Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
REVUE DE PRESSE~PRESS REVIEW~BERHEVOKAÇAPÊ~RIVISTA STAMPA~DENTRO DE LA PRENSA~BASIN ÖZETi<br />
turlcish daily news Saturday, July 2, 1994<br />
CSIS panel discusses Operation Provi<strong>de</strong> Comfort<br />
Çandar: III Turkey, civilians have llO natiollal security policy. TlUJt's why they follow the military's lead<br />
Wilkens on human rights: The US Congress is g<strong>et</strong>ting l1wre skeptical of Tw'key 'sjustification for fighting terrorism<br />
By ugur Akmel<br />
Turkish Daily News<br />
WASHINGTON. In a panel organized<br />
by the Center for Strategic and International<br />
Studies (CSIS) in Washington on June 30,<br />
the panelists Cengiz Candar (columnist for<br />
daily Sabah), Ellen Laipson (U.S. National<br />
Security Council), and Katherine Wilkens<br />
(U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee)<br />
discussed the implications of Operation<br />
Provi<strong>de</strong> Comfort for Turkey, the United<br />
States and northern Iraq.<br />
:rhe pan~l was ,!!o<strong>de</strong>rated b¥ Bülent<br />
Alinza, semar associate and the director of<br />
CSIS's newly inaugurated Turkish Studies<br />
section. Foreign Ministry Un<strong>de</strong>rsecr<strong>et</strong>ary<br />
Ambassador Oz<strong>de</strong>m Sanberk was once a<br />
guest of the Turkish Studies program.<br />
The panel that focused on Candar' s<br />
expert testimony emphasized the problematic<br />
nature of the contentious support Turkey<br />
has given to Operation Provi<strong>de</strong> Comfort<br />
(OPe).<br />
Wilkens' testimony reflected another<br />
view, that of the U.S. Congress. She ma<strong>de</strong> it<br />
clear that the United States was not as<br />
equivocal in its support for OPC, but that<br />
Congress <strong>de</strong>-linked the importance of OPe<br />
from U.S. policy vis-a-vis Turkey's human<br />
rights records, i.e. the Congress did not feel<br />
.like keeping silent in the face of certain<br />
recent <strong>de</strong>velopments in Turkey just because<br />
it also wanted to solicit Turkish support to<br />
keep OPe going.<br />
Laipson similarly voiced the administration's<br />
strong and unproblematic support for<br />
the OPe and said it continued to be a strong<br />
<strong>de</strong>terrent against Saddam Hussein.<br />
The panel was atten<strong>de</strong>d by an invited<br />
group of journalists, public relations specialists,<br />
scholars, representatives of the<br />
Kurdish Democratic Party, the Patriotic<br />
Union of Kurdistan, the U.S. State<br />
Department, the National Intelligence<br />
Council and various <strong>de</strong>fense firms. Also<br />
among the select audience were representatives<br />
of two Japanese banks: Bank of<br />
Tokyo, and Sumitomo.<br />
In his informative presentation, Candar<br />
outlined the history of OPe. As a previous<br />
consultant to the late Turkish Presi<strong>de</strong>nt<br />
Turgut Özal, Candar said that what had<br />
started back in the spring of 1991 as a tern:<br />
porary ad hoc measure to help the Ira91<br />
refugees escaping from Saddam Hussein s<br />
onslaught had been transformed into a permanent<br />
fixture of the local geopolitical<br />
scene.<br />
His overall message was that today in<br />
Turkey there were many people, including<br />
many industrialists and die speaker of the<br />
TurkIsh Parliament himself, who recognized<br />
the need to change the approach to the<br />
region and the Kurdish problem, and to create<br />
a truly mu~ticultura1-<strong>de</strong>mocratic soci<strong>et</strong>y.<br />
But there was such a popular psychoSIS<br />
about the assumed plots directed at<br />
Turkey's territorial integrity that such solutions<br />
still could not be Drought out and discussed<br />
freely.<br />
Particularly in relation to Operation<br />
Provi<strong>de</strong> Comfort, Candar explained that the<br />
US-British-French umbrella spread over the<br />
Kurds rekindled in the Turkish psyche<br />
memories of the Sevres Treaty of 1920<br />
which meant to carve an in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt<br />
Kurdistan out of Turkish territory.<br />
