Full document / COSOC-W-86-002 - the National Sea Grant Library
Full document / COSOC-W-86-002 - the National Sea Grant Library Full document / COSOC-W-86-002 - the National Sea Grant Library
586 program would not bo the only difficulty accompanying such a change. Enforcing water quality regulations is especially difficult for nonpoint pollution because extonsive monitoring is required and complicated linkages between water quality and land use practices must be established. Each parcel of land has a unique potontial for contributing to pollution. Enforcing a reallocation of rights away from farmers would bs very expensive. Transaction costs associated with alternative programs should also be considered. Leaving tbe entitlement in tho hands of the farmers but changing from a property rule to a liability rule for protection could bo expected to reduce transaction costs, as suggosted by Bromley. Such a reduction might offset somewhat the costs associated with compensation of tho farmers undor tho required cost sharing. If the rights are reallocated so that the public is entitled, the soil loss tax stratogy would likely bo preforablo to tho regulatory program in terms of lower transaction costs. This assumes legally acceptable measures of control. However, the allocation, as well as distribution, of the costs would bo an additional issue with which the government would have to deal. Summary A right ("entitlement") confers favor among individuals or groups making ccapotlng claims to an objoct or privilego. In defining rights, two matters must bo decldod: (1) initial ownership (allocation) of rights, and (b) rules under which they may be exchanged. Collective enforcement of both the initial allocation and the conditions for exchango is required of a legal system to have meaning. Tho rules for exchange of rights includo: (1) proporty rules, (2) liability rules, and (3) Inalienability. Curront and proposed programs to reduce and eliminate nonpoint source pollution impact tho allocation and uso of rights. As the environmental impacts of extracting our agricultural bounty havo become more apparent, farmers' use of natural resources havo become subject to ooro csroful review and regulation. Farnors' rights and the rights of others aro In a state of transition. Proposals for nonpoint pollution control would condition farmors' rights to use land on effocts that uses have on others, principally usors of water and aquatic environments. Hany of theso proposals would change the proporty rule of allocating rights to a liability rule. Proposed programs which fall into one category or tho other have been outlined. Altornatlvo methods of reducing tax exponditurea for offending pollutants could increase tho cost of pollution to farmers. Any change from tho current program will bo costly. Thoro aro two kinds of costs associated with nonpoint source water pollution - the costs of doing something and tho costs of doing nothing. Changes in proporty rights will involve administrative, enforcement and compensation costs. As public concern over
nonpoint source water pollution continues to mount, changes become more likely. However, such change oust be effective, enforceable and ethical. As Braden (1982) has asserted, an acceptable progroo will be ono which provides a mechanism by which the public intorest can bo sorved while providing fair compensation to owners whose rights are exchanged by fiat, retains tho flexibility of individual ownership, and is consistent with the national ethic of maximum individual liberties consistont with tho general welfare. References Bonbrook, Charles, 1979, "Integrating Soil and Commodity Prograas: A Policy Proposal", Journal c>f Soil and Water Conservation. 34(4) 160-167. Braden, John B. , 1982, "Soma Emerging Rights in Agricultural Land." Amnrtean Journal flf Agricultural Economics. 61(1): 19-27. Bromley, Daniel W., 1978, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Economics", Journal EsgjlS- Ihhucs 12 (1978): 43-60. Calabresl, Guido and A. Douglas Helamed. 1972. "Property Rulos, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of tho Cathedral." Harvard Law RejciflB. 85: 1089-1128. Davidson, John. 1981. Agricultural Law. Shepherds/McGraw-Hill. Ervin, David, William D. Heffornon, Gary P. Green, "Cross- Compliance for Erosion Control: Anticipating Efficiency and Distributive Impacts", 1984, American Journal of Agricultural Efionfialca 66(3) 273-228. Just v. Marinate Co. Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972). Harch, Richard A. , Randall A. Kramer, and L. Leon Geyer. 1981. "Nonpoint Source Water Pollution and Section 208 Planning: Logal and Institutional Issues." Tha Agricultural L£H Journal. Summer: 324-355. Killer, William L. , Josoph H. Gill, 1976, "Equity Considerations in Controlling Non-Point Pollution from Agricultural Sources", Amur lean Water Rnnraircwn Association. 12(2) 2S3-261. Prosser, W. 1971. Torts 63-79. West Publishing. Rogers W., Handbook on Environmental Law, 183-185 (1977). Stato Water Control Board v. Train 599 F.2d (921 (1977). U.S. Congress. 1972. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Public Law 95-200. 587
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5<strong>86</strong><br />
program would not bo <strong>the</strong> only difficulty accompanying such a<br />
change. Enforcing water quality regulations is especially<br />
difficult for nonpoint pollution because extonsive monitoring is<br />
required and complicated linkages between water quality and land<br />
use practices must be established. Each parcel of land has a<br />
unique potontial for contributing to pollution. Enforcing a<br />
reallocation of rights away from farmers would bs very expensive.<br />
Transaction costs associated with alternative programs should<br />
also be considered. Leaving tbe entitlement in tho hands of <strong>the</strong><br />
farmers but changing from a property rule to a liability rule for<br />
protection could bo expected to reduce transaction costs, as<br />
suggosted by Bromley. Such a reduction might offset somewhat <strong>the</strong><br />
costs associated with compensation of tho farmers undor tho<br />
required cost sharing. If <strong>the</strong> rights are reallocated so that <strong>the</strong><br />
public is entitled, <strong>the</strong> soil loss tax stratogy would likely bo<br />
preforablo to tho regulatory program in terms of lower<br />
transaction costs. This assumes legally acceptable measures of<br />
control. However, <strong>the</strong> allocation, as well as distribution, of<br />
<strong>the</strong> costs would bo an additional issue with which <strong>the</strong> government<br />
would have to deal.<br />
Summary<br />
A right ("entitlement") confers favor among individuals or groups<br />
making ccapotlng claims to an objoct or privilego. In defining<br />
rights, two matters must bo decldod: (1) initial ownership<br />
(allocation) of rights, and (b) rules under which <strong>the</strong>y may be<br />
exchanged. Collective enforcement of both <strong>the</strong> initial allocation<br />
and <strong>the</strong> conditions for exchango is required of a legal system to<br />
have meaning. Tho rules for exchange of rights includo: (1)<br />
proporty rules, (2) liability rules, and (3) Inalienability.<br />
Curront and proposed programs to reduce and eliminate nonpoint<br />
source pollution impact tho allocation and uso of rights.<br />
As <strong>the</strong> environmental impacts of extracting our agricultural<br />
bounty havo become more apparent, farmers' use of natural<br />
resources havo become subject to ooro csroful review and<br />
regulation. Farnors' rights and <strong>the</strong> rights of o<strong>the</strong>rs aro In a<br />
state of transition. Proposals for nonpoint pollution control<br />
would condition farmors' rights to use land on effocts that uses<br />
have on o<strong>the</strong>rs, principally usors of water and aquatic<br />
environments. Hany of <strong>the</strong>so proposals would change <strong>the</strong> proporty<br />
rule of allocating rights to a liability rule. Proposed programs<br />
which fall into one category or tho o<strong>the</strong>r have been outlined.<br />
Altornatlvo methods of reducing tax exponditurea for offending<br />
pollutants could increase tho cost of pollution to farmers.<br />
Any change from tho current program will bo costly. Thoro aro<br />
two kinds of costs associated with nonpoint source water<br />
pollution - <strong>the</strong> costs of doing something and tho costs of doing<br />
nothing. Changes in proporty rights will involve administrative,<br />
enforcement and compensation costs. As public concern over