Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

By Hayri Birler
The TON previously published an interview wit..l}
Ahmet Cem Ersever, a former major who
tendered his resignation while serving as
commander of the Gendarmerie Intelligence
Unit Command owing to his dissatisfaction with the way
the Turkish Army's fight against the PKK was being
fought. The interview contained his idiosyncratic views on
the organization and- its ties with foreign powers. Now
Ersever offers his opinions as to how the war against the
PKK must be fought.
If it were not for the locals' support for the PKK~
things wouldn't surely be as they are now. How much
backing does the PKK enjoy in areas where it is active?
"In such provinces as Gaziantep, Kahramanmara~,
Adlyarnan, Malatya, Elazlg, and ~anhurfa where Kurds are
the majority, even Kurdish-speaking locals are part of the
Turkish national identity thanks to the fact that they have
gone through a cultural, political, social, and economic
.transformation. So therefore a solution is in the offingin
such areas. It would be too much to say that even a potential
threat of Kurdish secessionism exists there. As long as the
locals there do not feel forsaken by the state, they will not
follow adventurist Kurdish policies. Only faced with
inconsistent state conduct, they will bow before terrorist
activity and might even help it strengthen and spread. In
that case, those that resist it against all odds will have to
leave the region for good."
How do you assess the situation in the East?
"In Tunceli, Erzincan,Erzurum, Kars" and Ago the
picture is a complicated one. Potential Kurdishseparatism
is not that strong, but it is also true that the total eradication
of the traces of past uprisings has not been possible. If the
.state influence in such provincesis kept intact, the PKK
threat is not 'such a big deal. But as PKK terrorist activity is
strong, the danger posed by Kurdish secessionism grows. If
we considerprovinces further s.outh in the region, we fmd
that in Bingöl, Mu~, Bitlis, Van, and Diyarbakir the threat
of Kurdish nationalism is strong and subject to foreign
influence. In case these provinces are kept under strict
control, very good, no problem. They will adapt themselves
to be part and parcel of our national identity -- though
belatedly and in a difficult way. The solution of the problem
is possible with short-term military measures and long'~
term economic,social, and cultural measures."
Would you say the same of five provinces within the
triangle formed by Syria, Iraq, and Iran?
"No. The sovereigntyof the Turkish state over the last 70
years in Siirt, Batman, ~lrnak, Mardin, and Hakkari has.
only been a superficial formality. Nothing like a common
culture, common political and' social goals, nor economic
coordination is possible there. The locals there are under
foreign influence and seem to have opted for a separatist
solution" which has been supported by the example of
(northern Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud) Barzani's
nationalist struggle. Purging the locals of Kurdish
nationalism andtheir subsequent inClusion as part of the
Turkish identity is no easy feat to accomplish. Yet is it not
impossible. If a decent way of life is offered to these people
who are likely to reach a dead end in case PKK terrorism is
eliminated, it will be possible in the long run to suppress
secessionist thought in these provinces."
The area has been hard hitby PKK terrorism. Taking
this into account, along ,what lines would you suggest . '
the fight against the PKK should be fought? ,
."The PKK has named the region comprising ~lrnak,
Hakkari, Siirt; Mardin, Bitlis, and Van the "State of Botan"
and made it into the focal base of separatist guerrilla
46
activity against the, Turkish state which has only a
superficial sovereignty over the area. Up until 1989, it tried
to "free" the region from the state at whatever cost. The
importance of the region stems from its proximity to
northern Iraq and northwest Iran as well as its convenience
for terrorist activity.Passage to northern Iraq and Iran is
very easy from there. Exactly because the border is long
and thus hard to control. Besides, the connivance of those
two .countries at the settlement and training of PKK .
militants in their te rri tory 'supplies the PKK with an.
Retired Major Ahmet Cern E
born in 1950 in Erzurum,
, withinthe boundaries 0
, PKK calls Turkish Kurdis
graduated {rom the Lan
tary Acad 1972 as
he latercomplete and
, training.
Ersever was se
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gion for Il years
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ta the rank
exceiIent opporlÙnity. Despite all that, AbduiIah Öcalan
keeps saying that the moment their secessionist activity is
contained in Botan, the PKK had better surrender en masse.'
Exactly because under such a condition, PKK activity will
have been contained in a small,area and will be branded a
"mere local" struggle. If the PKK is contained in the area
that it calls Botan and segments of the area are cut off,from
one another, then, despite their freedom of action, behind
the lines and support from abroad, internal degeneration
and conflict will surely occur in those contained areas.
Guerrillas in Palestine, El Salvador,Bolivia and Peru and '
northern Iraqi Kurds failed because their activities were
contained in certain regions. The PKK became aware of
this in 1990 and gave up on the idea of "liberating" Botan,
.apparently thinking that such a policy was irrational arid
posed a great danger to the future of the organization', They
realized that it would have been a tactical mistake which
would have had terrible consequences had it not been-given '
up." ' , '
But then how to contain the PKK in Botan?
"Since the PKK bases its existence on the survival of the
region it calls "Botan" and thinks that its survival is possible
only if terrorist activity is rampant throughout the length