti Irak : Ankara hésite entre son soutien aux.'USA .et. sa. hantise des Kurdes --. 'AfP'=:::: '.. ANKARA, 6 oct (AFP) - 13h29 - Face à une possible attaque des Etats-Unis en Irak, la Turquie hésite entre son soutien traditionnel au grand frère américain et sa hantise non moins traditionnelle à l'égard des Kurdes. "L'établissement d'un Etat indépe.ndant (kurde) près de, nos frontières serait inacceptable", Bulent Ecevit. " -- a martelé ce week-end' le 'Premier 'ministre turc • l ~. -, Si les Kurdes d'Irak venaient à créer un Etat indépendant, la Turquie prendrait "les mesures nécessaires", a-t-il averti au lendemain d'une réunion du parlement mis en place par les deux factions kurdes qui contrôlent le nord de l'Irak depuis la fin de la guerre du Golfe. La Turquie craint que l'apparition sud-est du pays. d'un Etat kurde à sa frontière ne réveille les velléités de sécession de sa propre minorité kurde dans le Quinze années de guerre contre le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistanont traumatisé le pay~ et expliquent l'intransigeance d'une partie de la classe politique face à la moindre revendication d'une population qui compte de 12 à 20 millions de personnes, soit près d'un habitant sur quatre en Turquie. . " Ce n'est que l'été dernier que le parlement turc. soucieux de l'attitude de l'Union européenne que le pays voudrait rallier. a autorisé l'enseignement privé et la diffusion radio-télévisée en langlie kurde. Cette réforme demeure toutefois contestée, notamment par les , ultra-nationalistes. ." Ceci permet de comprendre que les Kurdes irakiens tentent de t,assurer Ankara. "Les Kurdes ne menaceront pas la sécurité et la stabilité de leurs voisins et nous sommes prêts à donner des assurances", aftirmait par exemple vendredi Massoud Barzani~ leader du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK). Le PDK et l'Union patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK) de'Jalal Talabani veulent créer un Etat fédéral en Irak au sein duquel les Kurdes disposeraient d'une large autonomie. "Le fédéralisme veut dire l'union, pas la division,'~ affirme Said Ahmed Pire, responsable de l'UPK pour les relations étrangères. La Turquie, qui maintient depuis plusieurs années des soldats dans le nord de l'Irak, aftirme son attachement à l'intégrité, territoriale de son voisin, mais n'hésite pas à revendiquer un droit de regard sur cette ancienne province ottomane et le droit d'y défend~ les intérêts de la minorité turcomane. ' "Les ressources naturelles de l'Irak ne sont pas des ressources qui peuvent être octroyées à tel ou tel élément du pe'uple irakien", aftirmait récemment le ministre turc des Affaires étrangères Sukru Sina Gurel pour lequel il faut empêcher les Kurdes de s'approprier les riches puits de pétrole de la région de Kirkouk. "Comme nous l'avons fait à Chypre, nous prendrons le moment venu ce qui nous revient de droit à Mossoul et Kirkouk", affirmait plus énergiquement encore samedi le président du parlement turc, l'ultra-nationaliste Omer Izgi. . ."La Turquie devrait prendre l'initiative et ses forces armées prendre le' contrôle du nord de l'Irak, plus ou moins jusqu'au 36e parallèle" avant toute opération militaire américaine, avance pour sa part le général à la retraite et spécialiste géopolitique Armagan Kuloglu. Ceci permettrait "d'endiguer l'afflux de réfugiés, de garantir la sécurité des Turcomans et d'empêcher les Kurdes de devenir , économiquement forts en prenant la région de Mossoul et Kirkouk", ajoute-t~i1, estimant que 30.000 à 40.000 hommes suftiraient à la tâche. . , . . "La Turquie perdra beaucoup si elle ne prend pas une part active" au renversement du président irakien Saddam Hussein, estime lui aussi le général à la retraite Cevik Bir. ' 'Et d'ajouter: "la Turquie devrait se préparer à une opération qui semble inévitahlt>" Des Irakiens quittent Kirkouk, craignant une offensive américaine .(presse) ERBIL (Irak), 10 oct (AFP) - 17h53 - Les Irakiens installés par Bagdad dans les villages kurdes de la province pétrolière de Kirkouk (nord) retournent dans leurs régions d'origine, au sud et à l'ouest du pays, de crainte d'une frappe américaine, indique jeudi un journal kurde. Les Arabes installés dans la région ces dernières années retournent chez eux sans informer le gouvernement, face aux menaces américaines d'attaquer l'Irak, selon Birayeti, l'organe du Parti démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK), l'un des deux grands partis contrôlant le Kurdistan irakien. . Le journal fait allusion aux craintes des résidents arabes d'être l'objet de représailles de la part des Kurdes. Le PDK et l'Union patriotique du Kurdistan (UPK) se partagent le contrôle d'une enclave dans le nord de l'Irak qui est hors du contrôle du gouvernement depuis la fin de la guerre du Golfe en 199 I. Les partis politiques dans cette zone se plaignent depuis de nombreuses années de ce qu'ils considèrent comme des tentatives du régime irakien de chasser les Kurdes, Turkmènes et Assyriens de Kirkouk, pour les remplacer par des Arabes, changeant ainsi la composition ethnique de la région. -- - 19 .
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