Sozialalmanach - Caritas Luxembourg
Sozialalmanach - Caritas Luxembourg Sozialalmanach - Caritas Luxembourg
ecently offered the following prescription for the faltering world economy. First it proposed raising the retirement age and means-testing social security benefits, so as to restrict state spending without hampering growth. Secondly, ‘the rich world’s economies must spur productivity, encourage investment and foster competition. That points to a renewed focus on freeing trade, cutting spending rather than raising taxes and agreeing new financial regulations’. 11 As an admirer of The Economist’s analyses, I am often bewildered by the amazing consistency of its conclusions: almost whatever the problem, the proposed solution is more free trade, lower taxes, faster growth. Yet as the great economic historian Karl Polányi showed 12 , market economics is so far from common sense that the hegemony of the market model rooted on growth is rather unique to the last 200 years. As Polányi argues, in earlier societies the human passions were mainly directed towards non-economic ends, and in many societies the accumulation of goods was (and still is) regarded as anti-social, a failure in reciprocity. (For example the goal of honour, or social status, was acquired by giving, not by accumulating.) Polányi agrees that all societies are limited by economic factors, by the material conditions of their existence. The achievement of survival and sufficiency is always and everywhere a central societal project. But from the nineteenth century onwards, our Western societies have been ‘economic’ in a new and distinctive sense, for they have chosen to base themselves on a motive only rarely acknowledged as valid in the history of human societies, and certainly never before raised to the level of a justification of action and everyday behaviour, namely, gain. This model is culturally specific and is not inevitable: which is not to say that it will be easy to abandon. A contemporary version of Polányi’s fundamental critique was offered by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, in November 2009. He recalls that the words ‘economy’ and ‘economics’ derive from the Greek word for ‘housekeeping’. Yet we are still haunted by the dogma that the economic world, ‘economic realities’, economic motivations and so on are abstracted from the sort of human decisions we usually make and from considerations of how we build a place to live. Dr Williams went on to question the notion of ‘growth’: ‘The ability to produce more and more consumer goods (not to mention financial products) is in itself an entirely mechanical measure of wealth. It sets up the vicious cycle in which it is necessary all the time to create new demand for goods and thus new demands on a limited material environment for energy sources and raw materials. By the hectic inflation of demand it creates personal anxiety and rivalry. By systematically depleting the resources of the planet, 11 ‘New dangers for the world economy’, The Economist, February 13th, 2010, p. 9. 12 Polányi (1944). 281
it systematically destroys the basis for long-term well-being. In a nutshell, it is investing in the wrong things.’ 13 What can be done? The Archbishop cites a report of the UK’s Sustainable Development Commission, Prosperity without growth? 14 , which speaks of a new ‘ecology of investment’, in which the criterion of short-term returns is not the sole deciding factor, and we learn how to invest in infrastructure and public goods and new low-carbon technologies. Can we ‘revisit the concepts of profitability and productivity and put them to better service in pursuit of long-term social goals’? Certain kinds of growth will be acceptable, other kinds rejected. Is it possible to outline certain criteria for ‘good growth’? I believe it is. I wish to argue the fundamental value which judges economic expansion is that of fully human life and development: the deeper human good. This formulation about ‘the deeper human good’ is too vague to indicate what weight any given society ought to attach to economic criteria in general and economic expansion in particular. But it already indicates that as an instrumental good (or evil) expansion cannot be an absolute criterion of anything! That sounds bland: but it implies that where the goal of economic development becomes in, practice absolute, or where business ideology becomes socially and politically dominant (‘What’s good for General Motors is good for America’) the human good is endangered. If economic expansion is always one social goal among others, there are four reasonable implications: – Much depends on which other goals are associated with it. The package ‘economic expansion directed towards social justice’ is different from the package ‘economic expansion plus untrammelled individual liberty’. If a society seeks expansion in order to fund social protection systems better, policymakers will be alert to improve such systems as resources allow. Growth has a good chance of being inclusive. If the goal is expansion plus a minimal welfare apparatus (as under neo-liberalism), expansion will exacerbate poverty – for example as investment in technology displaces workers. – Economic expansion will always produce a mixed crop of good and evil together – some people’s good and others’ evil. Selling arms to a dictatorship encourages violent oppression overseas even as it ‘saves jobs’ (and boosts executive salaries) at home. It is not a pure good. 13 Williams (2009). 14 Jackson (2009); Ed.: see also p. 257). 282
