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Transport Layer Security 157 4. Application phase: at this point, the "handshake" is complete and the application protocol is enabled, with content type of 23. Application messages exchanged between client and server will also be encrypted exactly like in their Finished message. Apart from the performance benefit, resumed sessions can also be used for single sign-on as it is guaranteed that both the original session as well as any resumed session originate from the same client. This is of particular importance for the FTP over TLS/SSL protocol which would otherwise suffer from a man in the middle attack in which an attacker could intercept the contents of the secondary data connections. [32] TLS record protocol This is the general format of all TLS records. Content type Version + Byte +0 Byte +1 Byte +2 Byte +3 Byte 0 Bytes 1..4 Bytes 5..(m-1) Bytes m..(p-1) Bytes p..(q-1) Content type Version Length (Major) (Minor) (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0) Protocol message(s) MAC (optional) Padding (block ciphers only) This field identifies the Record Layer Protocol Type contained in this Record. Content types Hex Dec Type 0x14 20 ChangeCipherSpec 0x15 21 Alert 0x16 22 Handshake 0x17 23 Application This field identifies the major and minor version of TLS for the contained message. For a ClientHello message, this need not be the highest version supported by the client.
Transport Layer Security 158 Length Major Version Versions Minor Version Version Type 3 0 SSL 3.0 3 1 TLS 1.0 3 2 TLS 1.1 3 3 TLS 1.2 The length of Protocol message(s), not to exceed 2 14 bytes (16 KiB). Protocol message(s) One or more messages identified by the Protocol field. Note that this field may be encrypted depending on the state of the connection. MAC and Padding A message authentication code computed over the Protocol message, with additional key material included. Note that this field may be encrypted, or not included entirely, depending on the state of the connection. No MAC or Padding can be present at end of TLS records before all cipher algorithms and parameters have been negotiated and handshaked and then confirmed by sending a CipherStateChange record (see below) for signalling that these parameters will take effect in all further records sent by the same peer. Handshake protocol Most messages exchanged during the setup of the TLS session are based on this record, unless an error or warning occurs and needs to be signalled by an Alert protocol record (see below), or the encryption mode of the session is modified by another record (see ChangeCipherSpec protocol below). Message type + Byte +0 Byte +1 Byte +2 Byte +3 Byte 0 Bytes 1..4 Bytes 5..8 Bytes 9..(n-1) Bytes n..(n+3) Bytes (n+4).. This field identifies the Handshake message type. 22 Version Length (Major) (Minor) (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0) Message type Handshake message data length (bits 23..16) (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0) Handshake message data Message type Handshake message data length (bits 23..16) (bits 15..8) (bits 7..0) Handshake message data
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Security Articles from Wikipedia PD
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Article Licenses License 180
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Advanced Encryption Standard 2 is a
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Advanced Encryption Standard 4 The
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Advanced Encryption Standard 6 Know
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Advanced Encryption Standard 8 Test
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Block cipher 10 Block cipher In cry
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Block cipher 12 Block ciphers and o
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Block cipher modes of operation 14
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Certificate authority 24 Certificat
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Certificate authority 26 Security T
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CMAC 28 The CMAC tag generation pro
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Cryptographic hash function 30 resi
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Cryptographic hash function 32 func
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Cryptographic hash function 34 Algo
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DiffieHellman key exchange 36 The s
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DiffieHellman key exchange 38 3. Bo
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DiffieHellman key exchange 40 Upon
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DiffieHellman key exchange 42 • C
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Digital signature 44 every paramete
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Digital signature 46 implemented. I
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Digital signature 48 authority). Fo
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Digital Signature Algorithm 50 Digi
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Digital Signature Algorithm 52 Sens
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HMAC 54 Implementation The followin
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HMAC 56 External links • FIPS PUB
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HTTP Secure 58 Browser integration
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HTTP Secure 60 From an architectura
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IPsec 62 IPsec Internet Protocol Se
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IPsec 64 operates directly on top o
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IPsec 66 Cryptographic algorithms C
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IPsec 68 External links • All IET
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Kerberos (protocol) 70 Kerberos (pr
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Kerberos (protocol) 72 Client Authe
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Kerberos (protocol) 74 External lin
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Message authentication code 76 Mess
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Message authentication code 78 Exte
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NeedhamSchroeder protocol 80 S resp
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Pretty Good Privacy 82 Pretty Good
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Pretty Good Privacy 84 Security qua
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Pretty Good Privacy 86 PGP 3 and fo
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Pretty Good Privacy 88 based on sec
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Public key certificate 90 Public ke
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Public key certificate 92 (b) ensur
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Public key certificate 94 Usefulnes
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Public key infrastructure 96 As tim
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Public key infrastructure 98 Extern
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Public-key cryptography 100 In cont
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Public-key cryptography 102 To achi
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Public-key cryptography 104 using t
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Page 113 and 114: RSA (algorithm) 110 The RSA algorit
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Page 117 and 118: RSA (algorithm) 114 Signing message
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Page 121 and 122: RSA (algorithm) 118 • The PKCS #1
Page 123 and 124: S/MIME 120 administrative overhead
Page 125 and 126: Secure Electronic Transaction 122 T
Page 127 and 128: Secure Shell 124 Usage SSH is typic
Page 129 and 130: Secure Shell 126 • RFC 4462, Gene
Page 131 and 132: Secure Shell 128 ability to multipl
Page 133 and 134: Security service (telecommunication
Page 135 and 136: Security service (telecommunication
Page 137 and 138: SHA-1 134 SHA-1 SHA-1 General Desig
Page 139 and 140: SHA-1 136 Applications SHA-1 forms
Page 141 and 142: SHA-1 138 At the Rump Session of CR
Page 143 and 144: SHA-1 140 a = temp Add this chunk's
Page 145 and 146: SHA-1 142 • Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun L
Page 147 and 148: Stream cipher 144 Types of stream c
Page 149 and 150: Stream cipher 146 Filter generator
Page 151 and 152: Stream cipher 148 SNOW Pre-2003 Ver
Page 153 and 154: Symmetric-key algorithm 150 Key gen
Page 155 and 156: Transport Layer Security 152 TLS 1.
Page 157 and 158: Transport Layer Security 154 • SS
Page 159: Transport Layer Security 156 • Fi
Page 163 and 164: Transport Layer Security 160 layer
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Page 167 and 168: Transport Layer Security 164 • RF
Page 169 and 170: Transport Layer Security 166 Extern
Page 171 and 172: X.509 168 Extensions informing a sp
Page 173 and 174: X.509 170 00:d3:a4:50:6e:c8:ff:56:6
Page 175 and 176: X.509 172 Exploits • MD2-based ce
Page 177 and 178: X.509 174 External links • ITU-T
Page 179 and 180: Article Sources and Contributors 17
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Page 183: License 180 License Creative Common
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