Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
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Revue <strong>de</strong> Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro<br />
America and Iran<br />
The United States and Iran lUe engaged<br />
in the <strong>de</strong>licate business of trying<br />
to rPnAir a bfoken relationship. Rccœ-<br />
~öß will not be easy, and mar prove<br />
impossible if Iran does not end Its supportof<br />
temlrism and itseffort to <strong>de</strong>velop<br />
nuclear weapons. But the initial signs<br />
lUepromising and should be pursued.<br />
Iran's lieW presi<strong>de</strong>nt,. MOhammed<br />
Khatami, and Presi<strong>de</strong>nt Bill Clinton<br />
have ~ altered the tone of relations<br />
by speaking respectfully of one<br />
another's country and cul~. Iran has<br />
shifted policy by accepting the i<strong>de</strong>a of<br />
Israeli-Palestinian peace tlÛkS, curbing<br />
Iraqi oil smuggling and inviting cultural<br />
exchanges with America. After<br />
Iran warnùy gre<strong>et</strong>ed an American wres-.<br />
ding team in February, Mr. Clinton<br />
acknowledged the gesture by receiving<br />
the wres<strong>de</strong>rs at the White House.<br />
These may seem mo<strong>de</strong>st steos. but<br />
they required a fair <strong>de</strong>gree of courage<br />
by both lea<strong>de</strong>rs. Mr. Clinton still faces<br />
strong opposition in Congress to improved<br />
relations and knows that a misstep<br />
with Tehran could hand Republicans<br />
a foreign policy issue in this<br />
year's congressionalelectioos. Presi<strong>de</strong>nt<br />
Khatami, for his part, must contend<br />
with the conservative clerics who still<br />
hold supreme authority in Iran and lUe<br />
wary ofhis lea<strong>de</strong>rship in general and his<br />
opening to Washington in particular.<br />
Even now he is restrained from opening<br />
direct ta1ks with the White House.<br />
The benefits ofb<strong>et</strong>ter relations could<br />
be significant for both countries. For<br />
America, the military containment and<br />
economic isolation of Iraq would be<br />
gready simplified. Mi<strong>de</strong>ast peace<br />
talks, if they can be revived, would<br />
unfold in a less hostile regional environment,<br />
and Syria would feel pres-<br />
<strong>de</strong> la Prensa-Basm Oz<strong>et</strong>i<br />
sure to bargain on realistic tenns. Tensions<br />
b<strong>et</strong>ween America and Europe<br />
:over energy investments in Iran would<br />
be <strong>de</strong>fused, and more economical<br />
pipeline routes would be feasible for<br />
oil and gas from newly <strong>de</strong>veloped<br />
fields in the Caspian basin.<br />
With an end to American pressure,<br />
Iran could obtain cheaper capital to<br />
<strong>de</strong>velo~ its energy resources and the<br />
rest of Its economy. It could also draw<br />
greater profit from its geographic location<br />
as the most direct route for oil<br />
and gas pipelines from the Caspian to<br />
Turkey, Europe and beyond. B<strong>et</strong>ter<br />
.relations with Washington would<br />
leave Iran less isolated and vulnerable<br />
to Iraq, and b<strong>et</strong>ter able to exercise its<br />
influence as a regional power.<br />
Obstacles remain, but mending relations<br />
b<strong>et</strong>ween America and Iran is<br />
worth some work and some risk for Mr.<br />
Khàtarni and Mr. Clinton.<br />
- THE NEW YORK TIMES.<br />
The Trouble to Remove in Iraq Is Sf!ddam;<br />
WASHINGTON - The ~ m- ByThomasL.Friedman Uwmself ~<br />
' spectors entered the room mane<br />
of Saddam Hussein' s "palaces." What It is almost funny, ibis chara<strong>de</strong>, but<br />
n~<br />
was in this room, wbat was its function'!<br />
the inspectors asked the Iraqi<br />
not hu~ely.<br />
The mspectors had eliminated much aggression that brought the Gulf War,<br />
~<br />
monitors crowding around them. of Saddam' s chemical, biological and never <strong>de</strong>igned to conceal his plans to<br />
"Office of the special security or- nuclear weaponry and were close to the dominate the Middle East.<br />
ganization," was the answer. Then rest. they were looking mosdy for But .~~'s srow.ing pqwer at the<br />
~<br />
=<br />
