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Block cipher modes of operation 23 References [1] Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone (1996). Handbook of Applied Cryptography (http:/ / www. cacr. math. uwaterloo. ca/ hac/ ). CRC Press. ISBN 0-8493-8523-7. . [2] "Block Cipher Modes" (http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ groups/ ST/ toolkit/ BCM/ index. html). NIST Computer Security Resource Center. . [3] "FIPS 81: DES Modes of Operation" (http:/ / www. itl. nist. gov/ fipspubs/ fip81. htm). NIST Computer Security Resource Center. . [4] http:/ / www. itl. nist. gov/ fipspubs/ fip81. htm [5] http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ publications/ nistpubs/ 800-38a/ sp800-38a. pdf [6] http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ publications/ nistpubs/ 800-38E/ nist-sp-800-38E. pdf [7] http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ publications/ fips/ fips198/ fips-198a. pdf [8] http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ publications/ nistpubs/ 800-38B/ SP_800-38B. pdf [9] http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ publications/ nistpubs/ 800-38D/ SP-800-38D. pdf [10] http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ publications/ nistpubs/ 800-38C/ SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007. pdf [11] B. Moeller (May 20, 2004), Security of CBC Ciphersuites in SSL/TLS: Problems and Countermeasures (http:/ / www. openssl. org/ ~bodo/ tls-cbc. txt), [12] William F. Ehrsam, Carl H. W. Meyer, John L. Smith, Walter L. Tuchman, "Message verification and transmission error detection by block chaining", US Patent 4074066, 1976 [13] http:/ / www. iks-jena. de/ mitarb/ lutz/ security/ cryptfaq/ q84. html [14] Kaufman, C., Perlman, R., & Speciner, M (2002). Network Security. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Page 319 (2nd Ed.) [15] Kohl, J. "The Use of Encryption in Kerberos for Network Authentication", Proceedings, Crypto '89, 1989; published by Springer-Verlag; http:/ / dsns. csie. nctu. edu. tw/ research/ crypto/ HTML/ PDF/ C89/ 35. PDF [16] NIST: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation (http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ publications/ nistpubs/ 800-38a/ sp800-38a. pdf) [17] D. W. Davies and G. I. P. Parkin. The average cycle size of the key stream in output feedback encipherment. In Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPTO 82, pages 263–282, 1982 [18] http:/ / www. crypto. rub. de/ its_seminar_ws0809. html [19] Robert R. Jueneman. Analysis of certain aspects of output feedback mode. In Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPTO 82, pages 99–127, 1982. [20] Helger Lipmaa, Phillip Rogaway, and David Wagner. Comments to NIST concerning AES modes of operation: CTR-mode encryption. 2000 [21] R. Tirtea and G. Deconinck. Specifications overview for counter mode of operation. security aspects in case of faults. In Electrotechnical Conference, 2004. MELECON 2004. Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Mediterranean, pages 769–773 Vol.2, 2004. [22] http:/ / www. quadibloc. com/ crypto/ co040601. htm [23] Virgil D. Gligor, Pompiliu Donescu, "Fast Encryption and Authentication: XCBC Encryption and XECB Authentication Modes". Proc. Fast Software Encryption, 2001: 92-108. [24] Charanjit S. Jutla, "Encryption Modes with Almost Free Message Integrity", Proc. Eurocrypt 2001, LNCS 2045, May 2001. [25] http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ groups/ ST/ toolkit/ BCM/ modes_development. html [26] NIST: Modes Development (http:/ / csrc. nist. gov/ groups/ ST/ toolkit/ BCM/ modes_development. html)
Certificate authority 24 Certificate authority In cryptography, a certificate authority, or certification authority, (CA) is an entity that issues digital certificates. The digital certificate certifies the ownership of a public key by the named subject of the certificate. This allows others (relying parties) to rely upon signatures or assertions made by the private key that corresponds to the public key that is certified. In this model of trust relationships, a CA is a trusted third party that is trusted by both the subject (owner) of the certificate and the party relying upon the certificate. CAs are characteristic of many public key infrastructure (PKI) schemes. Commercial CAs charge to issue certificates that will automatically be trusted by most web browsers (Mozilla maintains a list of at least 36 trusted root CAs, though multiple commercial CAs or their resellers may share the same trusted root). [1] The number of web browsers and other devices and applications that trust a particular certificate authority is referred to as ubiquity. Aside from commercial CAs, some providers issue digital certificates to the public at no cost. Large institutions or government entities may have their own CAs. Domain Validation The commercial CAs that issue the bulk of certificates that clients trust for email servers and public HTTPS servers typically use a technique called "domain validation" to authenticate the recipient of the certificate. Domain validation involves sending an email containing an authentication token or link, to an email address that is known to be administratively responsible for the domain. This could be the technical contact email address listed in the domain's WHOIS entry, or an administrative email like postmaster@ or root@ the domain. The theory behind domain validation is that only the legitimate owner of a domain would be able to read emails sent to these administrative addresses. Domain validation suffers from certain structural security limitations. In particular, it is always vulnerable to attacks that allow an adversary to observe the domain validation emails that CAs send. These can include attacks against the DNS, TCP, or BGP protocols (which lack the cryptographic protections of TLS/SSL), or the compromise of routers. Such attacks are possible either on the network near a CA, or near the victim domain itself. Some Certificate Authorities offer Extended Validation (EV) certificates as a more rigorous alternative to domain validated certificates. One limitation of EV as solution to the weaknesses of domain validation is that attackers could still obtain a domain validated certificate for the victim domain, and deploy it during an attack; if that occurred, the only difference observable to the victim user would be a blue HTTPS address bar rather than a green one. Few users would be likely to recognise this difference as indicative of an attack being in progress. Domain validation implementations have also sometimes been a source of security vulnerabilities. In one instance, security researchers showed that attackers could obtain certificates for webmail sites because a CA was willing to use an email address like SSLCertificates@domain.com for domain.com, but not all webmail systems had reserved the "SSLCertificates" username to prevent attackers from registering it [2]. Issuing a certificate A CA issues digital certificates that contain a public key and the identity of the owner. The matching private key is not made available publicly, but kept secret by the end user who generated the key pair. The certificate is also a confirmation or validation by the CA that the public key contained in the certificate belongs to the person, organization, server or other entity noted in the certificate. A CA's obligation in such schemes is to verify an applicant's credentials, so that users and relying parties can trust the information in the CA's certificates. CAs use a variety of standards and tests to do so. In essence, the Certificate Authority is responsible for saying "yes, this person is who they say they are, and we, the CA, verify that".
