Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris
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REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RIVISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASIN ÖZETi<br />
turkish daily news / September 7, 1993<br />
Kurdish Hezbollah?<br />
- as common me<strong>et</strong>ing grounds for<br />
lea<strong>de</strong>rs and followers of the group.<br />
Another books hop' in Silvan, the<br />
• Ikra, has been i<strong>de</strong>ntIfied as a center<br />
for communications, while the Silvan<br />
karate school, the former Tekel<br />
neighborhood, the Feridun and Cami<br />
(mosque) districts are said to be populated<br />
by Islamic movement followers.<br />
In three separate villages near the<br />
village of Yolac (Susa), armed<br />
Muslim activists reportedly' remain<br />
on guard duty all mght whIle in the<br />
day, new recrqits are trained in military<br />
techniques.<br />
In his recent statements to the daily<br />
Cumhuriy<strong>et</strong>, a leading Hezbollah<br />
militant from Batman <strong>de</strong>clared earlier<br />
this year that they were at war with<br />
the Turkish Republic as much as with<br />
the PKK, but agreed that Turkey was<br />
tolerating this organization because<br />
"it is the only solution to the PKK."<br />
Bound by laws and international<br />
attention to human rights, he implied,<br />
the state security forces could not be<br />
effective against the separatists,<br />
whereas his organization had no limitations<br />
and could <strong>de</strong>al with the terrorists<br />
in the language they un<strong>de</strong>rstand.,<br />
Silvan locals have argued that<br />
there were several reasons explaining<br />
why the Hezbollah flourished in<br />
Batman, and their own home town,<br />
but cite at top the political momentum<br />
of the overall secessionist movement<br />
Batman is a crucial center, owing<br />
to its economic value, which stems<br />
from the p<strong>et</strong>roleum refineries there.<br />
Silvan has, since the 1920s, been an<br />
~PO!'lant c.e~ter for Turkish politics,<br />
WIth Its upnsmgs.<br />
In 1992, most of those killed by<br />
alleged Hezbollah activists in these<br />
towns ~eportydly had reçords ..yith ~e<br />
police. Sources say even Sll\an s<br />
Hezbollah arrived from Batman.<br />
Most of the Southeastern mur<strong>de</strong>rers,<br />
aged b<strong>et</strong>ween 14 and 17, are<br />
locally trained.<br />
There were reports in the Turkish<br />
press last week that some of their<br />
military training was even given at<br />
police head~uarters, wllh the<br />
Diyarbakir commg heading the list.<br />
Alleged police mvolvement in this<br />
fonnalton has been talked about for<br />
years, but never even once became a<br />
subject of investigation.<br />
Experts believe everything actually<br />
started in the second half of 1991,<br />
when Turkey's Interior Ministry and<br />
the police forces were engulfed in a<br />
major reshuffle.<br />
Replacing outgoina Interior<br />
Minister Abdülkadir Aksu - who<br />
resigned after the June 16 general<br />
congress of then-ruling ANAP -<br />
Mustafa Kalemli launched a brave<br />
campaign to purge a large and influential<br />
group of Islamic fundamentalists<br />
who had nearly taken over the<br />
whole police force body.<br />
The records of dozens of police<br />
officers based in the central and western<br />
parts of the country were evaluated<br />
with scrutiny by the new minister,<br />
and those suspected of extreme<br />
Islamic ten<strong>de</strong>ncIes were appointed in<br />
groups to the eastern and southeastern<br />
regions of Turkey, a sort of<br />
Turkish Siberia.<br />
Although then-Police Chief Ünal<br />
Erkan <strong>de</strong>nied reports that the sud<strong>de</strong>n<br />
reshuffling was politically motivated,<br />
sources wIthin the admimstration and<br />
close to the National Intelligence<br />
Organization (MIT) said the opposite.<br />
According to them, the changes<br />
were necessary to clean up the ministry's<br />
name as well as the security<br />
forces, which by then had started to<br />
gain a bad reputation<br />
Un<strong>de</strong>r the management of Aksu, a<br />
practicing Muslim and reportedly a<br />
member of an Islamic sect, there was<br />
a general inclination towards "Saudi<br />
Islamism" within the ministrr and<br />
even pro-Iraniim Islamism withm the<br />
force. Fundamentalist groups were<br />
engulfed in efforts to take over the<br />
police intelligence organization as<br />
well as the personnel <strong>de</strong>partment,<br />
where they could be most effective.<br />
Moreover, there were serious<br />
claims that police aca<strong>de</strong>my graduates<br />
were selected with scrutiny by these<br />
circles and only graduates with<br />
strong religious beliefs were appointed<br />
to Important positions.<br />
Thus, one of the firs.! things the<br />
new administra.tion did was to purge<br />
the directors of the police intelligence<br />
and personnel units along with the<br />
chief of the aca<strong>de</strong>my.<br />
In all, about two dozen senior<br />
police officials were reassigned<br />
Immediately after Kalemli was<br />
named the new minister and their<br />
<strong>de</strong>puties and supporters within the<br />
force soon followed, leaving crucial<br />
seats to their successors. In the words<br />
