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Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Baszn Ozeti yesterday's decision was more seen as a tactic to further stir up the competition among the remaining three. There are also speculations that a linkage has been established between Turkey's delayed nuclear energy plant project and the helicopter project. According to this theory, a winner in the decision to be made on which country's company is selected in the attack helicopter project will not have much chance of winning the nuclear energy plant scheme. A final winner on this scheme has also been delayed several times. Another reason cited for yesterday's announcement failing to make a concrete decision was linked to Ecevit's desire to guarantee President Suleyman Demirel's re-election for the second time. According to sources close to Ecevit, if Demirel's election is not guaranteed, Ecevit believes that the government may resign. In such a case Ecevit would prefer a new government to decide on this highly politicized project. It is expected that a final winner of the project may be decided after Turkey's religious feast on March 24 or April at the latest, according to defense industry sources. PKK Reportedly Worried by Turkey-PUK Rapprochement AI-Zaman IOMarOO by Saman Nuh Translated Text A source close to the Kurdish Workers Party [PKK] yesterday asserted that the meetings held by the Turkish Government and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK] between 2 and 5 March 2000 in Ankara basically dealt with the PKK issue and its presence and activities in northern Iraq. The source said that the security situation in the Kurdistan region, the Turkomans' conditions, and the relations of both Turkey and the PUK with the Kurdistan Democratic Party were also discussed. Both sides have had differences over these issues in the past. The source added that the PUK made several attempts recently to improve its relations with Turkey. It pointed out that it has tried to get close to the Turkoman parties acting under the (Turkey-backed) Turkoman Front. It has given them the necessary help for their operations in the areas under its control and allowed the Front to open a public relations office in Kafri and a cultural center and a radio station in al-Sulaymaniyah during the past few months. The PUK also closed a number of PKK centers in the area, its cultural center, and its newspaper. These steps were taken after the PKK's decision to abandon armed struggle and turn to political action. The source went on to say that officials from Turkey's security and military organs and the Foreign Ministry took part in the talks that revolved around the PKK's activities. From its current stands on the PKK, which are a continuation of its hard-line policy toward Turkey's Kurds, the Turkish side appears ready to give the PUK financial and political help to a certain degree in return for the latter changing its stand on the PKK. The source said that the Turkish Government is continuing its past policy and is trying to liquidate or arrest a number of PKK leaders and figures in Iraq's Kurdistan. It noted that Ankara is also wi11ingto cooperate with any party that will help it achieve this objective, which it regards as necessary for destroying the PKK's remaining strength. The attention and care accorded the visiting PUK delegation and the series of meetings held in Ankara underline this policy. The source, which asked to remain anonymous, commented on reports that economic and trade issues were the main issues of discussions. He said this is illogical because Turkey does not have borders with the areas under the PUK's control. A large delegation from the PUK led by Kawthar Rasul visited Ankara at the official invitation of the Turkish Government to discuss security and trade issues. The visit was preceded by an improvement in relations between the two sides following a Turkish delegation's visit to al-Sulaymaniyah last month. ************* 31
Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro de la Prensa-Basm Özeti Turkey's Generals Face Ne'U)Kin4of_ . . .Challenger: The .EU By Richard Boudrèaux Lost Angeles Times Service balked at complying, the commanders oréhestrated, a campaign by pro-secular business, labor and women's groupsbacked with threats of armed intervention - that forced Mr. Erbakan to resign . The armed' forces have powers, privileges and obsessions that would be un- ANKARA - At home and in their troubled neighborhood, which includes the Balkans, the Caucasus mountain .range and the. Middle East, the generals of Turkeyare accustomed to getting theirway. In the past three years, they have rid their nation of an Islamist-Ied government, crushed a Kurdish separatist insurgency, dissuaded Greek Cypriots from deploying Russian-made missiles against Turkish planes, forged a defense pact with Israel and begun a shopping spree for tanks and attack helicopters. . Threats to Turkey's security, by their . own assessment, are at the lowest point in decades. Now the commanders of NATO's second-largest conventional, military force are staring uneasily at a most unconventional challenger: the European Union. Europe's leaders have accepted. Turkeyas a candidate for membership in the EU and now expect Turkey' s military to give up the powerful role it has played for 76 years as self-appointed guardian of the republic's internal order. That is a demotion