Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
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18<br />
Revue <strong>de</strong> Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro <strong>de</strong> laPrensa-Basm Öz<strong>et</strong>i<br />
u.s. predicts ~oup if Iraq<br />
By Wal~erPincus<br />
_-IS atta~l7"~~--.<br />
TheWashingtonPost . ~1\.~u..<br />
thorized covert plan ruld only a small<br />
WASHINGTON: Senior intelligence chance of working unless accompanied<br />
experts insi<strong>de</strong> and outsi<strong>de</strong> government by outsi<strong>de</strong> militaryaction, 0;1' at.least by<br />
have reached a consensus that Presi. convincing the Iraqis that suth action<br />
<strong>de</strong>nt Saddam. Hussein of Iraq would .<br />
was imminent<br />
probably be overthrown in à coup led Iraqi officers over<br />
by members ofhis inner circle in the final<br />
days or hours before U.S. forces watched Saddam or-<br />
the years have<br />
launched a major ground attack.<br />
<strong>de</strong>r the shooting of<br />
Faced with an imminent, overwhelming<br />
U.S. assault and the choice for temporarily <strong>de</strong>-<br />
his own sons-in-law<br />
of either being Saddam's successors or fecting and the brutal<br />
being imprisoned orkilled in the fighting,<br />
top-ranking officers or a grOUp<br />
elimination of senior<br />
of<br />
military and other senior officials<br />
would take the chance to eliminate the<br />
Iraqi lea<strong>de</strong>r, several senior administration<br />
officials and intelligence experts<br />
said in recent interviews.<br />
"Someone will take action and cause<br />
it to happen," said a former high-ranking<br />
CIA officer with close ties to current<br />
thinking among intelligence officials.<br />
.<br />
..It is unclear how wi<strong>de</strong>spread this<br />
view is within the administration. But<br />
with military preparations for a possible<br />
attack un<strong>de</strong>rway, senior officials,<br />
including Defense Secrëtary Donald<br />
Rumsfeld, have recently spoken publiclY<br />
about iraqls' eliminating Sadd8m<br />
themselves, either, through assassination<br />
or by sending him into exile.<br />
. The White House spokesman. Ari<br />
Fleischer, picked up the theme last<br />
week, encouraging a coup d'état or assassination<br />
in answer to questions.<br />
about the possible cost of a U.S.-led invaSion.<br />
"The cost of a one-way tick<strong>et</strong> is<br />
. substantially less than the cost ofwar,"<br />
Fleischer said. "The cost of one bull<strong>et</strong>,<br />
ifthe Iraqi people take it on themselves,<br />
is substantially less than that."<br />
"SaddalIl Hussein could <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> that<br />
his futU;~ 'isÙmitèda~d he'd like to<br />
leave," Rumsfeld told the House Armed'<br />
Services Committee last month. "Another<br />
way to do it would be to persua<strong>de</strong><br />
enough people in Iraq" that "the world<br />
would be a lot b<strong>et</strong>ter ifthat regime weren't<br />
there and they <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to change<br />
the regime."<br />
The "silver bull<strong>et</strong>" approach - Iraqis<br />
eliminating Saddam on their own -<br />
has long been central to the CIA's ef-'<br />
forts to end the Iraqi lea<strong>de</strong>r's dictatorship.<br />
Early this year, Presi<strong>de</strong>nt George<br />
W. Bush directed the CIA to un<strong>de</strong>rtake<br />
a comprehensive covert program to<br />
topple Saddam, including the authority<br />
to use l<strong>et</strong>hal force.<br />
n inclu<strong>de</strong>d instructions to increase<br />
support and contacts with Iraqi opposition<br />
groups and forces outsi<strong>de</strong> and insi<strong>de</strong><br />
Iraq. n also authorized expan<strong>de</strong>d<br />
efforts to collect intelligence within the<br />
Iraqi government, military and intelligence<br />
service where pock<strong>et</strong>s of anti-<br />
Saddam sentiment have been <strong>de</strong>tected.<br />
The Washington Post reporteô in June<br />
that the director of central intelligence, .<br />
George Ten<strong>et</strong>, had briefed Bush and senior<br />
cabin<strong>et</strong> members that tqe newly au-<br />
colleagues based on<br />
rumors that they were disloyal.<br />
These officers "will have to be certain<br />
the Americans are coming with ..<br />
overwhelming force before they move,".<br />
a top government analyst said. "They<br />
have been hurt before."<br />
A former senior official in the Clinton<br />
administration agreed with this assessment,<br />
citing a failed CIA attempt<br />
employing Iraqi sénior officers to eliminateSaddam<br />
in 1996.<br />
«'It always has been the view of the intelligence<br />
community that there wasa<br />
low chance of success in the absence of<br />
the sound of military footsteps in Baghdad,<br />
" the official said.<br />
Several officials said one reason for<br />
their view that the inner circle in Baghdad<br />
would move against Saddam was<br />
the Bush administration's vocal, seemingly<br />
<strong>de</strong>termined planning to launch a<br />
