Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RWISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASlN ÖZETi<br />
4 Turkish Probe Augu,t .3. 1993<br />
and, as an officer recently put it to Turkish Probe,<br />
.operate as if they are acting in enemy territory .•<br />
In neighboring Iraq, where the world witnessed a<br />
U.S.-tolerated Kurdish uprising, such policies failed<br />
to work. A magnified reflection of almost all military<br />
tactics now in practice in Turkey was observed.<br />
The final stage of that campaign was the use of chemical<br />
weapons, directly on the people. People who,<br />
by then, had fully backed the peshmargas. The PKK<br />
lea<strong>de</strong>rship believes that Ankara's current campaign<br />
is fully based on the assumption that the organization<br />
cannot survive the winter. All operations, says<br />
the PKK, aim at encircling the mountain units, cutting<br />
all their logistic and personnel supply routes and<br />
starving the militants out during the winter months.<br />
As for the recent campaign which has been targ<strong>et</strong>ing<br />
civilian s<strong>et</strong>tlements, they believe this has various<br />
aims.<br />
The first and known one is the evacuation of villages<br />
which have either supported the militants or<br />
which are in a position to do so in the future. This<br />
inclu<strong>de</strong>s villages known to hold militia, which are<br />
currently un<strong>de</strong>r a compl<strong>et</strong>ely different organizational<br />
structure than the popular army, ARGK or the popular<br />
front, ERNK.<br />
Despite the un<strong>et</strong>hical nature of such operations<br />
(i.e. raiding villages, evacuating the population and<br />
burning down their houses), ARGK Military Council<br />
Chairman and PKK Central Committee member Cemil<br />
BaYlk agrees that this will --to an extent-- make<br />
life difficult for his mountain units, referred to normally<br />
as "Sava~çl" or fighters.<br />
"But,. he adds, "they are so tough that they can live<br />
even without supplies, eating what the mountains<br />
have to offer and drinking melted snow in place of<br />
water."<br />
Sait, a 25-year-old Kurd now based in Lebanon, is<br />
but one of the living examples of BaYlk's argument.<br />
Two years ago, Sait was hit in the head by shrapnel<br />
when Turkish helicopters opened rock<strong>et</strong> fire on his<br />
group on Mt. Cudi. Thinking he was <strong>de</strong>ad, his comra<strong>de</strong>s<br />
drew Sait into the tunnels, hid him un<strong>de</strong>r 4<br />
m<strong>et</strong>ers of snow, and escaped. They only r<strong>et</strong>urned<br />
four days later, to find him alive but with frostbite<br />
which cost him six toes. He still walks with a rock<strong>et</strong><br />
piece in his skull and dreams of going back to the<br />
mountains.<br />
To seriously believe that the PKK can be starved<br />
out is escaping from realities. Over the years, the<br />
children of the Southeast have melted into the nature<br />
of the mountains and become part of them.<br />
During the winter, militants live in makeshift plastic<br />
tents or in un<strong>de</strong>rground tunnels carved into the<br />
snow. They know the way to survive, as Sait has<br />
done.<br />
The PKK now suspects that the campaign on villages<br />
may have more to it than what me<strong>et</strong>s the eye.<br />
According to Bayik, "the military must know that<br />
they are recruiting for us. They are not so ignorant.<br />
This means they have a master plan ... A very dangerous<br />
plan."<br />
Even if the evacuation of villagers does hin<strong>de</strong>r<br />
PKK logistics, it also sends plenty of people up to<br />
the mountains. Once a village is rai<strong>de</strong>d, a la American<br />
vs. Vi<strong>et</strong>cong style, most of the youngsters flee<br />
to the mountains. From sympathizers (or supporters)<br />
they turn into active fighters. And, after some<br />
training, perhaps even into ARGK or PKK cadres.<br />
What happens to the rest may actually be more<br />
important. According to local sources, the population<br />
in towns and cities is soaring.<br />
The city population of Diyarbakir alone has gone<br />
up by about threefold, reaching 900,000. Most of<br />
the newcomers are regar<strong>de</strong>d as a potential threat<br />
by terrorism experts. Thrown out of their villages<br />
and with nowhere else to go, it is but natural for<br />
them to feel enmity to the system. In the words of<br />
senior PKK lea<strong>de</strong>rs, this is exactly what the campaign<br />
may be after. Perhaps, this is the essence of the<br />
new Turkish policy: To create friends and foes, forcing<br />
the latter to surface. To draw a <strong>de</strong>finite line b<strong>et</strong>ween<br />
the two groups without leaving anyone "in the<br />
middle." To force as many as pOSSible into enemy<br />
lines and <strong>de</strong>al with them en masse. And in doing<br />
15