Due to such a paranoia Turks fail to<br />
notice the important fact that today the<br />
PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) does not<br />
want OPe, he said. Thus implying the question:<br />
why should the PIQ( try to g<strong>et</strong> nd of<br />
OPC if It fostered Kurdish autonomy in<br />
northern Iraq?<br />
Candar's characterization of Turkey's<br />
military's role with respect to OPe was one<br />
of the highlights of ilie panel. After spotlighting<br />
the Turkish military's unique historical<br />
mission as the "protectors of the<br />
nation and Turkish temtorial integrity,"<br />
Candar stressed the fact that, in many cases,<br />
the Turkish National Security Council<br />
(NSC) was the real power hol<strong>de</strong>r in<br />
Turkey.<br />
The NSC <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d which policies to follow<br />
concerning national security. Although<br />
civilians comprised one half of the counCil,<br />
in practice soldiers dictated the outcome<br />
alniost every time, he said.<br />
To illustrate the Turkish military's dominance<br />
he mentioned that the top five civilians<br />
in Turkey did not know that OPe did<br />
not keep any ground troops in northern Iraq.<br />
"How can the civilians run the security policy<br />
when they are not aware of even such<br />
el~!ßentary.military facts?" he asked.<br />
When Ozal was alive, he managed to<br />
manipulate the NSC for his own ends and<br />
Turkey benefited from this. But those who<br />
followed him cannot do the same and the<br />
military dominates the <strong>de</strong>cision making<br />
process," Candar said. As another illustration<br />
of his point, he related how Prime<br />
Minister Tansu Çiller reneged on her<br />
promise to discuss the SpanIsh Basque<br />
mo<strong>de</strong>l in Turkey as a possible solution to<br />
the Kurdish llroblem, following her consultation<br />
with soldiers at a NSC me<strong>et</strong>ing.<br />
"Part of the paradox is that in Turkey<br />
civilians do not have a national security policy<br />
of their own. So they have to follow the<br />
lead of the only &I:0upthat does have such a<br />
policy, i.e. the military."<br />
NSC ambivalence toward ope<br />
Candar ma<strong>de</strong> two more interesting observations<br />
concerning the situation in Turkey.<br />
The first one concerned the ambivalent<br />
approach of the NSC to Operation Provi<strong>de</strong><br />
Comfort (OPe).<br />
Çandar said that the soldiers did not actually<br />
like OPC because they believed that<br />
what started as a humanitarian assistance<br />
program was fast becoming an umbrella for<br />
the establishment of an in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt<br />
Kurdish state in northern Iraq.<br />
But, on the other hand, OPe had become<br />
such an integral part of U.S.-Turkish relations<br />
in particular and Turkish-Western relation<br />
in general that not renewing it would<br />
certainTy send the wrong signals to the.<br />
West.<br />
So every six months, the NSC grudgingly<br />
pushes for the extension of the operatIOn<br />
while fighting the reasons for its existence<br />
the rest of the time, Candar observed.<br />
The second interesting point Candar<br />
raised was the current lack of a consensus in<br />
Turkey on many fundamental issues. "And<br />
that is good," he ad<strong>de</strong>d. "Because that<br />
shows that we are thinking about these matters<br />
for the fIrst time in the last 70 years. It<br />
means we are making progress toward a<br />
multicultural <strong>de</strong>mocratic soci<strong>et</strong>y."<br />
The columnist for the daily Sabah raised<br />
some eyebrows in the room when he suggested<br />
that Turkey should have "a close,<br />
open-bor<strong>de</strong>r relationship with an<br />
autonomous (Kurdish) regime in northern<br />
Iraq while sovereignty still rests totally<br />
widi Baghdad. In that fashion the temtorial<br />
integrity of Iraq would also be preserved."<br />
But for that to happen "a restructuring of<br />
the Turkish state and a restructuring of<br />
____________________________________________________ ........1<br />
7