Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RWISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE LA PRENSA-BASIN ÖZETÎ
78
Turkish Probe August 24, 1993
Gearing Up .For "Operation Iraq?"
Ankara appears to be gearing up for another
cross-border venture into Iraq, possibly to
turn the incident into a military victory to cover
up for policy failures back at home against the
outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
Immediately after the October 1992 operation into
Iraq, which was instigated by a written invitation issued
through an Iraqi Kurdish official in Zakho who was
by then engaged by the Turkish intelligence, the military
announced its great victory. '
According to Turkish officials of that time, great damage
had been inflicted on PKK forces in the area.
and losses of the organization were around 4,000.
For weeks, the victory was highlighted as the end of
the organizatiol1.
Later, however, it was understood that the Iraqi
Kurds were better at giving the true casualty figures
and that Turkish figures had been inflated. PKK losses
throughout the operation were only near 180.
But hundreds of militants had managed to escape into
Syria' and Iran. About 1,500 others were moved
southward into Iraqi kurdistan.
One reason for this outcome was the style of the
operation. The other was the ethics of local Turkish
commanders. First, Turkish troops were "invited" to
Iraq without the knowledge of Iraqi Kurdish leaders,
and their presenceis said to have hindered the Kurdish
Peshmarga operation already launched on the
PKK. Second, Turkey's secret request for a handing
over of all arrested PKK militants so they could be silently
"removed" wal?turned down. T,he Kurds believed
that much would be unethical.
Today, the commanders who once boasted of breaking
the backbone of the PKK in Iraq are arguing
that the organization is back in its camps and carrying
out attacks on Turkey.
They are saying that the Iraqi Kurds allowed the
PKK to move and thus violated a protocol signed in
April between them and Ankara. What they do not
mention is that Ankara itself has failed to meet any of
the 13 items in this secret text. That the Iraqi Kurds
are far weaker than Turkish forces on the border and
that it is the duty of the Turkish forces to protect that
border, more than that of the Kurds.At least, this is
the argument which the Kurdish side has brought up.
According to military figures, the PKK is said to have
about 1,500-2,000 militants in Iraqi Kurdistan and
has carried out at least two recent raids into Turkey
over the border. An attack on a military patrol earlier
this month and a subsequent raid on the Üzümlü
gendarmerie station are cited as examples of this.
Last week, the Gendarmerie command in Ankara delivered
a memorandum to the representatives of Iraqi
Kurdish movements and called for immediate measures
to be implemented against the PKK. "Or else,"
warned the note, "relations will become very negative...
We will have to bomb the territory."
For years, Turkish bombings in northern Iraq have
hurt civilians more than the PKK, and appear to have
been initiated only to draw Iraqi Kurdish hatred towards
this organization. This time, however, the
Kurds are wary. Not only do they claim that the
2,000 militants figure is exaggerated and the real
number of PKK fighters in their territory is no more
than 300, but they also argue Ankara may be involved
in a major scheme. According to Turkish Probe
sources, Gendarmerie Commander Gen. Aydin liter
was to visit Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader
Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Democrat Party (KDP)
Chairman Masoud Barzani around the 12th of August.
The visit was planned but never took place.
Later, the Iraqi Kurds sent a message to Ankara
but not a single military official was willing to reply
and tell them what Ankara wanted from them.
The Kurds say they are willin'g to cooperate and
could deal with the PKK swiftly. The PKK already
has serious problems with Barzani's movement and
has come to the point of clashing with It .
But, they add, unless the Kurds are told what Ankara
expects, there is nothing to do. In nationalist
circles, meanwhile, talk of a greater Kurdistan and a
federal system is spreading. Earlier, PKK leader Abdullah
Öcalan had warned that Turkey may be planning
on a federation based on friendly Kurdish forces,
namely village chieftains, village guard commanders
and assimilated Kurdish politicians. .
Last week, there was talk among nationalists that if
the Iraqi Kurds agreed "to join Turkey," a federal solution
could be considered and this would serve to
suffocate the PKK movement. There is even guesswork
now on whether Turkey could act and unite the
Kurds of Iran, Iraq and Syria for such a solution.
Far from reflecting regional realities and the true
balance of forces, such scenarios unknowingly show
that acknowledging the Kurdish identity and being
part of the debate are actually positive positions.
But, this changes nothing as far as military plans
with regard to northern Iraq are concerned.
Turkey's commanders have pledged to deal with
the PKK by the end of the winter, but all observers
agree that based on the current policy, this is' impossible.
Thus, by the middle of next year, Turkey is bound
to start debating the requirement of martiallaw,
which mayalso be part of a master plan. Also. both
the political management and certain forces may agree
that for the sake of credibility alone, an operation
into Iraq would serve to save Ankara's position.
The Kurdish movement, believes that once Ankara
realizes it cannot cope with the PKK in Turkish territory
as easily as it thought, the attention will turn to
them. They say the current buildup is based on this
and is a threatening development.
As for the PKK, it is using Turkish territory more
now. Unless its bases in Turkeyare dealt with, there
is little hope that a cross-border operation will to curb
violence....