- Page 232 and 233: Des inégalités et la perte du pou
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- Page 246 and 247: Dies ist nicht nur eine Katastrophe
- Page 248 and 249: Was bedeutet ein Wachstum von 4%? D
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- Page 254 and 255: Friedensmissionen freikaufen, genau
- Page 256: wäre dementsprechend nicht gleichb
- Page 259 and 260: sometimes their homes. A spiral of
- Page 261 and 262: And economic resilience really does
- Page 263 and 264: Perhaps the most telling point of a
- Page 265 and 266: Flourishing - within Limits Fixing
- Page 267 and 268: are grouped into three main themes
- Page 269 and 270: and that of others. And somewhere a
- Page 271 and 272: höchst altmodisch mit Platons, Kan
- Page 273 and 274: Für Platon/Aristoteles war der ein
- Page 275 and 276: „Ob der Mensch, in bösem Übermu
- Page 277 and 278: A cliché of the present discussion
- Page 279 and 280: egoism. 5 The ‘real economy’ of
- Page 281: usiness collapsed and the wife lost
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- Page 288: 3. Teil Die soziale Entwicklung Lux
- Page 291 and 292: Toutes les données illustrées dan
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- Page 295 and 296: 5) Taux de risque de pauvreté mon
- Page 297 and 298: 9) Taux de risque de pauvreté mon
- Page 299 and 300: 12) Coefficient de Gini dans l’UE
- Page 301 and 302: % 12 16) Taux de chômage dans l’
- Page 303 and 304: 20) Évolution du taux de chômage
- Page 305 and 306: 24) Jeunes ayant quitté prématur
- Page 307 and 308: Autorenverzeichnis Serge Allegrezza
- Page 309 and 310: Sozialalmanach 2007 Schwerpunkt: So
- Page 311: Sozialalmanach 2009 Schwerpunkt: Na
ecently offered the following prescription for the faltering world economy. First it proposed<br />
raising the retirement age and means-testing social security benefits, so as to restrict state<br />
spending without hampering growth. Secondly, ‘the rich world’s economies must spur<br />
productivity, encourage investment and foster competition. That points to a renewed focus<br />
on freeing trade, cutting spending rather than raising taxes and agreeing new financial<br />
regulations’. 11 As an admirer of The Economist’s analyses, I am often bewildered by the<br />
amazing consistency of its conclusions: almost whatever the problem, the proposed solution<br />
is more free trade, lower taxes, faster growth.<br />
Yet as the great economic historian Karl Polányi showed 12 , market economics is so far<br />
from common sense that the hegemony of the market model rooted on growth is rather<br />
unique to the last 200 years. As Polányi argues, in earlier societies the human passions were<br />
mainly directed towards non-economic ends, and in many societies the accumulation of<br />
goods was (and still is) regarded as anti-social, a failure in reciprocity. (For example the<br />
goal of honour, or social status, was acquired by giving, not by accumulating.) Polányi<br />
agrees that all societies are limited by economic factors, by the material conditions of their<br />
existence. The achievement of survival and sufficiency is always and everywhere a central<br />
societal project. But from the nineteenth century onwards, our Western societies have been<br />
‘economic’ in a new and distinctive sense, for they have chosen to base themselves on a<br />
motive only rarely acknowledged as valid in the history of human societies, and certainly<br />
never before raised to the level of a justification of action and everyday behaviour, namely,<br />
gain. This model is culturally specific and is not inevitable: which is not to say that it will<br />
be easy to abandon.<br />
A contemporary version of Polányi’s fundamental critique was offered by the Archbishop<br />
of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, in November 2009. He recalls that the words ‘economy’<br />
and ‘economics’ derive from the Greek word for ‘housekeeping’. Yet we are still haunted by<br />
the dogma that the economic world, ‘economic realities’, economic motivations and so on<br />
are abstracted from the sort of human decisions we usually make and from considerations<br />
of how we build a place to live. Dr Williams went on to question the notion of ‘growth’:<br />
‘The ability to produce more and more consumer goods (not to mention financial products)<br />
is in itself an entirely mechanical measure of wealth. It sets up the vicious cycle in which it<br />
is necessary all the time to create new demand for goods and thus new demands on a limited<br />
material environment for energy sources and raw materials. By the hectic inflation of demand<br />
it creates personal anxiety and rivalry. By systematically depleting the resources of the planet,<br />
11 ‘New dangers for the world economy’, The Economist, February 13th, 2010, p. 9.<br />
12 Polányi (1944).<br />
281