the commanders are clt~arly reluctant to accept. Arguing that Turkey' s elected civilian leaders are often lax in dealing with Kurdish separatists and Islamic' fundamentalists, the military exercises broad constitutional authority to intrude in the governance of this mostly Muslim nation. In view ofTurkey's strategic value, its strongest ally, the United States, has tolerated much of this meddling. Euro- , peans, however, want it stopped. Negotiations over Turkey's entry to the EU are expected to last for years and cover thousands of laws and regulations on i~sues ranging from child labor to the . size of bananas. But of all the changes . the EU is seeking, none would transform Turkey as deeply as the generals' submission to civilian control. That prospect has energized Turkey's beleaguered advocates of democracy and human rights, who contend that the military must surrender its Big Brother role to join the EU. . "There should be a revision of the , entire security doctrine, the deployment and the structure of the armed forces of Turkey, whose territorial integrity can be placed under' European guarantee," Cengiz Candar, a columnist persecuted in the past for challenging the military, wrOte recently in the mass-circulation Istanbul newspaper Sabah. Publicly, the generals say they sup- . port EU membership beç:ause it would , fulfill the secular, European-oriented vi- .sion of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the general who founded the army ànd the TurK- , ish republic on the Ottoman Empire's ruins. More practically, they do not want to be excluded as Europe forms defense organizations independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But only in recent weeks have the generals begun a detailed study of how they might be affected by the EU imperative that aspiring members achieve "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities. " . Signs of irritation and resistance have surfaced in comments by senior officers and in a memo by the general staff to rankand-file units just before the EU voted in December to make Turkey a candidate . The memo focused on two membership conditions often spelled out by European leaders: that Turkey abolish its mil- . itary-dominated National Security Council and that it subordinate the general staff to the civilian Defense Ministry. "These efforts to change the administrative structure of Turkey ," the memo said, "result either from an ignorance of history or, worse, a desire to unjustly attack and weaken the Turkish armed forces." . Turkey has been under direct military rule three times since 1960. Before withdrawing for the third time, in 1983, the generals wrote a constitution enhancing their power to govern from behind the scenes. In the military's view, "practically :e.v~rything in public life is related to nlltional security," said a civilian who :works in the National Security Council' s policy planning center and likens it to a parallel government. "Everything must be seCure." . . .Control of the planning operation 'gives the armed forces the upper hand in decision-ml,lking by the Security Council its~lf, which is made up of the president, four senior cabinet ministers and the five top military commanders. "The military alwayS comes better prepared ,than the . civilians and takes the initiative," said a retired army general, Dogan Gures, who 'is a.former council member. . " Some of the military's initiatives are ultimatums. ,_.In 1997, the commanders used the Security Council's monthly meetings to badger Neemettii1 Erbakan, the nation's fIrst Islamist prime minister, into agreeing to curb MUlllimreligious schools and' foundations. When the government- Presslink Kemal Ataturk, the officerwho founded modern Turkeyafter the fall of the Ottoman Empire. thinkable in the democracies of Europe. They report to the prime minister, not the defense minister - and they once attacked Kurdish rebel bases in Iraq with- . out telling either minister. They take 9 percent of the national budget without a word of debate in Parliament and spend without civilian oversight. They cç>ntrol arms procurement, much of it from defense companies they own, and have extensive holdings in Turkey's automotive, cement, food and chemical industries. Senior officers lobby quietly to maintain laws curbing free expression and encourage prosecutors to open criminal cases against those who challenge the military's views. . A general once demanded that an Istanbul soccer club take disciplinary action against its British coach, who had protested ..the army's conscription of a star player. The club and the coach made a public apology. A Turkish officer's swagger comes with. his training and is sustained by genuine respect from most of this society. From age 14, military school cadets are taught that they are superior to civilians, especially in understanding the national interest. "They teach you to obey the rules of democracy as long as there is stability in the country," said a retired air force lieutenant colonel, Metehan Demir. "But they also teach that if there is instability, you have a special duty to intervene. " T,he anti-militarist sentiment prevalent 10 much of Western Europe is weak in Turkey, where politicians are held in low esteem. But the military was widely criticized for a sluggish search-and-rescue effort after a magnitude 7.4 earthquake last August. . 32
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