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Source 7.75. “Australian attitudes to the relationship with Britain” extract from
Crossroads: Asia and Australia in world affairs (Cowie, 1980, p. 214).
Illuminating the increasing dissociation Australia had with Great Britain, a sub section titled
The state of the defence forces in Chapter 16 Australia at war 1939 to 1945 in the textbook
The modern world emerges, contrasts Australia’s defence spending from the 1920s and early
to mid 1930s to that of after 1937. The move away from Navy spending that was seen as
important for Great Britain’s defence is a very significant strategic decision made by
Australia; and would not have been without pressure and concern from Great Britain. The
extract reads:
The state of the defence forces
During the 1920s and 1930s Australia had seen its defence role as one of helping in
the defence of the British Empire. Therefore, almost all defence money had been
spent on the navy, for this was Australia’s link with the empire. Between 1924 and
1929 two heavy cruisers, a seaplane, and two submarines were added to the fleet.
Very little was spent on the army and the air force. By the early 1930s there were
only a handful of officers and a few hundred soldiers in the army. The compulsory
school cadet training meant that young Australian males were given basic training,
and they, together with 30 000 part-time soldiers, formed the basis on which any
future army would be organized.
In the early 1930s it became increasingly obvious that Japan intended building
an empire in Asia, beginning with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. There were
growing doubts about Britain’s ability to defend Australia if Japan were to attack, in
spite of the fact that Britain had a large force stationed at Singapore for the purpose
of defending British interests in the Pacific and protecting Australia.
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