30.06.2013 Views

Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RWISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASlN ÖZETi<br />

4 Turkish Probe Augu,t .3. 1993<br />

and, as an officer recently put it to Turkish Probe,<br />

.operate as if they are acting in enemy territory .•<br />

In neighboring Iraq, where the world witnessed a<br />

U.S.-tolerated Kurdish uprising, such policies failed<br />

to work. A magnified reflection of almost all military<br />

tactics now in practice in Turkey was observed.<br />

The final stage of that campaign was the use of chemical<br />

weapons, directly on the people. People who,<br />

by then, had fully backed the peshmargas. The PKK<br />

lea<strong>de</strong>rship believes that Ankara's current campaign<br />

is fully based on the assumption that the organization<br />

cannot survive the winter. All operations, says<br />

the PKK, aim at encircling the mountain units, cutting<br />

all their logistic and personnel supply routes and<br />

starving the militants out during the winter months.<br />

As for the recent campaign which has been targ<strong>et</strong>ing<br />

civilian s<strong>et</strong>tlements, they believe this has various<br />

aims.<br />

The first and known one is the evacuation of villages<br />

which have either supported the militants or<br />

which are in a position to do so in the future. This<br />

inclu<strong>de</strong>s villages known to hold militia, which are<br />

currently un<strong>de</strong>r a compl<strong>et</strong>ely different organizational<br />

structure than the popular army, ARGK or the popular<br />

front, ERNK.<br />

Despite the un<strong>et</strong>hical nature of such operations<br />

(i.e. raiding villages, evacuating the population and<br />

burning down their houses), ARGK Military Council<br />

Chairman and PKK Central Committee member Cemil<br />

BaYlk agrees that this will --to an extent-- make<br />

life difficult for his mountain units, referred to normally<br />

as "Sava~çl" or fighters.<br />

"But,. he adds, "they are so tough that they can live<br />

even without supplies, eating what the mountains<br />

have to offer and drinking melted snow in place of<br />

water."<br />

Sait, a 25-year-old Kurd now based in Lebanon, is<br />

but one of the living examples of BaYlk's argument.<br />

Two years ago, Sait was hit in the head by shrapnel<br />

when Turkish helicopters opened rock<strong>et</strong> fire on his<br />

group on Mt. Cudi. Thinking he was <strong>de</strong>ad, his comra<strong>de</strong>s<br />

drew Sait into the tunnels, hid him un<strong>de</strong>r 4<br />

m<strong>et</strong>ers of snow, and escaped. They only r<strong>et</strong>urned<br />

four days later, to find him alive but with frostbite<br />

which cost him six toes. He still walks with a rock<strong>et</strong><br />

piece in his skull and dreams of going back to the<br />

mountains.<br />

To seriously believe that the PKK can be starved<br />

out is escaping from realities. Over the years, the<br />

children of the Southeast have melted into the nature<br />

of the mountains and become part of them.<br />

During the winter, militants live in makeshift plastic<br />

tents or in un<strong>de</strong>rground tunnels carved into the<br />

snow. They know the way to survive, as Sait has<br />

done.<br />

The PKK now suspects that the campaign on villages<br />

may have more to it than what me<strong>et</strong>s the eye.<br />

According to Bayik, "the military must know that<br />

they are recruiting for us. They are not so ignorant.<br />

This means they have a master plan ... A very dangerous<br />

plan."<br />

Even if the evacuation of villagers does hin<strong>de</strong>r<br />

PKK logistics, it also sends plenty of people up to<br />

the mountains. Once a village is rai<strong>de</strong>d, a la American<br />

vs. Vi<strong>et</strong>cong style, most of the youngsters flee<br />

to the mountains. From sympathizers (or supporters)<br />

they turn into active fighters. And, after some<br />

training, perhaps even into ARGK or PKK cadres.<br />

What happens to the rest may actually be more<br />

important. According to local sources, the population<br />

in towns and cities is soaring.<br />

The city population of Diyarbakir alone has gone<br />

up by about threefold, reaching 900,000. Most of<br />

the newcomers are regar<strong>de</strong>d as a potential threat<br />

by terrorism experts. Thrown out of their villages<br />

and with nowhere else to go, it is but natural for<br />

them to feel enmity to the system. In the words of<br />

senior PKK lea<strong>de</strong>rs, this is exactly what the campaign<br />

may be after. Perhaps, this is the essence of the<br />

new Turkish policy: To create friends and foes, forcing<br />

the latter to surface. To draw a <strong>de</strong>finite line b<strong>et</strong>ween<br />

the two groups without leaving anyone "in the<br />

middle." To force as many as pOSSible into enemy<br />

lines and <strong>de</strong>al with them en masse. And in doing<br />

15

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!