Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basm Özeti
ing manner: ..... even made interior
minister.") According to information
received from Resurrection Party
(YDP) leader Hasan Celal Güzel, a .
former Prime Ministry undersecretary,
these appointments were made
deliberately and in some cases ministers
implicated in irre~larities were
switched to other mirnsterial positions.
(In the unedited draft Sudi
Türel' s name was mentioned as one
of these ministers).
The 12names
Abdullah çatlI, whose involvement
in the assassination of Topal has been
determined on the basis of substantial
evidence, the casino king' s business
partners Sami Ho~tan and Ali Fevzi
Bir (who were, along with the abovementioned
Special Team members,
detaineçl as suspects following
Topal's äéatti~änd Deputy Sedat
Bucak and his guards all had known
one another for quite some time.
They used to meet frequently. All of
these individuals were familiar with,
and in fact had links with, Agar and
Sabin.
Around the time the Topal murder
was committed, çath, Bucak, Ho~tan,
Bir and Bucak's guards (Mustafa
Altmok, Enver mu, Ömer Kaplan,
Ayhan Çarkm, E. Ersoy and Oguz
Yorulmaz) came together at Bucak's
house in Siverek-Sanhurfa - as they
had done during tIle days which preceded
the murder and again after the
murder. Their having such an intense
round of talks, displaying togetherness
and solidarity around that event
leads to the conclusion that they must
have acted with a specific purpose in
mind. Mehmet Eymür, head ef the
anti-terrorism department of the
National Intelligence Organization
(MtT), who was convinced that
"MlT informer" Tank Ümit had been
abducted and interrogated by çath
and his men, expressed his conviction
to Agar (then director general of
security) and to Sabin (then acting
director of the Special Operations
Department) cîtmg names. Agar.'s
and Sabin's reaction to Eymür's
words indicated they had infoDTIation
about çath's involvement in Umit's
disappearance, and çath' s activities
with the other people named.
Considering all these testimonies
and documents, the persons (Agar
and Bucak) against whom the
Istanbul State Security Court prosecutor'
s office has drawn a report (in
an effort to have their legislative
immunity lifted) and the persons
against whom an indictment has been
dfafted and charges have been
brought have been implicated togeth-
.er in all of these incidents. The commission
believes that this unity and
togetherness was not a coincîdence,
that the policemen in question were
not assigned (to Bucak) only as
guards, that those in question had
been gathered together deliberately
for a specific purpose, that J?efSons
wanted by the police for vanous
crimes (gambling house o~rators,
certain administrators, politicîans and
some policemen who are members of
the Special Team) came together to
form an or~anization to commit
crimes, or Joined an organization of
that type which had already existed.
Elkatm.,: 'PM of the
time responsible'
Chairman of the Susurluk
Co~ssion. Mehmet ElkatmJ~ of the
Welfare Party (RP) held a press' cori-
ference to disclose the commission
report, saying that the "prime minister
of the time" had been responsible
for the gang relationships extending
from Agar to çath.
Saying, 'There should be no state
secret hidden from Parliament,"
Elkatnu~ complained that the com-
~ssion was deni~ access to a significant
amount of information on the
grounds that these were "state
secrets" or "commercîal secrets."
Elkatnu~ said that six of the nine
commission members opposed the
assessments made in the conclusion
portion of the report, that opposition
members were expressing reservations
while two DYP members
approved on the whole of the report.
Elkatnu~ noted that the crimes
committed by the gang had taken
place in 1995, therefore Tansu Çiller
ha,d a po~~cal respons!bility as the
prune InlDIster of the tune. He said
that A~ar, on the other hand, had
shifted""responsibility to the National
Security Council (MGK) as well by
tellin~ the commission, "I did everything
ID the framework of the MGK
decisions."
The commission chairman said
that in the report they referred to the
"political responsibility" issue by
~aying, "Persons who been the sub-
Ject of an MIT rep,ort have been given
ll?e ~gh~s! posts, ' and that these specific
mdivlduals and the particular
posts should be investigated. The RP
di~ not owe an~g ~o anyone, he
SaId. and the COIIl1lllSS10nhad decided
against hearing Deputy Prime
Minis~~r Tansu Çiller and her husband
Ozer Çiller due to being pressed
for time. He said they had done their
duty and that he had a clear conscience.
Gamk / 5-6 avril 1997
M. de Charette rassure la Turquie
Le ministre français des affaires
étrangères, M. Hervé de Charette,
a tenu à assurer les autorités turques,
jeudi lors de sa visite à Ankara,
qu'elles pouvaient trouver en la
France un partisan de leur entrée
dans l'Union européenne. Des engagements
rassurants pour son homologue
turque, Mme Tansu Ciller,
comme pour le président Suleyman
Démirel, à qui il a affirmé que la
"vocation européenne de la Turquie
ne fait aucun doute"; il rectifiait ainsi
le tir après le congrès de l'Union des
chrétiens démocrates européens, le
mois dernier, au cours duquel plusieurs
responsables européens
avaient manifesté leur intention de
renvoyer aux calendes grecques l'adhésion
de la Turquie. Autant dire que
M. de Charette a eu droit à un accueil
nettement plus chaleureux que
quelques jours plus tôt son homologue
allemand, Klaus Kinkel (voir
page 4), dont les conditions posées à
l'entrée de la Turquie en Europe ont
quelque peu refroidi les relations
entre Bonn et Ankara. M. de Charette
a cependant tenu à souligner qu'il
était "temps que les candidats à l'Union
européenne, comme la Turquie, prennent
les mesures qui s'imposent pour
mériter l'adhésion". La Turquie
devrait presenter sa nouvelle demande
d'adhésion en juin à Amsterdam,
mais il est peu probable qu'elle ait
réussi d'ici là à se mettre en conformité
avec les normes démocratiques
exigées par les Européens. Du moins
M. de Charette, dans un soucis de
désamorcer les menaces de veto
d'Ankara dans le cadre de l'OTAN, a-
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