Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
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.Revue <strong>de</strong> Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro<br />
<strong>de</strong> la Prensa-Basm Öz<strong>et</strong>i<br />
dialogue, and stressed that he was not trying to establish an in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt Kurdish state, which had<br />
previously been stated as the PKK's aim.<br />
In a statement broadcast April!? by a London-based Kurdish TV station, Ocalan pointed to the "Northern<br />
Ireland formula" as an example for Turkey. "I'm prepared to leave the arms and enable [talks]," he said.<br />
But one senior government official says Ocalan is simply trying a new tactic. He says Turkey's "southeast<br />
problem" - officials still refuse to refer to it as a "Kurdish problem" - has no resemblance to the situation in<br />
Northern Ireland.<br />
Public opinion, beyond that of the liberal elite, seems to favor a hard line. Many Turks blame the PKK for<br />
14 years of terrorism, the <strong>de</strong>aths of 30,000 people, and a cost to Turkey of $80 billion. Many have rallied<br />
for the execution of Sakik, who is likely to be tried for several guerrilla attacks, including one that killed 33<br />
Turkish soldiers in 1993.<br />
No Progress in Iraq<br />
••It was clearly apparent that all sites<br />
had un<strong>de</strong>rgone extensive evacuation.<br />
In all the sites outsi<strong>de</strong> of Baghdad, for<br />
example, there were no documents and<br />
no computers. The buildings were<br />
largely empty .... Iraq' s explanation for<br />
Chiswas that such measures were taken<br />
in anticipation of a military strike. "<br />
So much for the United Nations'<br />
victory in winning access to Iraq' s<br />
"presi<strong>de</strong>ntial sites. "<br />
This was the issue, you recall, that<br />
stymied UN inspections of Iraqi nuclear,<br />
chemical and biological weapon<br />
capabilities, led to a buildup of U.S.<br />
forces in the Gulf and culminated in<br />
February in a <strong>de</strong>al negotiated by UN<br />
Secr<strong>et</strong>ary-General Kofi Annan with<br />
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein - a<br />
<strong>de</strong>al portrayed by the Clinton administration<br />
as a victory for its combination<br />
of diplomacy and show of force.<br />
Now UN weapons inspectorCharles<br />
Duelfer has reported to Mr. Annan. He<br />
notes that Iraqi cooperation since the<br />
agreement has been "satisfactory"<br />
and that the presence of senior diplomats,<br />
ad<strong>de</strong>d- to inspection teä'ms by<br />
or<strong>de</strong>r of the Annan-Saddam agreement,<br />
"worked out generally well."<br />
But his report raises questions about<br />
who really gained from the monthslong<br />
crisis that Saddam generated.<br />
The Clinton administration said the<br />
presence of diplomats and Mr. An-<br />
~an's promi~ to respect. IrJlq's "national<br />
secunty, sovereigrity and dignity"<br />
would not make inspections<br />
more cumbersome. In fact, Mr.<br />
Duelfer says diplomats did' at times<br />
challenge and argue with UN inspectors,<br />
"supporting Iraqi views against<br />
those of Unscom," as the inspection<br />
commission is known. "Such problems<br />
are likely to re-emerge in the<br />
future, especially when' true no-notice<br />
inspections are conducted," he said.<br />
Iraqis outnumbered inspectors by<br />
ratios of 5 to I, at times so crowllmg<br />
inspectors that their work was impe<strong>de</strong>d.<br />
With 25 UN vehicles and 50 or<br />
more Iraqi vehicles, •'convoys at times<br />
excee<strong>de</strong>d a kilom<strong>et</strong>er in length. ' ,<br />
Administration officials insisted in<br />
February that, <strong>de</strong>spite new intermediaries<br />
reporting to Mr. Annan, Saddam<br />
had not succee<strong>de</strong>d in un<strong>de</strong>rmining<br />
the inspectors' authority. But Mr.<br />
Duelfer notes that, when Iraqis objected<br />
to inspectors' plans at the presi<strong>de</strong>ntial<br />
sites, they engaged directly 00<br />
with Mr. Annan, not with the inspec- g:<br />
tors .• 'This has important implications ~<br />
for the authority of Unscom and its ;f<br />
chief inspectors," Mr. Duelfer says.<br />
Having had plenty of time to sanitize<br />
the palace sites, Iraqi officials now<br />
t::3<br />
=:<br />
maintain that they have fulfilled their ~<br />
obligations and may not have to l<strong>et</strong> >f<br />
inspectors back in. As Mr. Duelfer ~<br />
wrote, "One major aspect of the agree- Z<br />
ment, involving the continuing natur~ =<br />
of such access, is still unresolved, ~<br />
merely postponed." In<strong>de</strong>ed~ Baghdad ~<br />
last week resumed agitating for a lifting ~<br />
of sanctions and an end to inspections. S~<br />
It is worth recalling that the point<br />
here was not to tour Saddam Hussein' s<br />
palaces but to <strong>de</strong>termine wh<strong>et</strong>her Iraq,<br />
a <strong>de</strong>feated aggressor. had given up ils<br />
weapons of mass <strong>de</strong>struction, as prom- '<br />
~<br />
ised. Toward that goal almost no progress<br />
has been ma<strong>de</strong> in the past six<br />
months, according to chief UN arms<br />
~<br />
=<br />
inspector Richard Butler; in fact, all ~<br />
evi<strong>de</strong>nce points to the contrary. "'"<br />
Soon Iraq, friends and would-be =<br />
commercial parln~rs can ~ ~xpt:cled El<br />
to resume lobbying for a phony cer- ~<br />
tificate of compliance. The last time ~<br />
that happened, America found itself ~<br />
with no appealing options. One won- t:!<br />
<strong>de</strong>rs wh<strong>et</strong>her it is using this interval to ~<br />
put itself in a more advantageous position<br />
next time around.<br />
- TIft: ....ASHfNGTON POST,<br />
107