war - with the goal not just of eliminating<br />
Iraqi weapons of mass <strong>de</strong>struction<br />
but also of changing the country's<br />
lea<strong>de</strong>rship.<br />
Senior <strong>de</strong>fense and intelligence officials<br />
have spoken openly of their conviction<br />
that many Iraqi military units<br />
would not <strong>de</strong>fend Saddam in the event<br />
of a U.S. attack, or could be persua<strong>de</strong>d<br />
not to do so. .<br />
The assessment that a coup in Bagh-'<br />
dad would' be possible, if not probable; .<br />
may have helped shape some of the administration's<br />
thinking about planning<br />
for a post-Saddam Iraq.<br />
It has led many CIA and State Pepartmeilt<br />
officials, for example, to op-'<br />
pose recognition of the lea<strong>de</strong>rs of prominent<br />
Iraqi exile groups as a government<br />
in exile, arguing that they would never<br />
be accepted to head any new Baghdad<br />
government. .<br />
"The exiles would be seen as a U.S.<br />
quisling government," a senior analyst<br />
said, referring to the Norwegian who<br />
b<strong>et</strong>rayèd his country to the Nazis in .<br />
World War II and then hea<strong>de</strong>d the government<br />
un<strong>de</strong>r Fascist occupation.<br />
Although U.S. officials have talked of<br />
instituting a <strong>de</strong>mocratic government in.<br />
Baghdad, many intelligence officials<br />
believe a military-led coup could help<br />
keep Iraq tog<strong>et</strong>her and avoid moves toward<br />
separation that could come from<br />
its three major <strong>et</strong>hnic groups: the Shiite<br />
majority, Kurdish groups of the north<br />
and the Sunni minority that has dominated<br />
the country in recent times.<br />
A coup also would leave many of<br />
Iraq's upper- and middle-level bureaucrats<br />
in place, limiting the need for major<br />
rebuilding of the government, according<br />
to the intelligence<br />
community's thinking. .<br />
. _ One- of severaLclan<strong>de</strong>stine_operations<br />
the CIA has un<strong>de</strong>rtaken in Iraq<br />
since the late 1990s has been to i<strong>de</strong>ntify<br />
key officials around Saddam and 'find<br />
ways to contact:them, mostly through.<br />
intermediaries ...<br />
The object is to plant the seeds for an<br />
eventual coup or<br />
possible assassination,<br />
according to<br />
current and former<br />
U.S. officials. Promises<br />
of future power<br />
or wealth are among<br />
the rewards dangled<br />
in front of the Iraqis,<br />
sources said.<br />
Exiled Iraqi officers and political figures<br />
are being used by U.S. intelligence<br />
to keep in touch with former colleagues.<br />
There are continuing efforts, mostly<br />
unsuccessful, to approach and perhaps<br />
recruit Iraqis who travel outsi<strong>de</strong> the<br />
country, officials said.<br />
Saddam is aware of these activities<br />
and has regularly shaken up his top officer<br />
corps and others with access to<br />
him, including those in his own security<br />
force. "He came up through the security<br />
ranks of the Ba'ath Party and is obsessed<br />
with his own security," a senior<br />
analyst said.<br />
Saddam's closest ai<strong>de</strong>s are often the<br />
only ones to see him and he constantly<br />
is on the move, sources said. His public<br />
. appearances are almost never announced<br />
ahead of time and it is wellknown<br />
that he almost never sleeps in<br />
the same bed two nights in a row.<br />
The Special Republican Guard and<br />
other key security forces are run by<br />
Saddam's younger son, Qusay, and they<br />
inclu<strong>de</strong> a large number of members<br />
from their tribe in Tikrit, the Iraqi lea<strong>de</strong>r's<br />
power base in northern Iraq.<br />
Even so, Saddam and his son constantly<br />
move key people around "just to<br />
keep them off balance," an intelligence<br />
official said.<br />
Another official said that these people<br />
are so i<strong>de</strong>ntified with the Iraqi lea<strong>de</strong>r<br />
that his overthrow would probably inclu<strong>de</strong><br />
wiping out most ofhis tribe.<br />
"They have profited from the relationship<br />
and they know his <strong>de</strong>ath could .<br />
be theirs," an official said. "That makes<br />
them even more loyal."<br />
One of the more curious nuances in<br />
the administration's public pronouncements<br />
in rècent weeks is the i<strong>de</strong>a of Saddam<br />
and his family and advisers being<br />
sent into exile.<br />
In his testimony to the House last<br />
month, Rumsfeld said that one choice<br />
Saddam had was "to take his family and<br />
key lea<strong>de</strong>rs and seek asylum elsewhere.<br />
Surely one of the ISO-plus countries<br />
would take his regime - possibly Belarus."<br />
.<br />
But most intelligence analysts said .<br />
they doubted Saddam would take that<br />
route. "He knows that if he is not in<br />
power, he's <strong>de</strong>ad," one top analyst ofthe .<br />
Iraqi government said. "What country<br />
would take him and how could he be<br />
. sure he would be.safe?"