The Diffusion of Ideas over Contested Terrain - Personal World Wide ...

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N = 684)
#2144-ASQ V49 N4-December 2005—file: 49401-fiss
Variable Mean S.D. .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08
01. SVO espousal 0.09 0.28
02. German bank ownership level 0.01 0.09 0.04
00. —(espousing)
03. German bank ownership level 0.47 0.92 0.00 –0.01
00. —(non-espousing)
04. German firm ownership (espousing) 0.04 0.30 0.16 –0.01 –0.06
05. German firm ownership 0.99 3.24 –0.16 0.00 –0.05 –0.36
00. —(non-espousing)
06. German government ownership level 0.08 0.43 0.06 –0.01 –0.06 0.11 –0.03
00. —(pro-business)
07. German government ownership level 0.08 0.45 –0.04 –0.01 –0.04 0.07 –0.05 –0.03
00. —(pro-labor)
08. Family ownership level 0.23 0.81 –0.01 –0.02 –0.15 –0.04 –0.05 –0.05 –0.05
00. — (3rd or later generation)
09. Family ownership level 0.35 0.93 0.04 –0.02 –0.11 –0.02 –0.16 –0.07 –0.06 –0.11
00. —(1st and 2nd generation)
10. CEO age 56.64 5.91 –0.04 0.02 0.00 –0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 –0.08
11. CEO economics or law degree 0.58 0.49 0.12 –0.04 0.14 –0.02 0.04 0.03 –0.05 –0.10
12. Debt/external market capitalization 0.11 0.75 –0.03 0.00 0.40 –0.02 –0.04 0.02 0.00 –0.04
13. Foreign sales/total sales 33.09 27.20 0.14 0.01 –0.11 0.08 –0.20 –0.02 –0.14 0.15
14. Percentage of shares dispersed 40.23 28.97 0.15 –0.01 –0.06 0.01 –0.19 0.02 –0.03 –0.10
15. Ties to prior adopters (one-step) 0.80 0.95 0.29 0.06 0.10 0.15 –0.09 0.04 –0.04 –0.13
16. Ties to prior adopters (two-step) 0.07 1.18 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 –0.06 –0.10
17. Network centrality 21.23 16.26 0.09 –0.01 0.21 –0.07 –0.05 0.03 –0.08 –0.28
18. Other institutional investor ownership 0.34 0.75 0.10 –0.01 0.06 –0.05 –0.08 0.02 –0.02 –0.11
19. Union strength 73.63 16.31 0.01 –0.04 –0.22 0.06 0.04 –0.09 –0.01 0.16
20. Log of market capitalization 7.43 1.13 0.14 –0.03 –0.02 –0.07 –0.09 0.09 0.02 –0.17
21. lnSales 8.20 1.30 0.15 0.00 0.05 –0.04 –0.17 0.10 0.02 –0.19
22. Return on assets 2.92 4.41 –0.01 –0.12 –0.07 0.05 –0.02 –0.05 –0.05 0.21
23. Total return 7.85 30.92 0.04 –0.08 –0.03 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00
24. Diversification 5.69 1.86 0.06 0.03 0.02 –0.01 –0.12 –0.05 –0.04 0.01
Variable .09 .10 .11 .12 .13 .14 .15
10. CEO age –0.03
11. CEO economics or law degree –0.05 –0.10
12. Debt/external market capitalization –0.04 –0.05 0.05
13. Foreign sales/total sales 0.20 –0.11 0.00 –0.14
14. Percentage of shares dispersed –0.04 0.00 0.11 –0.14
15. Ties to prior adopters (one-step) –0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.09
16. Ties to prior adopters (two-step) 0.06 –0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 –0.02 0.00
17. Network centrality –0.13 0.18 0.18 0.04 0.15 0.37 0.33
18. Other institutional investor ownership –0.13 0.05 0.14 –0.03 –0.05 –0.02 0.16
19. Union strength 0.03 –0.10 –0.06 –0.29 0.41 –0.02 –0.01
20. Log of market capitalization –0.10 0.23 0.04 –0.03 0.09 0.31 0.26
21. lnSales –0.02 0.09 0.02 –0.02 0.24 0.51 0.20
22. Return on assets 0.09 0.11 0.00 –0.08 0.05 –0.06 –0.06
23. Total return –0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 –0.02 –0.04 0.14
24. Diversification 0.10 0.00 0.01 –0.22 0.30 0.30 0.06
Variable .16 .17 .18 .19 .20 .21 .22 .23
19. Network centrality 0.07
20. Other institutional investor ownership –0.04 0.28
21. Union strength 0.03 –0.12 –0.46
22. Log of market capitalization 0.09 0.68 0.22 –0.18
23. lnSales 0.06 0.62 0.15 –0.10 0.73
24. Return on assets –0.08 –0.08 –0.10 0.14 0.06 –0.13
25. Total return 0.07 0.05 0.04 –0.02 0.21 0.02 0.15
26. Diversification 0.05 0.24 0.07 0.14 0.26 0.38 0.06 –0.01
groups. H1a predicted that blockholding by German banks
that have themselves espoused a shareholder value orientation
would increase the likelihood of a firm espousing a
shareholder value orientation. Models 2, 6, and 9 all show
520/ASQ, December 2004