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Vol. 5 Num. 3 - GCG: Revista de Globalización, Competitividad y ...

Vol. 5 Num. 3 - GCG: Revista de Globalización, Competitividad y ...

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Finbarr Murphy & Martin Mullisplain to see. Over the course of the 1990s trading and investment patterns in the nationsof the Southern Cone became more diversified. Asia became an important export <strong>de</strong>stination,and Europe, the principle source of foreign direct investment. Intraregional tra<strong>de</strong> alsobecame an important consi<strong>de</strong>ration. The overall result was that the traditional <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nceon the United States was diluted.21During the mid-to late-1990s, we see the beginning of a trend whereby the WashingtonConsensus began to unravel. Panizza cites the Summit of the Americas in 1994 in providinga <strong>de</strong>finition of the Washington Consensus as the pursuance of prosperity through open markets,hemispheric integration and sustainable <strong>de</strong>velopment (Panizza, 2009). It is importantto note that the Washington Consensus was always an evolving paradigm but it did reflectthe liberal free market economics so dominant in the United States. Furthermore, there wereserious consequences for any State in Latin America that challenged free market orthodoxy,in other words, the United States would exact a price for policy sets that were perceived ascontrary to its interests. By the late 1990s, there was a growing sense of frustration and disappointmentwith the results of the Washington Consensus and so contemporaneous withthe <strong>de</strong>cline of US political influence in South America, we see a growing ten<strong>de</strong>ncy towardsmore in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt economic thinking across the region. Part of this change saw a moveaway from notions of a hemispheric free tra<strong>de</strong> area towards a regionalism that embraced thei<strong>de</strong>a of South America. Historically, this was a propitious moment for the Brazilian foreignpolicy establishment who had long feared that hemispheric free tra<strong>de</strong> would result in themarginalisation of the region and would leave little opportunity to <strong>de</strong>velop Brazilian influencein the region. A combination of more open <strong>de</strong>bt markets, favourable commodity prices andpolitical stability meant that Brazil could pursue a more autonomous set of policies and firmlyresist hemispheric free tra<strong>de</strong>.4. Brazilian Foreign PolicyThe Itamaraty (the Foreign Ministry) has a long history of autonomy within the Brazilian politicalestablishment and those occupying other parts of the political system rarely challenge itspolicies. The Itamaraty had, over the years, secured a high <strong>de</strong>gree of control over policymakingand their influence exten<strong>de</strong>d into other parts of government.Decisions in Brazil regarding international tra<strong>de</strong> are not taken by the tra<strong>de</strong> minister or bythe finance minister, as might be expected, but by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty)(Wahrendroft Caldas 1998, p.xxi).To some extent, the foreign policy establishment was insulated from outsi<strong>de</strong> forces. Thefragmentation of the political parties in Brazil ten<strong>de</strong>d to mitigate against a firm foreign policyemanating from Congress. In comparison with Argentina, the Brazilian elite governed a less<strong>de</strong>mocratic country and so was insulated, to some extent, against popular opinion (Escudé& Fontana, 1998, p. 76).<strong>GCG</strong> GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - UNIVERSIA SEPTIEMBRE-DICIEMBRE 2011 VOL. 5 NUM. 3 ISSN: 1988-7116pp: 16-29

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