Edição Especial - Faap

egardless how we call it, they were also a way of dealing with circumstances
that were quite different from those prevailing in the past.
As such, they are part of a process that evolved over time. Players, from
issuers to creditors as well as international organizations and other actors,
including legal bodies had to proceed according to what they deemed best fit
to those circumstances. It is also worthwhile noticing that the process that I was
referring to, does not seem to have crystallized; therefore, we should expect
more changes to come. Nevertheless, in this presentation I will try to identify
some previously prevailing modalities that shaped behaviors, which merit major
revision in light of the current circumstances that were quite clearly exposed in
the Argentine exchange and finalize with a brief comment about shaping up the
agenda that follows those thoughts.
Role of international financial organizations
The first topic is referred to the role of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). In the previous debt exercises, it was stressed that the international
financing organizations (IFIs), particularly the IMF, would play a catalytic role.
This would result from some combination of factors, such as the assessment
they would make of the economic situation and the remedies taken to
overcome what was viewed as a difficult situation, but moreover how they
would line up financial resources that would also help to mobilize creditors,
debtor as well as certain other authorities to increase chances of success of a
difficult coordination exercise. For instance, if deemed appropriate, the IMF
would disburse given amounts of money when certain conditions were met.
Some requirements were tied to economic measures, other to certain actions to
be carried out by debtors and/or creditors.
In the recent experience under consideration, and apart from the
reputational aspects affecting the IMF or possible differences of opinion on
domestic policy issues at a time when economic recovery was underway, the
role played by the IMF was influenced as well by a potential conflict of interest
between that organization as an already existing creditor and the others. The
IMF claimed its some sort of de facto preferred creditor status. To the extent
that the debtor could only devote a limited amount of resources over time to
service its obligations, the more and/or faster the IMF would collect its own
claims would be perceived as at the expense of the other creditors. In this case,
the IMF stayed away from the design or explicit endorsement of a multi-year
financial program that would recognize their status and would potentially put
it in an uncomfortable position confronted with other parties. Regular
creditors, on the other hand, did not organize themselves to deal effectively
with this particular subject.
Another aspect is that the link among the parties that existed in the past
was no longer there. Previously creditors were basically commercial banks that
were usually supervised by the same authorities that were represented in the
IMF’s board of directors, which also had the borrowing country as a member.
That shared forum helped to create more cooperative ways between acting
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Revista de Economia & Relações Internacionais, vol.5(edição especial), 2006