Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basm Ozeti
o p E
ons with the Islamic state
threatened
to turn some screws on Tehran
of such executions from books and articles,
but it's a completely different story when it
happens to you."
The inquiry played out like a detective
novel. Tipped off by federal intelligence
agents, German police fairly quickly
rounded up five of the eight men suspected
of carrying out the murders: one Iranian
and four Lebanese; the three others had
fled Germany. After similar acts of mayhem
in which the hand of Iran's leadership
had left fingerprints, European governments
either balked at following the trail of
evidence or allowed suspects
to go free. Prosecutors
in the Berlin case were made
of sterner stuff. "At the beginning,
the state prosecutors
were told by the government,
'Four dead, five
suspects, that should be
enough,' " says a source close
to the case. It was not
enough. As chief prosecutor
Bruno Jost's investigation
proceeded, German intelligence
agencies opened their
classified files. Then, last autumn,
appeared the anonymous
''Witness C": later
identified as Abolhassan
Mesbahi, 34, a former senior
Iranian agent who had defected.
He implicated the
regime with detailed testimony
on mechanics of the
assassination plot.
What the mounting evidence portrayed,
with a clear trail of weapons supply
and chain of command, was a machinery of
vengeance so elaborate as to seem an obsession
of state. By the time German prosecutors
issued an international arrest warrant
for Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali
Fallahian a year ago, the smooth Fallahian
had already incriminated himselfby boasting
on Iranian TV of Tehran's ability to deal
"decisive blows" against Kurdish opponents
abroad. His remark was recorded a
few weeks before the Mykonos hit.
"The United States doesnot need to be
convinced about Iran's role in supporting
terrorism internationally," declared U.S.
State Department spokesman Nicholas
Burns, who urged Europe to "choke off
trade with Iran." Such a step looked highly
improbable. Germany did more than $1.4
billion worth of business with the Islamic
Republic last year, and has extended it $4.8
billion in loans. Yet the E.U.'s policy of
"critical dialogue" -constructive engagement
by another name-may take on a
sharper edge. "We think that this critical
dialogue should be more critical and a lot
less dialogue," said a U.S. official.
According to Western intelligence
agencies, Iran has for years used its embassy
in Bonn as Terror Central, where hit
squads packaged European operations ordered
by Tehran. Weapons, fake identity
papers and visas for the assassins would arrive
at the embassy by diplomatic pouch. In
the Mykonos case, Fallahian was indicted
for hiring Kazem Darabi, an ex-agent of
the Iranian spy agency VEVAK who ran a
food and clothing store in Berlin. Darabi in
turn recruited Abbas Rhaye~ 30, and three
DEADLY NIGHT OUT: The Mykonos back room after the
shootInp, which were tnK:ked to "highest state levels"
other Lebanese. Darabi and Rhayel, the
accused gunmen, were sentenced to life.
Youssef Amin, who turned state's evidence,
received 11 years and Mohamed
Atris five years, three months. One defendant,
Atallah Ayed, was acquitted.
Based on insiders' testimony of how assassination
planning worked, the court,
without naming names, concluded that the
regime of President Rafsanjani and Iran's
supreme spiritual leader, Ayatullah Ali
Khamenei, approved the murders. What
role Rafsanjani plays exactly in such plotting
is still debated in the West, but at the
least he appears to be hostage to a small yet
powerful clique supported by radical mullahs.
During the Berlin trial, witnesses received
anonymous death threats and warnings
about car accidents involving their
children. Kohl's intelligence adviser,
Bernd Schmidbauer, testified that Fallahian
himself, in a 1993 visit to Bonn, had
urged him to drop the prosecution.
Germany's Foreign Ministry had reason
to brace for possible trouble. Tehran
crowds surrounded the German embassy
late last year when Khamenei's and Rafsanjani's
names were cited in court. They
pelted the embassy with stones, eggs and
tomatoes and, provocatively, displayed
blown-up photos of blindfolded u.s. embassy
hostages during the 1979-81 crisis. A
threat to do the same? Possibly, but Iran
would have few friends left indeed ifooit
went that far. Though Rafsanjani probably
would like to cool the crisis, Iran may find
it hard to control the demons ofhatred that
the regime itself had let loose. -Reporled
by Jordan Bontante/Bonn, Scott Macleod/Paris,
Aleandra Sflglnuryer/Berlln .nd DougIn
W.,Ier/Wahington
TIME, APRIL 21, 1997
269