Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
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REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RWISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASlN ÖZETi<br />
Friday, June 3,1994<br />
By Uitur Akmel<br />
, Turkish Daily News<br />
WASHINGTON- American, Turkish, Israeli,<br />
Egyptian, Iranian and Kurdish scholars and journalists<br />
f.OèuSed on Turkey's role in the Middle East at a two-day<br />
conference that started today. The conference, "A<br />
Reluctant Neighbor: Analyzing Turkey' Role in the<br />
Middle East," atten<strong>de</strong>d by an audience of over 350 registered<br />
g1!ests,is'organized by the United States <strong>Institut</strong>e of<br />
Peace. TON editor Ism<strong>et</strong> Ims<strong>et</strong> was among the panelists<br />
that discussed the Kurdish issue.<br />
If there was a single overall result that most of the<br />
speakers and commentators agreed on, it was the fact that<br />
none of the compe6ng and contending nation states in the<br />
Middle East, Turkey melu<strong>de</strong>d, had anything to gain from<br />
a change of the bor<strong>de</strong>rs of its neighbors. A second and<br />
related consensus evolved around the thesis that Turkey<br />
,and its nei2hbors had more reasons and issues to cooperate<br />
for in tIte future than to fight for. Despite the senous<br />
risks such explosive issues as water and the Kurdish<br />
problem poscil for all the countries involved, the panelists<br />
agreed that forces of regional cooperation had a<br />
good chance of winning out in the end.<br />
In the first panel, "The History and Geopolitics of the<br />
Region," SelIm Deringil of Bogaziçi University and<br />
Henri Barkey of Lehigh University portrayed the general<br />
historical frameworK within which Turkey's role has<br />
changed in the region. Paul Wolfowitz, <strong>de</strong>an of the' Paul<br />
H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of<br />
John Hopkins University (and a former un<strong>de</strong>rsecr<strong>et</strong>ary of<br />
<strong>de</strong>fence), in his opening remarks listed the new arguments<br />
for increased strategic importance of Turkey as<br />
follows: 1) The volatile Balkans 2) New conflicts along<br />
the Black Sea and Ukraine. "Some say Crimea is the<br />
location of the next world war. I hope that's not a good<br />
prediction," he ad<strong>de</strong>d. 3) Its role as bridge to Central<br />
Asia. 4) New strategic relations <strong>de</strong>veloped m the Middle<br />
East. Wolfowitz pointed out that Turkey had changed<br />
quite a bit from the days of the inner-oriented policies of<br />
Ataturk. who "refused to take Salonika back, althou~ he<br />
could have, because he said it was not a Turkish city. '<br />
The mo<strong>de</strong>~tor. Al~in Rubenstein, of the .University of<br />
Pennsylvama highlIghted Amencans' Ignorance of<br />
Turkey <strong>de</strong>spite its growing importance in the region.<br />
"Due to the American national Alzheimer' s, interest in<br />
Turkey <strong>de</strong>clined," he lamented. He emphasized that, surroun<strong>de</strong>d<br />
by seven neighbors none of whom was friendly<br />
fA 'f]r~ey, ~ll!i~ rt:Jl}ained a real an4 top ag~ndaitelll<br />
for Tudœy. Selim Denngil ~inted out that history and<br />
the legacy of the Ottoman Empire was still alive for<br />
Turks and continued to shape the nature of many arguments<br />
on Turkey's emerging role in the Middle East. He<br />
recalled-Presi<strong>de</strong>nt Demirel's recent comment that "history<br />
is tugging at our sleeves" as an apt characterization.<br />
Referring to Eric Hobsbawn's concept of the "twili2ht<br />
zone of historical consciousness" that shaped the era tftat<br />
came after it, Deringil <strong>de</strong>fined the period b<strong>et</strong>ween 1880<br />
and the 1900s as the "twilight zone" of the present day<br />
Middle East He went on to comment that the Palestinian<br />
as well as the Kurdish issues were still conditioned in<br />
sorne ways by Abdülhamid D's policies. The parallels he<br />
drew b<strong>et</strong>ween Abdülhamid' s Hamidiye regiments and the<br />
present day village guards in the Southeast drew energized<br />
questions from the audience. The shadow of the<br />
Ottoman regime continues today through the Welfare<br />
Party's refeiral to an "Ottoman style" municipal 'system<br />
as well as Cengiz çandar's referrals to the Ottoman times<br />
