Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RIVISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASIN ÖZETi
and breadth of the Southeast, countermeasures to be taken
against the PKK must surely ta~e this fact into ~c~oun~.
First, let's consider PKK desIgns on the admInIstratIve
structure of the region. Gaziantep, Kahrama~~ara~,
Adlyaman Malatya, ElaZlg, and ~anhurfa are wllhln the
areas that the PKK calls the states of '~outheast and G~P.'
Through efficient action, PKK t~rrorlsm co.uld be pu: an
end to in these 'states.' This is not dlfficul~ and.ls a necessl~.
It is also possible to wipe out terrorism In Kars, ;\gn,
Erzurum, Erzincan, and Tunceli, provinces included ln the
self-styled PKK states, Serhat and, Dersim. ~n en~ to
terrorist activity there may necessItate more intensIve,
coordinated, efficient state action, th,ough.
Then there are provinces stuck In between, such as
DiyarbakIr, Bingöl, Mu~, Bitlis, and Van. The PKK prefers
to call them such names as Amed, Middle, and Garzan
states. If proper action is taken against the Serha~ and
Dersim states in the north and the Southwest and GAP m the
west the PKK could be weakened in the said 'in-betwe~n'
state's. To suppress. PKK activity in Botan, those '10between'
regions are of crucia,l importa!lce. ~ey serve. as
bases for security forces. If therr controlls lost, mterventton
"The solution of the problem in
16 provinçesjn the East and
Southeast IS possible. But the
sovereignty of the Turkish state
over the last 70 years in Siirt,
Batman, $trnak, Mardin, and ..
Hakkari has only been a superfIcIal
formality. Purging the locals of
Kurdish nationalism and then
instilling a sense of Turk;s~ ;d~ntity
is !JO easy feat to accomplIsh.
in other states might prove impossible, let alone in Botan.
In order to make better use of them, security forces have to
get rid of PKK activity in Serh~t, Dersim, Southwest, and
GAP states. This could be possIble throug~ I~al .support.
When these regions are won over to the state s sIde, It ~11I ~
possible to come up with an 'antidote' to seceSSIOnIst
violence.
Apart from its militants in the mountains, what
support can the PKK count on in ~he reg~on?
"To give a satisfactory answer to thISquestIon, one has to
'\':,~:\, ..1\:~:f'i.r.tft~'~~lfl~.çg!J~lJtf>,.}ll.
.,' ",.the'areal! calls.Botall'aIJi:J\)',
',segments o(thearea' àre};
cut off (romone.another,'
then, .despite'tlJ,eir.fr~e.dQft!;:'
of action behind the lines,)
ancl,supportl(f!J!,~br9~fl': '
.l~!fl;~~~~~:F~:
in those cOrJtaine.cJ.~,"e.'
,~:.:;}:'ttt:,':;..{;\',i:. 'i;', f.
make a detailed examination of the area consisting of the
provinces of Gaziantep, Kahramanmara~, Adlyaman,
Malatya, and ~anhurfa, where the PKK has proven most
intransigent, unwilling to bend before security forces. As in
other areas in the region, security forces have failed to curb
terrorist activity in these provinces. Mount Nurha1c and
Mount Engizak are PKK strongholds in their self-declared
Southwest state. If their bases hidden away in those
mountains are wiped off the map, the local population will
extend its heartfelt support to the state. That way,
Gaziantep and Kahramanmaras will have been saved from
the terrorist threat, the organization will have lost its ability
to recruit new members from among the locals, and the
contact between the urban and rural cadres of the PKK will
have been disrupted. In this region where the Kurdish
secessionist movement is relatively weak, it is possible to
initiate a strong anti-separatist movement and propagate it
"T , he strategy to be urgently
adopted against the PKK is this:
Since armed conflict strengthens
Kurdish nationalism, it must be
annihilated. Since organized
groups of militants engage in
armed conflict, they must be
denied the chance to organize.
Since (PKKleader) Abdullah 'Apo'
Öca/an keeps the organization
alive, he must be done in."
both in the international arena and inside the country.
The PKK has started an operation from its northern states
to besiege the provinces in the so-called 'in-between'
regions. Forced shutter chl6ures, hunger strikes, ambushes,
arson attacks have become common recently. If such
tactics are spread to Southwest as well, the 'in-between'
area will fall. .
Then that will mean the whole regiori has become a
bigger Botan, the whole Southeast. If this comes off,
security forces deployed in the region will have to merely
protect their official residences, barracks, other official
buildings perhaps. The Southeast will be PKK property if
this region is lost."
What, then, can be done to save the "in-between"
region from possible PKK rule?
"The region must be kept alive until Botan is crippled.
This can be done by wiping out terrorists up north and in the
Southwest state. Thus will the PKK have been contained in
Bolan and its activity in Mardin, Siirt, ~lfI1ak, and Hakkari
curbed. To keep the 'in-between' region under control,
tacticalsuperiority both in cities and rural areas is
compulsory. To effect.tactical superiority in ruraI areas, the
annihilation of PKK groups is an absolute necessity. To
effect such superiority in city centers, preventing the PKK's
from front-line action is a must.This can be done through
efficient intelligence work, sound interrogations and
operations. Another thing ~at must be taken into account.
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's importance for the
organization is gradually increasing. If Apo loses his
footing, this will mean the end of the PKK as well, given the
current conflict between the PKK and the Kurdish
bourgeoise. "
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