Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RIVISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASIN ÖZETi
turkish daily news / September 7, 1993
Kurdish Hezbollah?
- as common meeting grounds for
leaders and followers of the group.
Another books hop' in Silvan, the
• Ikra, has been identIfied as a center
for communications, while the Silvan
karate school, the former Tekel
neighborhood, the Feridun and Cami
(mosque) districts are said to be populated
by Islamic movement followers.
In three separate villages near the
village of Yolac (Susa), armed
Muslim activists reportedly' remain
on guard duty all mght whIle in the
day, new recrqits are trained in military
techniques.
In his recent statements to the daily
Cumhuriyet, a leading Hezbollah
militant from Batman declared earlier
this year that they were at war with
the Turkish Republic as much as with
the PKK, but agreed that Turkey was
tolerating this organization because
"it is the only solution to the PKK."
Bound by laws and international
attention to human rights, he implied,
the state security forces could not be
effective against the separatists,
whereas his organization had no limitations
and could deal with the terrorists
in the language they understand.,
Silvan locals have argued that
there were several reasons explaining
why the Hezbollah flourished in
Batman, and their own home town,
but cite at top the political momentum
of the overall secessionist movement
Batman is a crucial center, owing
to its economic value, which stems
from the petroleum refineries there.
Silvan has, since the 1920s, been an
~PO!'lant c.e~ter for Turkish politics,
WIth Its upnsmgs.
In 1992, most of those killed by
alleged Hezbollah activists in these
towns ~eportydly had reçords ..yith ~e
police. Sources say even Sll\an s
Hezbollah arrived from Batman.
Most of the Southeastern murderers,
aged between 14 and 17, are
locally trained.
There were reports in the Turkish
press last week that some of their
military training was even given at
police head~uarters, wllh the
Diyarbakir commg heading the list.
Alleged police mvolvement in this
fonnalton has been talked about for
years, but never even once became a
subject of investigation.
Experts believe everything actually
started in the second half of 1991,
when Turkey's Interior Ministry and
the police forces were engulfed in a
major reshuffle.
Replacing outgoina Interior
Minister Abdülkadir Aksu - who
resigned after the June 16 general
congress of then-ruling ANAP -
Mustafa Kalemli launched a brave
campaign to purge a large and influential
group of Islamic fundamentalists
who had nearly taken over the
whole police force body.
The records of dozens of police
officers based in the central and western
parts of the country were evaluated
with scrutiny by the new minister,
and those suspected of extreme
Islamic tendencIes were appointed in
groups to the eastern and southeastern
regions of Turkey, a sort of
Turkish Siberia.
Although then-Police Chief Ünal
Erkan denied reports that the sudden
reshuffling was politically motivated,
sources wIthin the admimstration and
close to the National Intelligence
Organization (MIT) said the opposite.
According to them, the changes
were necessary to clean up the ministry's
name as well as the security
forces, which by then had started to
gain a bad reputation
Under the management of Aksu, a
practicing Muslim and reportedly a
member of an Islamic sect, there was
a general inclination towards "Saudi
Islamism" within the ministrr and
even pro-Iraniim Islamism withm the
force. Fundamentalist groups were
engulfed in efforts to take over the
police intelligence organization as
well as the personnel department,
where they could be most effective.
Moreover, there were serious
claims that police academy graduates
were selected with scrutiny by these
circles and only graduates with
strong religious beliefs were appointed
to Important positions.
Thus, one of the firs.! things the
new administra.tion did was to purge
the directors of the police intelligence
and personnel units along with the
chief of the academy.
In all, about two dozen senior
police officials were reassigned
Immediately after Kalemli was
named the new minister and their
deputies and supporters within the
force soon followed, leaving crucial
seats to their successors. In the words
of one po.lice officer questioned by
the TDN on the issue at that time,
"All we wanted to do was to worle, to
work without political interference
and pressure."
Thus, the Kalemli-Erkan duo had
offered the conditions. "In the past
we had no alternative but to act like
staunch Muslims. We wénl to prayers
on Fridays and were aware that they
were keeping records on those who
were not as religious," said another,
indicating also how dangerous the
situation was. In the police intelligence
unit before the purge, senior
officials could be spotted walking
along the corridors with prayer mats
under their arms at prayer times, and
throughout the General Directorate, it
had become a custom to attend
Friday prayers en masse. .
"Some would .even leave their
doors open in the office so that others
could see they were praying," an official
said. ThIs pro-Islamic surge also
had an impactback at home where
many seDlar officials apparently
asked their wives and daujahters to
cover their heads or wear slamicstyle
headgear. In practice, although
everyone knew about it, nothing
could be done to prevent the socalled
"fundamentalist infiltration"
while Aksu was in power. Most 'officials
preferred only to turn their
backs or tolerate what was happenirig
in this secular republic of Turlœy.
Even after the-then MIT chief
openly warned the Cabinet of what
was goin~ on, little action was taken.
The tOlerance witnessed in the fall
of 1991 seriously hindered Turkey's
national security intèrests of that
time, but the solution introduced with
the reshuffle under Kalemli may have
had a more fatal affect.
In the midst of the Islamization of
the police force in major cities, what
went nnnoticed in the country's
Southeast; where a separatist campaign
claimed new lives every day,
was the low-key organizational activities
of a different Islamic ~roup. In
the cities, pro-Islamic terronsts could
easily gun down Turkish intellectuals
orjournalists and-get away with their
cnm~s
Secular police chiefs could openly
~omplain that they were instructed by
"top-level offiCiais" to-keep the~r
heaôs low and not to pursue mvest!gations
into crimes comm~tted by
radical Muslim groups.
When, however, fundameqtal!st
elements were cleansed from major
positions in the cities. they were
either appointed to passive jobs or to
the Soutlieast.
And, amid those appointments,
specifically to the troubled Southeast
region; the unnoticed organizational
effort of a group of radical Muslims
took a violent turn.
After the 1991 security purge and
more specifically after the fall of that
year - when the newly appointed
officers had taken their seats and settled
down - the fundamentalist
movement in the region claimed its
first life. '
Under the name first of Hezbollah,
a wave of bombings struck Batman, a
refinery city heavIly affected by the
security purge, and at least 10 places
were blown up.
"Hez,bollah" activities, äctually
carried out by a splinter group report-
. edly led by Huseyin Velioglu, soon
spread into major settlements
tfuoughout the region.
Bomb attacks were followed with
assassinations.
Using mainly 9 mm pistols,
"Hezbollah" assailants killed their
victims with a singlebûlIet in thé
head. People were abducted from
their homes, extensively tortured and
executed~ Villages known to have
connections or to sympathize with
the separatists were raided and completely
burned down. And in the period
from October 1991 to June f992:
'the so-called Hezbollah took its place
in the region as the second most violent
and ruthless organization - after
the PKK. In the rural areas, where the
PKK battled with so-called
Hezbollah followers in a bid for full
control, the organization headed for
the cities where new security personnel
were taking controL
Soon, the organization flourished.
The fact that after each and every
crime of "religious" origin, officials
failed to come up with any evidence
and failed to catch the culprits, rapidly
changed the picture of the
Hezbollah in the minds of millions of
civilians of Kurdish origin living in
the middle of acontra-guerrilla war.
The amount of immunity this flank
of the Kurdish Hezbollah enjoyed
soon earned it its nickname of
"Hezbol-contra." Reports followed
one another that the organization was
also against the main Hezbollah, and
was at times hired on a contract basis
to carry out murders of pro-Kurdish
individuals who could not bè dealt
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