Edição Especial - Faap

Edição Especial - Faap Edição Especial - Faap

27.08.2013 Views

egardless how we call it, they were also a way of dealing with circumstances that were quite different from those prevailing in the past. As such, they are part of a process that evolved over time. Players, from issuers to creditors as well as international organizations and other actors, including legal bodies had to proceed according to what they deemed best fit to those circumstances. It is also worthwhile noticing that the process that I was referring to, does not seem to have crystallized; therefore, we should expect more changes to come. Nevertheless, in this presentation I will try to identify some previously prevailing modalities that shaped behaviors, which merit major revision in light of the current circumstances that were quite clearly exposed in the Argentine exchange and finalize with a brief comment about shaping up the agenda that follows those thoughts. Role of international financial organizations The first topic is referred to the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the previous debt exercises, it was stressed that the international financing organizations (IFIs), particularly the IMF, would play a catalytic role. This would result from some combination of factors, such as the assessment they would make of the economic situation and the remedies taken to overcome what was viewed as a difficult situation, but moreover how they would line up financial resources that would also help to mobilize creditors, debtor as well as certain other authorities to increase chances of success of a difficult coordination exercise. For instance, if deemed appropriate, the IMF would disburse given amounts of money when certain conditions were met. Some requirements were tied to economic measures, other to certain actions to be carried out by debtors and/or creditors. In the recent experience under consideration, and apart from the reputational aspects affecting the IMF or possible differences of opinion on domestic policy issues at a time when economic recovery was underway, the role played by the IMF was influenced as well by a potential conflict of interest between that organization as an already existing creditor and the others. The IMF claimed its some sort of de facto preferred creditor status. To the extent that the debtor could only devote a limited amount of resources over time to service its obligations, the more and/or faster the IMF would collect its own claims would be perceived as at the expense of the other creditors. In this case, the IMF stayed away from the design or explicit endorsement of a multi-year financial program that would recognize their status and would potentially put it in an uncomfortable position confronted with other parties. Regular creditors, on the other hand, did not organize themselves to deal effectively with this particular subject. Another aspect is that the link among the parties that existed in the past was no longer there. Previously creditors were basically commercial banks that were usually supervised by the same authorities that were represented in the IMF’s board of directors, which also had the borrowing country as a member. That shared forum helped to create more cooperative ways between acting 158 Revista de Economia & Relações Internacionais, vol.5(edição especial), 2006

parties, including the sovereign debtor, authorities of various countries and representatives of creditors. Currently most of the creditors are all kinds of bondholders that do not necessarily respond to the influence of monetary bodies or alike. Because of that, the connection of parties that had a path through the IMF is no longer there. Definition of eligible debt A second aspect that was different from exercises of previous decades was the definition of eligible debt. Some years ago, the prevailing view was that financial crises affecting countries were in some fashion equivalent to balance of payments crises. As a consequence, there was a scarcity of foreign exchange that would recommend through some ways produce a relief of payments of foreign currency debt that was contracted by borrowers in the country involved, regardless of the legal, economic or even financial status of the particular debtor. In practice, it meant that private as well as public sector foreign indebtedness were components of the universe subject to treatment. Then, foreign currency debt had been roughly equivalent to debt owed to foreigners. Although this particular debt was from time to time rescheduled, this was perceived often as less of a punishment than the erosion of purchasing power that suffered the domestic currency debt as a consequence of successive devaluations of its currency predicated as a means to restore supply of foreign currency. Over the last several years, and as a way of protection, there had been increasing volumes of foreign currency financial instruments both, issued and acquired by residents in a given country as well as more recently foreigners holding domestic currency securities. Increased interconnectivity of financial markets across the world also were the reflection of rapidly growing capital mobility helped by technological changes. As a consequence of all of these developments, the clear distinction along the lines of currencies and subsequent repercussions of a diagnostic of a pure balance of payments situation was more difficult to sustain as thought before. The current prevailing view is more given by the liquidity and solvency circumstances of the particular debtor and its merits. That is why in the Argentine case, as well as the other recent exchanges, the debt involved was of sovereign nature, regardless of currency. Private sector debt was generally speaking also left alone, meaning that it was not subject to across-the-board treatment mandated by authorities. The implication of this is that some private sector credits are trading at level richer and lower implied cost of capital than the sovereign, based upon perceived stronger financials and not necessarily subject to unnecessary governmental debt actions. Other aspects, like definition of a cut-off-date, even from exceptions of securities or other claims to be incorporated in a restructuring exercise to understandings pertaining comparability of treatment are still effectively within the interpretation done by the sovereign borrower. On these issues, we might see more precise conventions evolving over time. Argentina’s debt exchange - new paradigm?..., Daniel Marx, p. 157-161 159

parties, including the sovereign debtor, authorities of various countries and<br />

representatives of creditors. Currently most of the creditors are all kinds of<br />

bondholders that do not necessarily respond to the influence of monetary<br />

bodies or alike. Because of that, the connection of parties that had a path<br />

through the IMF is no longer there.<br />

Definition of eligible debt<br />

A second aspect that was different from exercises of previous decades was<br />

the definition of eligible debt. Some years ago, the prevailing view was that<br />

financial crises affecting countries were in some fashion equivalent to balance of<br />

payments crises. As a consequence, there was a scarcity of foreign exchange that<br />

would recommend through some ways produce a relief of payments of foreign<br />

currency debt that was contracted by borrowers in the country involved,<br />

regardless of the legal, economic or even financial status of the particular<br />

debtor. In practice, it meant that private as well as public sector foreign<br />

indebtedness were components of the universe subject to treatment. Then,<br />

foreign currency debt had been roughly equivalent to debt owed to foreigners.<br />

Although this particular debt was from time to time rescheduled, this was<br />

perceived often as less of a punishment than the erosion of purchasing power<br />

that suffered the domestic currency debt as a consequence of successive<br />

devaluations of its currency predicated as a means to restore supply of foreign<br />

currency. Over the last several years, and as a way of protection, there had been<br />

increasing volumes of foreign currency financial instruments both, issued and<br />

acquired by residents in a given country as well as more recently foreigners<br />

holding domestic currency securities.<br />

Increased interconnectivity of financial markets across the world also were<br />

the reflection of rapidly growing capital mobility helped by technological<br />

changes. As a consequence of all of these developments, the clear distinction<br />

along the lines of currencies and subsequent repercussions of a diagnostic of a<br />

pure balance of payments situation was more difficult to sustain as thought<br />

before. The current prevailing view is more given by the liquidity and solvency<br />

circumstances of the particular debtor and its merits. That is why in the<br />

Argentine case, as well as the other recent exchanges, the debt involved was of<br />

sovereign nature, regardless of currency. Private sector debt was generally<br />

speaking also left alone, meaning that it was not subject to across-the-board<br />

treatment mandated by authorities. The implication of this is that some private<br />

sector credits are trading at level richer and lower implied cost of capital than<br />

the sovereign, based upon perceived stronger financials and not necessarily<br />

subject to unnecessary governmental debt actions.<br />

Other aspects, like definition of a cut-off-date, even from exceptions of<br />

securities or other claims to be incorporated in a restructuring exercise to<br />

understandings pertaining comparability of treatment are still effectively within<br />

the interpretation done by the sovereign borrower. On these issues, we might<br />

see more precise conventions evolving over time.<br />

Argentina’s debt exchange - new paradigm?..., Daniel Marx, p. 157-161<br />

159

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