Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

REVUE DE PRESSE~PRESS REVIEW~BERHEVOKAÇAPÊ~RNISTA STAMPA~DENTRO DE LA PRENSA~BASIN ÖZETi
ned down while the others were partially torched.
However, the people of Güne~li still refuse to move
out of the area and are settled down on the banks of
the Diele river, receiving assistance from other villages,
the DEP and even the Siirt governor who was
reportedly very disturbed over the incident.
For the time being, the domestic press is kept under
control. Not a single newspaper other than pro-
Kurdish publications could file reports on what occurred
in Yüksekova city center. Not a single report
appeared on the smoke rising from the town of Çukurca
on Friday as all entrance and exit to and from
the city was prohibited. And, no one dared even to
write about the torched villages.
On August 16, the Sisi village of Lice, Diyarbakir,
was completely burned down. Reporters of Ist?nbul
newspapers were told not to file on the issue. Just
like after the incident in Ikizce village on the l;)lrnak-
Cizre road on July 16.
First six houses were hit by mortar fire and then
all were torched. Pictures of the village were published
in the TON but never found their way into the
Istanbul press.
The Turkish press is silenced, as it was in 1989
when under the-then Motherland Party administration,
Turkey turned to tougher "Special Warfare" policies.
But, similar to the example of the past, this silence
is actually damaging the country. Without any
strong criticism, the press is ending up losing its role
as the fourth force of democracy even though Demirel
maintains that its main goal "is to become the
first force." Again according to Demirel, democracy
is such a system that when it starts leading towards
a division, it is no longer viable. In his words, "a democracy
which will lead to division is no democracy."
More openly, the president and Turkey's commanders
still believe that any rights to be granted to the
Kurdish people will only serve to disrupt the indivisibility
of the country and bring Turkey to the point of
division. Period.
They don't want to hear anything of reforms, let
alone the freedom of the Kurdish language and/or
Kurdish language radio and television broadcasts.
As far as they are concerned, terrorism has to be
crushed once and for all. Even then, though, it is not
clear whether anyone will think of reforms. In a similar
occasion with TON editors at the end of 1992,
Demirel had brought an interesting approach to the
argument on the Southeast. In his words, there was
no way to accept the demand of the local people as
a demand for democracy since they did not know
anything of democracy.
"If you don't know of something, you can't ask for
it," he had said then. Obviously, Ankara's current
policy is based on fear. Fear that any step taken in
the way of improvement will eventually lead to division.
That once the hand is given, Turkey will lose
its arm, as Çiller has put it.
This is actually a stance against the coalition protocol
between the True Path-Social Democrat Populist
party coalition. A protocol which promises to see
all ethnic cultures as part of the rich mosaic of Turkey
and protect them.
Ironically, the argument of current state officials is
based on maintaining the sovereignty of Turkey
whereas the argument which strongly challenges
Turkish Probe August 24, 1993
them says the same.
Today, there are two views heard in Ankara, both
stemming from the fear that Turkey may be led to
the point of division in the future. The first is that of
the ruling officialdom. The second is of those who
claim the official policy in practice is the policy which
would inevitably divide Turkey.
Behind the scenes, the two flanks are debating
whose policy is a real threat to Turkey and which is
closer to dividing the country.
The only way to judge the legitimacy and chances
of success for Ankara's current policy is to look at
the "crisis assessment" it is based upon. If, as Turkish
officials claim, a Kurdish problem does not exist
in Turkey, such a policy would have a chance of
success. If, as Turkish officials claim, the crisis in
the Southeast is merely one of terrorism, there is a
chance of success.
And,)f killing or capturing each and every member
of the PKK will end the local violence, the problem
can be solved.
But, if there is a Kurdish problem, if the crisis is far
more complicated than a mere terrorism issue and if
after the death of each PKK militant more locals are
joining the organization, such a policy is doomed
from the very beginning. Because, it will be a treatment
introduced after a wrong assessment and one
which could kill the patient.
Since there is no Kurdish problem, Turkey's position
may be understood. Perhaps this is why officials
are fearlessly persecuting pro-Kurdish politicians
and activists, why a court can strip a parliamentarian
of his immunity and allow another to attempt to send
him to the gallows only for making a speech, why
deputies can openly be threatened with death by
state security forces, why newspapers can be banned
from distribution without court warrants and
why, under the Demirel era, a total of 14 journalists
writing on human rights and the "non-existent" Kurdish
problem have been gunned down.
This mayalso explain the systematic campaign of
evacuating and burning villages as well as killing the
Kurds using death squads who never get caught.
In other words, seeing the issue as one of terrorism,
Ankara may now be systematically dealing
with it as it would have dealt with the terrorists.
Currently, this policy is only helping the PKK and
bringing Turkey, step-by-step to the threshold of a
massive civil war.
Both sides are being sharpened and turning against
each other. The Turks, in general, have startedto
see the Kurds as the PKK. The Kurds, in general,
have started to see oppression as the Turks. In
short, the two peoples are now approaching the point
of an open confrontation.
"This," said Demirel last week, "is what I fear
most." But on the government side, steps taken in
way of creating a professional force to deal with terrorism
are only increasing this threat.
Either Turkey will have to accept there is a Kurdish
problem and start trying to deal with it, or the
country is to face an even greater crisis, spreading
nationwide.
As long as the policy is based on denial of identity
and the actual problem, a solution cannot be expected.
And, unfortunately, there will be much more bloodshed....
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