Page 1 and 2: Security Articles from Wikipedia PD
Page 3 and 4: Article Licenses License 180
Page 5 and 6: Advanced Encryption Standard 2 is a
Page 7 and 8: Advanced Encryption Standard 4 The
Page 9 and 10: Advanced Encryption Standard 6 Know
Page 11 and 12: Advanced Encryption Standard 8 Test
Page 13 and 14: Block cipher 10 Block cipher In cry
Page 15 and 16: Block cipher 12 Block ciphers and o
Page 17 and 18: Block cipher modes of operation 14
Page 25: Block cipher modes of operation 22
Page 29 and 30: Certificate authority 26 Security T
Page 31 and 32: CMAC 28 The CMAC tag generation pro
Page 33 and 34: Cryptographic hash function 30 resi
Page 35 and 36: Cryptographic hash function 32 func
Page 37 and 38: Cryptographic hash function 34 Algo
Page 39 and 40: DiffieHellman key exchange 36 The s
Page 41 and 42: DiffieHellman key exchange 38 3. Bo
Page 43 and 44: DiffieHellman key exchange 40 Upon
Page 45 and 46: DiffieHellman key exchange 42 • C
Page 47 and 48: Digital signature 44 every paramete
Page 49 and 50: Digital signature 46 implemented. I
Page 51 and 52: Digital signature 48 authority). Fo
Page 53 and 54: Digital Signature Algorithm 50 Digi
Page 55 and 56: Digital Signature Algorithm 52 Sens
Page 57 and 58: HMAC 54 Implementation The followin
Page 59 and 60: HMAC 56 External links • FIPS PUB
Page 61 and 62: HTTP Secure 58 Browser integration
Page 63 and 64: HTTP Secure 60 From an architectura
Page 65 and 66: IPsec 62 IPsec Internet Protocol Se
Page 67 and 68: IPsec 64 operates directly on top o
Page 69 and 70: IPsec 66 Cryptographic algorithms C
Page 71 and 72: IPsec 68 External links • All IET
Page 73 and 74: Kerberos (protocol) 70 Kerberos (pr
Page 75 and 76: Kerberos (protocol) 72 Client Authe
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Kerberos (protocol) 74 External lin
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Message authentication code 76 Mess
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Message authentication code 78 Exte
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NeedhamSchroeder protocol 80 S resp
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Pretty Good Privacy 82 Pretty Good
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Pretty Good Privacy 84 Security qua
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Pretty Good Privacy 86 PGP 3 and fo
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Pretty Good Privacy 88 based on sec
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Public key certificate 90 Public ke
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Public key certificate 92 (b) ensur
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Public key certificate 94 Usefulnes
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Public key infrastructure 96 As tim
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Public key infrastructure 98 Extern
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Public-key cryptography 100 In cont
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Public-key cryptography 102 To achi
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Public-key cryptography 104 using t
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Public-key cryptography 106 Spreadi
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Public-key cryptography 108 Externa
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RSA (algorithm) 110 The RSA algorit
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RSA (algorithm) 112 A working examp
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RSA (algorithm) 114 Signing message
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RSA (algorithm) 116 Side-channel an
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RSA (algorithm) 118 • The PKCS #1
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S/MIME 120 administrative overhead
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Secure Electronic Transaction 122 T
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Secure Shell 124 Usage SSH is typic
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Secure Shell 126 • RFC 4462, Gene
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Secure Shell 128 ability to multipl
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Security service (telecommunication
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Security service (telecommunication
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SHA-1 134 SHA-1 SHA-1 General Desig
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SHA-1 136 Applications SHA-1 forms
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SHA-1 138 At the Rump Session of CR
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SHA-1 140 a = temp Add this chunk's
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SHA-1 142 • Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun L
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Stream cipher 144 Types of stream c
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Stream cipher 146 Filter generator
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Stream cipher 148 SNOW Pre-2003 Ver
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Symmetric-key algorithm 150 Key gen
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Transport Layer Security 152 TLS 1.
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Transport Layer Security 154 • SS
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Transport Layer Security 156 • Fi
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Transport Layer Security 158 Length
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Transport Layer Security 160 layer
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Transport Layer Security 162 Suppor
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Transport Layer Security 164 • RF
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Transport Layer Security 166 Extern
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X.509 168 Extensions informing a sp
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X.509 170 00:d3:a4:50:6e:c8:ff:56:6
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X.509 172 Exploits • MD2-based ce
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X.509 174 External links • ITU-T
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Article Sources and Contributors 17
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Article Sources and Contributors 17
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License 180 License Creative Common
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