of one po.lice officer questioned by<br />
the TDN on the issue at that time,<br />
"All we wanted to do was to worle, to<br />
work without political interference<br />
and pressure."<br />
Thus, the Kalemli-Erkan duo had<br />
offered the conditions. "In the past<br />
we had no alternative but to act like<br />
staunch Muslims. We wénl to prayers<br />
on Fridays and were aware that they<br />
were keeping records on those who<br />
were not as religious," said another,<br />
indicating also how dangerous the<br />
situation was. In the police intelligence<br />
unit before the purge, senior<br />
officials could be spotted walking<br />
along the corridors with prayer mats<br />
un<strong>de</strong>r their arms at prayer times, and<br />
throughout the General Directorate, it<br />
had become a custom to attend<br />
Friday prayers en masse. .<br />
"Some would .even leave their<br />
doors open in the office so that others<br />
could see they were praying," an official<br />
said. ThIs pro-Islamic surge also<br />
had an impactback at home where<br />
many seDlar officials apparently<br />
asked their wives and daujahters to<br />
cover their heads or wear slamicstyle<br />
headgear. In practice, although<br />
everyone knew about it, nothing<br />
could be done to prevent the socalled<br />
"fundamentalist infiltration"<br />
while Aksu was in power. Most 'officials<br />
preferred only to turn their<br />
backs or tolerate what was happenirig<br />
in this secular republic of Turlœy.<br />
Even after the-then MIT chief<br />
openly warned the Cabin<strong>et</strong> of what<br />
was goin~ on, little action was taken.<br />
The tOlerance witnessed in the fall<br />
of 1991 seriously hin<strong>de</strong>red Turkey's<br />
national security intèrests of that<br />
time, but the solution introduced with<br />
the reshuffle un<strong>de</strong>r Kalemli may have<br />
had a more fatal affect.<br />
In the midst of the Islamization of<br />
the police force in major cities, what<br />
went nnnoticed in the country's<br />
Southeast; where a separatist campaign<br />
claimed new lives every day,<br />
was the low-key organizational activities<br />
of a different Islamic ~roup. In<br />
the cities, pro-Islamic terronsts could<br />
easily gun down Turkish intellectuals<br />
orjournalists and-g<strong>et</strong> away with their<br />
cnm~s<br />
Secular police chiefs could openly<br />
~omplain that they were instructed by<br />
"top-level offiCiais" to-keep the~r<br />
heaôs low and not to pursue mvest!gations<br />
into crimes comm~tted by<br />
radical Muslim groups.<br />
When, however, fundameqtal!st<br />
elements were cleansed from major<br />
positions in the cities. they were<br />
either appointed to passive jobs or to<br />
the Soutlieast.<br />
And, amid those appointments,<br />
specifically to the troubled Southeast<br />
region; the unnoticed organizational<br />
effort of a group of radical Muslims<br />
took a violent turn.<br />
After the 1991 security purge and<br />
more specifically after the fall of that<br />
year - when the newly appointed<br />
officers had taken their seats and s<strong>et</strong>tled<br />
down - the fundamentalist<br />
movement in the region claimed its<br />
first life. '<br />
Un<strong>de</strong>r the name first of Hezbollah,<br />
a wave of bombings struck Batman, a<br />
refinery city heavIly affected by the<br />
security purge, and at least 10 places<br />
were blown up.<br />
"Hez,bollah" activities, äctually<br />
carried out by a splinter group report-<br />
. edly led by Huseyin Velioglu, soon<br />
spread into major s<strong>et</strong>tlements<br />
tfuoughout the region.<br />
Bomb attacks were followed with<br />
assassinations.<br />
Using mainly 9 mm pistols,<br />
"Hezbollah" assailants killed their<br />
victims with a singlebûlI<strong>et</strong> in thé<br />
head. People were abducted from<br />
their homes, extensively tortured and<br />
executed~ Villages known to have<br />
connections or to sympathize with<br />
the separatists were rai<strong>de</strong>d and compl<strong>et</strong>ely<br />
burned down. And in the period<br />
from October 1991 to June f992:<br />
'the so-called Hezbollah took its place<br />
in the region as the second most violent<br />
and ruthless organization - after<br />
the PKK. In the rural areas, where the<br />
PKK battled with so-called<br />
Hezbollah followers in a bid for full<br />
control, the organization hea<strong>de</strong>d for<br />
the cities where new security personnel<br />
were taking controL<br />
Soon, the organization flourished.<br />
The fact that after each and every<br />
crime of "religious" origin, officials<br />
failed to come up with any evi<strong>de</strong>nce<br />
and failed to catch the culprits, rapidly<br />
changed the picture of the<br />
Hezbollah in the minds of millions of<br />
civilians of Kurdish origin living in<br />
the middle of acontra-guerrilla war.<br />
The amount of immunity this flank<br />
of the Kurdish Hezbollah enjoyed<br />
soon earned it its nickname of<br />
"Hezbol-contra." Reports followed<br />
one another that the organization was<br />
also against the main Hezbollah, and<br />
was at times hired on a contract basis<br />
to carry out mur<strong>de</strong>rs of pro-Kurdish<br />
individuals who could not bè <strong>de</strong>alt<br />
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