10/05/2012 - Myclipp

Bloomberg/ - Politics, Seg, 14 de Maio de 2012
CLIPPING INTERNACIONAL (Supreme Court)
How Roe v. Wade Empowered U.S.
Investors
It’s possible, but unlikely, that small differences in
culture alone can explain the greater economic
success of the U.S. relative to Europe and Japan after
the introduction of the Internet. The U.S. has poured
investment into innovation since the early 1990s. It
opened trade borders to lower costs, freed resources
and relaxed capacity constraints. When besieged by
low-cost unskilled offshore labor, it transitioned quickly
from manufacturing to more productive endeavors that
included innovation and services that cannot be
produced offshore. In contrast, Europe and Japan
remained wedded to manufacturing-based economies
with attendant lower levels of innovation and slower
growth rates. High costs imposed by pro- labor
governments discouraged companies from exiting
manufacturing, laying off workers, and redeploying
them to more productive endeavors. Pro-labor
governments obstructed trade borders to slow
workforce dislocations. In Germany and Japan, about
20 percent of employment remains in manufacturing,
compared with only 10 percent in the U.S.
Manufacturing Transition Europe’s and Japan’s slower
transition out of manufacturing left their best thinkers
mired in a declining sector. Meanwhile, the most
talented U.S. thinkers created communities of experts
around companies such as Google Inc. (GOOG) and
Facebook Inc. (FB) And the U.S.’s more valuable
on-the-job training, lower labor- redeployment costs,
and lower marginal tax rates increased payouts for
successful risk taking. Nonetheless, the questions
remain: Why did these underlying incentives emerge in
the U.S. and not elsewhere? Why does the U.S. have
lower labor redeployment costs, more open trade
borders, lower marginal tax rates and, ultimately, more
tolerance for unequal distribution of income? By the
random dint of history, the landmark Supreme Court
case Roe v. Wade of 1973 brought pro-investment
voters to power in the U.S. The faction of
pro-investment voters, representing about 35 percent
of the electorate, combined with enough of the
now-mobilized social conservatives -- principally the
members of the Christian Right, who vote Republican
and represent 15 percent of the electorate -- to seize
the majority and permanently shift the political
economic center to the right. A similar shift in political
power didn’t occur in Europe and Japan, and
pro-labor, anti-investment majorities continued to
control those economies. These majorities increased
labor- redeployment costs and closed trade borders to
slow the need for redeploying labor; supported
unionism by strengthening trade barriers; failed to
lower marginal tax rates as much as the U.S.; and
discouraged unequal distribution of income and
wealth. The U.S. differs from Europe and Japan in four
ways. Europe and Japan have parliamentary
democracies where parties are represented in
proportion to their share of the vote. In the U.S., it’s a
winner takes all, two-party system and that makes it
easier for a large minority of voters -- in this case, proinvestment
tax cutters -- to join forces with another
large minority of voters -- the Christian Right -- to seize
power. Roe might have had a minimal effect on U.S.
politics were it not for the fact that Christian
fundamentalists are a large enough portion of the
country’s population to affect the outcome of an
election. About 25 percent of U.S. voters identify
themselves as evangelical Christians. Prior to Roe v.
Wade, three-fifths of evangelical Christian voters were
Democrats, and two-fifths were Republicans. Reagan
Embrace When Ronald Reagan endorsed the pro-life
movement, these proportions reversed. Reagan
combined the Christian Right with the pro-investment
tax cutters to create a majority. Pro- investment tax
cutters maintained control of the party, selecting
fiscally conservative, but socially moderate,
presidential candidates such as John McCain, George
W. Bush, Bob Dole, George H.W. Bush and Gerald
Ford. The fact that conservative Southern Democrats
controlled political power throughout the southeastern
U.S. amplified Roe’s political impact. As conservative
pro-life voters defected to the Republican Party
because of the ruling, it became increasingly difficult
for fiscally conservative Southern Democrats to win
elections as Democrats. Over time, these conservative
Southern Democrats changed sides, gradually shifting
political power to Republicans. Most voters don’t
realize that Roe does more than legalize abortion. It
legalizes controversial third-trimester abortions in
certain cases and takes away the electorate’s right to
vote on this issue by making the late procedures a
judicial right rather than a legislative decision.
Third-term abortions are illegal throughout most of the
democratic world. Their legalization by Roe, even if
few women chose to have them, made opposition to
the ruling more tolerable to pro-choice moderates. The
court’s denial of the electorate’s right to vote on an
issue where both sides have legitimate points of view
-- the majority of Americans opposes third-term
abortions -- further increased the tolerance for
opposition to Roe by pro-choice moderates. The denial
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