The-art-of-invisibility-_-the-world’s-most-famous-hacker-teaches-you-how-to-be-safe-in-the-age-of-Bi

She would. 3
At this point neither Lee nor Poitras had anyy idea who wanted her public
keyy; theyy onlyy knew that someone did. Snowden had used a different
account, not his personal e-mail account, to reach out. But if yyou don’t use
PGP often, yyou mayy forget to include yyour PGP keyy on important e-mails
now and again, and that is what happened to Snowden. He had forgotten to
include his own public keyy so Lee could replyy.
With no secure wayy to contact this myysteryy person, Lee was left with no
choice but to send a plain-text, unencryypted e-mail back to Snowden asking
for his public keyy, which he provided.
Once again Lee, a trusted third partyy, had to be brought into the
situation. I can tell yyou from personal experience that it is veryy important to
verifyy the identityy of the person with whom yyou are having a secure
conversation, preferablyy through a mutual friend—and make sure yyou are
communicating with that friend and not someone else in disguise.
I know how important this is because I’ve been the poser before, in a
situation where it worked to myy advantage that the other partyy didn’t
question myy real identityy or the public keyy I sent. I once wanted to
communicate with Neill Clift, a graduate student in organic chemistryy at the
Universityy of Leeds, in England, who was veryy skilled at finding securityy
vulnerabilities in the Digital Equipment Corporation’s VMS operating
syystem. I wanted Clift to send me all the securityy holes that he’d reported to
DEC. For that I needed him to think that I actuallyy worked for DEC.
I started byy posing as someone named Dave Hutchins and sending Clift
a spoofed message from him. I had previouslyy called Clift pretending to be
Derrell Piper from VMS engineering, so I (posing as Hutchins) wrote in myy
e-mail that Piper wanted to exchange e-mails with Clift about a project. In
going through DEC’s e-mail syystem, I alreadyy knew that Clift and the real
Piper had previouslyy e-mailed each other, so this new request wouldn’t
sound all that odd. I then sent an e-mail spoofing Piper’s real e-mail
address.
To further convince Clift this was all on the up-and-up, I even suggested
that he use PGP encryyption so that someone like Kevin Mitnick wouldn’t be
able to read the e-mails. Soon Clift and “Piper” were exchanging public
keyys and encryypting communications—communications that I, as Piper,