Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RlVISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASIN ÖZET;
4 Turkish Probe August 31, 1993
Kurdish Violence Shifts
to the Northeast
The outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
has been shifting its nine-year old armed
campaign in the southeast of Turkey further
north since late this spring.
To be more precise, the Bingöl attack on May 24
in which more than 30 unarmed soldiers and 5 civilians
were killed can be regarded as a milestone in
that campaign. The attack had brought an end to
the unilateral ceasefire which had been announced
by the PKK leadership in March 1993. The leadership
in Syria had denied any knowledge of the attack
when they first heard, but later had to claim responsibility
for it. The attack had been carried out by the
"Amed" region commander of the PKK, $emdin Saklk,
who is known for his autonomous intentions regarding
the Central Committee of the organization.
Amed region, which covers parts of the provinces
of Diyarbakir, Mu~ and Bingöl, was later supported
by "Dersim," Tunceli, parts of Erzincan, Erzurum
and "Serhat: parts of Erzurum, Kars, I~dlr, AOn,
Van regions. The combined activity started to spread
in an area so as to draw an arch beginning from
Turkey's border with Iran and Armenia at DoOubeyazit,
largely surrounding the Lake Van from its
north then bending south to Diyarbakir.
One characteristic of the region is that it has almost
no physical contact with PKK bases in northern
Iraq. The groups here are believed to have logistical
contact with their bases in Iran and Armenia.
Another characteristic of this region is its rather
mixed demographic structure with respect to
the more homogeneous Kurdish southeast.
A third characteristic of the region is its mixed religious
structure. Kurds, Arabs and Turks living in the
southeast are mostly Sunni Moslems. But in the
arch there are Shiite Azeris, Shiite Turks, Sunni
Turks, Alawite Turks, Alawite Kurds and Sunni
Kurds. Moreover, Erzurum is one of the provinces
in Turkey where Turkish nationalism is strongest.
When all those factors come together, the PKK
factor in the region may turn into ethnic and perhaps
religious conflicts among ordinary people.
That also depends on the attitude of the Turkish
security forces while dealing with the PKK attacks.
Political analysts say that if the Turkish security repeats
its "mistake" in the southeast, such conflicts
may become real. According to the analysts aswell
as some government officials, the way to handle
the problem safely is to differentiate between the
PKK and the ordinary Kurdish citizens.
Some political analysts also draw attention to
another dimension of the new PKK campaign. The
mentioned rp.gionof the armed campaign is on the
possible routes for the Azerbaijan-Turkey crude oil
pipeline project. The PKK's Bingöl attack, in fact coincided
with a technical study by the international
group of companies involved in the project which
was to include field inspections. When combined
with a worker abduction incident in $Irnak the next
day -- which later turned out to be a fake one -- the
western partners of the project had asked for a
postponement. A second attempt was postponed in
. June when the PKK launched a rocket attack on oil
.storage facilities in the eastern province of Batman.
The coincidences lead some analysts to speculate
whether the recent PKK decision to shift its nine-year
old campaign •• in which more than 7,000 people
have been killed -- further north is related to regional
oil politics. They add that the PKK might be acting
in line with the interests of some countries -- or
companies -- who are against or excluded from the
pipeline project. One speculation for that is Armenia.
Does the PKK Have Links With Armenia?:
One high ranking Turkish intelligence officer says it
would be too "naive" to assume that the Armenians,
as traditional and bitter enemies of the Turks, "would
waste an opportunity to help other enemies of
the Turks." Another official says there is little doubt
that there was assistance of some sort, but they
say they are not able to produce solid evidence for
that. Turkish intelligence sources also say that they
are just starting to focus on the Armenia-PKK link.
There are actually unconfirmed reports about
PKK camps in Armenia and military training provided
to PKK militants by the Armenians.
Intelligence sources say the reports claim there
are at least six camps in Armenia: three between
the OkçuoQluand Güllübudak villages in Leninakan
province of Armenia, by the Turkish border; one
three kilometers away from the town of Mazdaian;
one two kilometers from the town of Misis; and one
near the town of Colga. Sources also believe that
the PKK militants are using Zengezor and Markara
regions to cross into Iran and Turkey. The reports
claim that the militants fight on behalf of Armenian
forces in Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan,
both in return for camps and to gain combat experience
against Turkish forces. Lachin region in Azerbaijan
which is under Armenian occupation since
last year is another place claimed to be used by the
PKK under Armenian supervision. Armenia had an
unsuccessful attempt last year to make Kurds establish
a satellite Kurdish state in Lachin. Turkish
press goes as far as to say that Armenians give helicopter
training to PKK militants. Armenian officials
categorically deny any kind of relation with the
PKK. But the Armenian Writers Union does have a
relationship with the secessionist Kurdish organization.
The Union has awarded PKK leader Abdullah
Öcalan -- who lives in the Syrian capital Damascus,
and in Ber Elias in Lebanon from time to time -- an
honorary membership earlier this year. •
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