Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Baszn Özeti
as a predommantly Islamic yet secular country.
Hence the reason why one. will neyer catc~ any
visiting Iranian di~tary, ~ It a ~resldent, pnrne
minister or otherwise, paymg thetr respects to the
founder of secular Turkey, Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk. by visiting.his Mausoleum in~.
If they do, on the other hand, as some medium
level officials have had to do on very rare occasions
for the sake of appeasement, this is purely
due to {>Utical "force majeur." As it is, this particular
pomt has been a contin~g bone of contention
with secular elements m Turkey, whose
powerful media or~ans have on n!ß11erous occasions
blasted at thetr own successive governments
for allowing.such "impudence." It would not,
under nonnaI circumstances, be strange for
Turkish high officialsvisiting Tehran to pay their
respects and even to pray at the graveside of
Ayatollah Khomeini, because the respect this signifies
toward that nation would be understood gen.
eratly as a "diplomatic necessity."
But if today Turkish officials do not visit
Khomeini's ~ve, this is purelyon the basis of
"reciprocity, ' a kind of countering a sign of what
is considered to be "disrespect" in similar fashion.
And when Turkish officials do visit Khomeini's
grave it is a reflection of p:rsonal preference, and
not of official policy, which is as clearly set as the
Iranian refusal to visit Atatürk's
- It is in fact this "revolutionary
Mausoleum ..
commitment" to
their world view by the Iranian side that has on
more occasions than not been at the root of the
problem, according to Turkish analysts. A clear
example of this, they ~1'is the chain of events
that lead to the undignitïed departure in Aprill989
of Manuchehr Mottaki, the Iranian ambassador to
Ankara. This was in fact almost similar to the way
that Ambassador Mohammed Reza Bagheri was
for~ed to leave Ankara just a few weeks ago.
A debate was raging in Turkeyin 1989 as to
whether girls wearing Islamic headscarves should
be allowed into universities. The Higher Education
Authority (YOK) had said no and Mottaki,
although a foreign envoy, had spoken out against
this. Already having attracted attention for his
presence at pro-Islamic Welfare Party (RP) rallies
around the country, it was not long before Turkish
columnists were shouting out "Is this an ambassador
or an Islamic militant."
Eventually Turkey forced Mottaki to leave by a
roundabout way, by recalling Ömer Akbel, its
ambassador to Tehran at the time, for "consultations."
This was a message to Iran to do the same
with its own ambassador but with a view to not
having him return.
It appeared at the time that relations had hit rock
bottom. But just as there is the potential for such
high tension between the two countries, there is
also the almost tacit understanding on both sides
that these ties should still remain "uninterrupted."
This understanding came into play only a few
months after Mottaki left, when Ankara used the
occasion of the death of Ayatollah
"nonnalize" ties.
Khomeini to
Thus it not only sent a state minister to
Ayatollah Khomeini's funeral but got Ambassador
Akbel to accompany
in Tehran.
him with a view to remaining
. Shortly after this Turkey gave the necessary
diplomatic ~ment for Ambassador Mohammed
Reza Baghen to come to Ankara. He remained
Chronology of Turkish.lranian ties
1JD
Part.1 •
APRIL
3- Turkey recalls its
ambassador, Ömer Akbel,
from Tehran for "consultations"
after Iranian
Ambassador Monuchehr
Mottaki Is accused of interfering
in domestic aft'airs by
supporting Turkish women
who want to wear Islamic
headscarves at university.
7- Ambassador Mottaki
departs from Turkey in
response to Ambassador
Akbel's being recalled to
Ankara.
JUNE
5- Turkey decides to send
State Minister Cemil Çiçek
to Iran for the funeral of
Ayatollah Khomeini. It also
decides that Ambassador
Akbel will travel with Çiçek
and stay in Tehran as a first
step to normalization.
OCTOBER
23- New Iranian
President Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani says his
country is eager to improve
its relations with Turkey.
NOVEMBER
17- Ankara agrees to
grant acceptance to new
Iranian Ambassador:
Mubammad Reza Dagberi.
1DQ
MARCH
1- Turkish Prime
MinIster Yddlnm Akbulut,
on an official visit to Iran,
meets with President
Hashemi Rafsanjani.
APRIL
14- Ankara calls in
Ambassador Mohammed
Reza Dagberi and expresses
. its displeasure over anti-
Turkish propaganda and
sentiment in Iranian media.
JUNE
12- The Iranian Embassy
in Ankara denies reports in
a daily paper that the ''turban
(Islamic headscarf)
movement" in eastern
Anatolian universities was
being backed by the Iranian
Consulate in the region.
24- ''The Naked Gun," a
parody film is censored in
Ankara movie theaters after
Iran's omcial protest over a
brief segment in the movie
which lampoons Ayatollah
Rohallah Khomeini.
1.IIJ.
MARCH
10- Respect for the territorial
integrity of states Is
the main focus of talks with
Iranian First Vice-President
Hassan Habibi in Ankara.
OCTOBER
22- A Greek Cypriot ship,
the Cape Meleas, is seized by
Turkeyafter it is discovered
to be carrying rocket
launchers, anti-aircraft
gons, cannons ammunition,
and acid anhydride, none of
which are listed in the bill of
lading. .
26- The Iranian Foreign
Ministry summons the
Turkish ambassador to Iran
to protest the seizing of the
Cape Meleas, saying the
ships consignment belongs to
Iran.
31- Ali Reza Moayyeri, an
envoy of Iranian President
Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjl!ni, meets President
Turgot ozalto ask for the
Cape Maleas's release.
Turkey says it will release
the shipload of anus If
Tehran can prove it owns
them.
DU
MARCH
15-The Iranian Foreign
Ministry denies allegations
Tehran is supporting the
Hizbullah in Turkey.
27