REVUE DE PRESSE, PRESS REVIEW,BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ,RlVISTA STAMPA,DENTRO DE LA PRENSA,E.\SIN ÖZETi .IS AUGUST 1993 TURKISH DAILY NEWS ON SUNDAY Ahm<strong>et</strong> Cem Ersever.' PKK finished if contained in Botan \~~;.;,If the, PKK is contained in the ;;i~:i;. area it calls Botan and segments of the area are cut off from one another, then, <strong>de</strong>spite their freedom of action behind the lines and support from abroad, internal <strong>de</strong>generation and conflict will surely occur in those contained areas. O Here are the m<strong>et</strong>hods to fight the PKK: An organization of professionals must be s<strong>et</strong> up, an organization which is able to <strong>de</strong>al with terrorism, which enjoys requisite legal powers, and which has authority to . conduct operations and engag in intelligence work internally and internationally. Furthermore, 1t must be able to drag before the judge those chiefs who manipulate and or<strong>de</strong>r terrorists from abroad. 45
By Hayri Birler The TON previously published an interview wit..l} Ahm<strong>et</strong> Cem Ersever, a former major who ten<strong>de</strong>red his resignation while serving as comman<strong>de</strong>r of the Gendarmerie Intelligence Unit Command owing to his dissatisfaction with the way the Turkish Army's fight against the PKK was being fought. The interview contained his idiosyncratic views on the organization and- its ties with foreign powers. Now Ersever offers his opinions as to how the war against the PKK must be fought. If it were not for the locals' support for the PKK~ things wouldn't surely be as they are now. How much backing does the PKK enjoy in areas where it is active? "In such provinces as Gaziantep, Kahramanmara~, Adlyarnan, Malatya, Elazlg, and ~anhurfa where Kurds are the majority, even Kurdish-speaking locals are part of the Turkish national i<strong>de</strong>ntity thanks to the fact that they have gone through a cultural, political, social, and economic .transformation. So therefore a solution is in the offingin such areas. It would be too much to say that even a potential threat of Kurdish secessionism exists there. As long as the locals there do not feel forsaken by the state, they will not follow adventurist Kurdish policies. Only faced with inconsistent state conduct, they will bow before terrorist activity and might even help it strengthen and spread. In that case, those that resist it against all odds will have to leave the region for good." How do you assess the situation in the East? "In Tunceli, Erzincan,Erzurum, Kars" and Ago the picture is a complicated one. Potential Kurdishseparatism is not that strong, but it is also true that the total eradication of the traces of past uprisings has not been possible. If the .state influence in such provincesis kept intact, the PKK threat is not 'such a big <strong>de</strong>al. But as PKK terrorist activity is strong, the danger posed by Kurdish secessionism grows. If we consi<strong>de</strong>rprovinces further s.outh in the region, we fmd that in Bingöl, Mu~, Bitlis, Van, and Diyarbakir the threat of Kurdish nationalism is strong and subject to foreign influence. In case these provinces are kept un<strong>de</strong>r strict control, very good, no problem. They will adapt themselves to be part and parcel of our national i<strong>de</strong>ntity -- though belatedly and in a difficult way. The solution of the problem is possible with short-term military measures and long'~ term economic,social, and cultural measures." Would you say the same of five provinces within the triangle formed by Syria, Iraq, and Iran? "No. The sovereigntyof the Turkish state over the last 70 years in Siirt, Batman, ~lrnak, Mardin, and Hakkari has. only been a superficial formality. Nothing like a common culture, common political and' social goals, nor economic coordination is possible there. The locals there are un<strong>de</strong>r foreign influence and seem to have opted for a separatist solution" which has been supported by the example of (northern Iraqi Kurdish lea<strong>de</strong>r Masoud) Barzani's nationalist struggle. Purging the locals of Kurdish nationalism andtheir subsequent inClusion as part of the Turkish i<strong>de</strong>ntity is no easy feat to accomplish. Y<strong>et</strong> is it not impossible. If a <strong>de</strong>cent way of life is offered to these people who are likely to reach a <strong>de</strong>ad end in case PKK terrorism is eliminated, it will be possible in the long run to suppress secessionist thought in these provinces." The area has been hard hitby PKK terrorism. Taking this into account, along ,what lines would you suggest . ' the fight against the PKK should be fought? , ."The PKK has named the region comprising ~lrnak, Hakkari, Siirt; Mardin, Bitlis, and Van the "State of Botan" and ma<strong>de</strong> it into the focal base of separatist guerrilla 46 activity against the, Turkish state which has only a superficial sovereignty over the area. Up until 1989, it tried to "free" the region from the state at whatever cost. The importance of the region stems from its proximity to northern Iraq and northwest Iran as well as its convenience for terrorist activity.Passage to northern Iraq and Iran is very easy from there. Exactly because the bor<strong>de</strong>r is long and thus hard to control. Besi<strong>de</strong>s, the connivance of those two .countries at the s<strong>et</strong>tlement and training of PKK . militants in their te rri tory 'supplies the PKK with an. R<strong>et</strong>ired Major Ahm<strong>et</strong> Cern E born in 1950 in Erzurum, , withinthe boundaries 0 , PKK calls Turkish Kurdis graduated {rom the Lan tary Acad 1972 as he latercompl<strong>et</strong>e and , training. Ersever was se a gendarmerie ca gion for Il years active role . the terra tan War: neere darm Unit liGen E ratio yed mu" H Turk in th Iraq, stat the was rie Inte on he of lieu everwas province hat the .Having esMiliutenant, armerie' hile still the neingan against Kurdis- , hepiothe Gen~ nti-Terror he name mand." 'tary op<strong>et</strong>heplaunsolved. dinating hmergas , northern that the t against, 'on, Ersever Gendarme- ' hestayed ta the rank exceiIent opporlÙnity. Despite all that, AbduiIah Öcalan keeps saying that the moment their secessionist activity is contained in Botan, the PKK had b<strong>et</strong>ter surren<strong>de</strong>r en masse.' Exactly because un<strong>de</strong>r such a condition, PKK activity will have been contained in a small,area and will be bran<strong>de</strong>d a "mere local" struggle. If the PKK is contained in the area that it calls Botan and segments of the area are cut off,from one another, then, <strong>de</strong>spite their freedom of action, behind the lines and support from abroad, internal <strong>de</strong>generation and conflict will surely occur in those contained areas. Guerrillas in Palestine, El Salvador,Bolivia and Peru and ' northern Iraqi Kurds failed because their activities were contained in certain regions. The PKK became aware of this in 1990 and gave up on the i<strong>de</strong>a of "liberating" Botan, .apparently thinking that such a policy was irrational arid posed a great danger to the future of the organization', They realized that it would have been a tactical mistake which would have had terrible consequences had it not been-given ' up." ' , ' But then how to contain the PKK in Botan? "Since the PKK bases its existence on the survival of the region it calls "Botan" and thinks that its survival is possible only if terrorist activity is rampant throughout the length
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