how come there is nota piece ofpaper, documents.- d~uments that could United Nations has focused some U.S. ~<br />
a document. of any kind to be found ~eal. Iraqi testing of chemical and minds on the reality that America faces :z;<br />
here'! The Iraqis just did not know. blologlc~ ~eapons on live humans, - not inspection, not .sanctions, but Q<br />
Thepa1aceslUegreatcompoundsthat lead to mIssmg warheads, disclose or- Saddam. In an article for the Los ~<br />
inclu<strong>de</strong> offices and warehoQses of Sad- ~ers for chemicals that make the chem- Angeles ~ Syndicate, Henry Kis- :<<br />
dam' s military, wèapon-production and ~cals~t make people <strong>de</strong>ad. So foiling singer put it entirely straight and clear: ~<br />
security organizations. As part of a <strong>de</strong>al<br />
with UN Secr<strong>et</strong>ary-General Kofi Anms~on<br />
~hing<br />
b~ sanitizing sites and atnon-mspectors<br />
to the inspec-<br />
"After all that has passed b<strong>et</strong>ween<br />
Saddam Hussein and the U.S., no <strong>de</strong>al<br />
~<br />
nan last month, Saddam gave inspectors bon team were important to Saddam. is conceivable no matter what Saddam<br />
permission to enter the compounds Som<strong>et</strong>imes inspec~rs tried to save does regarding inspection. The <strong>de</strong>pth<br />
barred to them for seven years. Nobody face for the United Nations by saying, of this feeling must be un<strong>de</strong>rstood by<br />
was cru<strong>de</strong> enough to say that un<strong>de</strong>r the my, how cooperative the Iraqis had be- f~ign lea<strong>de</strong>rs pressing for accommocease-fire<br />
~en~ he signed with the come. ~e truth is ~t after a few days dabon ... If we cannot negotiate with<br />
Gulf War coalibon m 1991 be had no the iraqiS started whittling down even S~ we must try to weaken or, if<br />
right to keep them out for a day. the Annan-Saddam tenns. They began poSSible, to overthrow him. The out-<br />
N~w, in r<strong>et</strong>urn for his act of grace and skipping appointments, losing keys to come of any crisis with Saddam must<br />
pendmg contracts, he knows that Rus- locked doors, protesting against taking be viewed in terms of its impact on<br />
sia, France, China and the Muslim coun- this picture or that, pushing surveillance that objective. "<br />
tries will push hard to lift the sanctions so tight that it risks acci<strong>de</strong>nts. Tile New York Times.<br />
that bave blocked bis military growth.' The inspectors are the system's only<br />
I won<strong>de</strong>r how diplomats kept a remaining protection. They will not<br />
straight face during the closed UN Se- give Saddam the clearance he needs to<br />
curity Council me<strong>et</strong>ings, when they g<strong>et</strong> sanctions lifted wiless he sud<strong>de</strong>nly<br />
approved the <strong>de</strong>al that Saddam had <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>s he does not want weapons of<br />
worked out with Mr. Annan. It bears mass -.<strong>de</strong>struction after all. But he has<br />
~e ~ of <strong>de</strong>structi.on of the entire powerful friends at the United Nations,<br />
mspecbon system, which uncovered so and the United States so far has been no<br />
much o~ Saddam's weaponry of mass pillar of constancy against Saddam.<br />
<strong>de</strong>s~cbon - but not all. Once again, Saddam, with the help<br />
FIfSt, Saddam g<strong>et</strong>s away penalty- of UN allies like China, Russia and<br />
free for !taving tieduP. the inspection France, has come out way ahead. As in<br />
sys~ s~ce last f~. Blgge~: 'The sys- every self-ma<strong>de</strong> crisis since the end of<br />
tem ISr~~sed to his taste, With ~ small the Gulf War, he has gained prestige by<br />
army of dipl~ts attached to 1ßSpect suckering the United States.<br />
the profess~onal mspectors.<br />
This time Saddarn & Co. ma<strong>de</strong> the<br />
And, the kicker: ~en inspectors world concentrate on his campaign<br />
fmally.entered suspect Sites,he had had against the sanctions instead of on the<br />
more bIne than he nee<strong>de</strong>d to move out core issue: that Saddarn was and alsuspicious<br />
documents and materials, as ways will be a danger to world ~.<br />
he did in that "security" office. He has never forsworn the kind of<br />
~<br />
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