in his comments on the possible <strong>de</strong>ployment of Turkish<br />
troops to Bosnia. Even Jhirinovski and government<br />
turkish daily news<br />
spokesman YI1dmm Aktuna use Ottoman imagery to<br />
analyze situations. Aktuna explained the malaise of the<br />
Turkish civil soci<strong>et</strong>y by claiming that the Kemalist<br />
regime dismantled the Empire so fast that "the people did<br />
not ~ave the pro~r ti.me to. mourn the pas.smg of the<br />
Empire. Thus certam CITelesm Turkeyare still nostalgic<br />
for the Ottoman' Empire." Henri Barkey reviewed<br />
Turkey's ne~ regional. role in relation to four dynamics:<br />
1) The Kurdish rebellIon, 2) Water problems with Iraq<br />
and Syria, 3) The new geopolitical balance that emerged<br />
after the Israeli-Arab ~ce agreement, and 4) Some Gulf<br />
War countries' belief ID Turkey as a new force of stability<br />
in the region to balance Iran and Irag.<br />
Barkey saw the Kurdish and water Issues as the major<br />
sources of risk for Turkey in the region. After the sigrnng<br />
of the Sept. 13, 1993 JX:3ceaccord b<strong>et</strong>ween Israel and the<br />
Palestinians, Syria might withdraw its Il divisions from<br />
the Israeli, bor<strong>de</strong>r and re<strong>de</strong>ploy them in the north, giving<br />
Damascus a stronger leverage vis-a-vis Turkey on the<br />
water issue. Barkey said that although from an economic<br />
point of view, Turkey's main commitment is to Europe,<br />
the K~dish and.water issues will conti.nue to pull Turkey<br />
back mto the Middle East and occupy Its resources in the<br />
foreseeable future.<br />
Commentator Heath Lowry of Princ<strong>et</strong>on University<br />
said that '1'urkey has lost the ability to see itself with the<br />
eyes of her neighbors." He said miscommunication, as<br />
well as lack of communication, was the source of common<br />
misconce~tions b<strong>et</strong>ween Turks and Arabs. "For<br />
example," he Said, "although they have shared a common<br />
history of 400 years, Arabs focus on the Young Turk<br />
period and their linguistic Turkification project that lasted<br />
only five years. On the basis of that short period Arabs<br />
e1aim that Turks tried to <strong>de</strong>stroy their language. Turks, in<br />
turn, believe that Arabs stabbed them in the back during<br />
World War I when they nee<strong>de</strong>d the Arabs most against<br />
colonial powers." Another commentator, Ahmed Ab<strong>de</strong>l<br />
Halim of the National Center for Middle East Studies of<br />
Cairo, Egypt, emphasized that Egypt was' willing to<br />
cooperate with Turkey for increased stability in the<br />
region. HaIim, in contrast to Barkey, proposed that a new<br />
alliance for regional peace in the Middle East should<br />
inclu<strong>de</strong>, not only sud} major players as Turkey, Israel,<br />
and Egypt, but Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria as well<br />
for lastmg peace and stability. He ad<strong>de</strong>d that Turkey can<br />
play an important role in arms control issues and help<br />
establish a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.<br />
In the afternoon session' on the KUrdish issue, TON' s<br />
Ism<strong>et</strong> Ims<strong>et</strong> said that although Turkish authorities did not<br />
accept the existence of a "Kurdish problem," Kurds in<br />
TurKey have now started to say that they are living a<br />
'1'urkish problem" in Turkey. Giving a nutshell history<br />
of the PKK, Ims<strong>et</strong> said that the reason the PKK grew<br />
from 3,000 fighters in 1990 to a force of 10,000 men in<br />
1992 was the <strong>de</strong>cision of Turkey to solve' theproblem<br />
through force. Referring to an imagery used by Presi<strong>de</strong>nt<br />
Demirel, he said: "The boot is now stepping on the serpent.<br />
But how long will it be able to press it down? It is<br />
costing Turkey$? billion a year."<br />
After citing the number of politicians and writers who<br />
went to jail for voicing pro-Kurdish opinions, Ims<strong>et</strong> said,<br />
"The main reason for the fighting and bloodshed is not<br />
the PKK but Ankara's in<strong>de</strong>xing of everything to the<br />
PKK.," which he characterized as a ruthless terror organization<br />
like Sen<strong>de</strong>ro Luminoso of Peru. 'The hard-liners<br />
in Turkey use the. PKK. as an excuse to legitimize the<br />
blocking of all moves that lead to further <strong>de</strong>mocratization,"<br />
he.said.<br />
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