Full document / COSOC-W-86-002 - the National Sea Grant Library

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1. ClOSS. cmrmlliinr!.
An alternative to tho currant voluntary BHP program is a crosscompliance
strategy. Cross-ccapliance would requlro farmers to
comply with a specific BHP program in order to receive government
sponsored agricultural program benefits. Specific programs which
could be reduced or eliminated for non-complying farmers include
federal price support, crop insurance, access to extension
sorvices, and loan subsidy programs. In addition to financial
penalties, cross-compliance could also be deslgnod to increase
program benefits for participating farmers. Tho effect would be
threefold: the commitment to government spending with regard to
Income-support and subsidy prograas need not increase, the
imposition of costs (ponaltios) on non-participants, and indirect
cost-assistance to complying farmers in tho form of higher prico
supports. Fines and/or reductions in program baneflts would
occur in event of farcer violation of the specified BHP program.
Under cross-coopllanco, tho farmer still remains ontltled and
protected under the proporty rule. Although tho benefits and
costs associated with 'owning" a particular entitlemont have
shifted, there is no fundamental change In rights. Farmers may
still continue to use (pollute) the water if the compensation
society is willing to pay Is not sufficient.
Any change from tha current voluntary program will involve an
increase in costs, but ioplcoentation and administrative costs In
regard to cross-complianco need not be excessive. The existing
administrative framework could be upgraded to incorporate tho
program (Benbrook, 1979). Farmers will also face increased costs
with either adoption of a BHP program or a reduction in benefits.
BHP costs could bo offset if additional benefits are provided for
those who comply.
An important policy consideration is at what magnitude to adjust
federal income support programs. If insufficient penalty or
reward is associated with compliance, farmers with highly orosive
land will continue to pollute the water. Whother crosscomplianco
will roach tha heavy users (polluters) of water
remains inconclusive (Ervln, Hoffernan, Greon, 198ft). Also,
since no direct cost sharing assistance is provldod, farmers of
undulating land will be at a significant cost disadvantage. The
negative effects on tho owners of highly erodable land raises
another question: which farmer owns this land? For example,
research in Indiana suggests small faros are more likely to be
located on undulating land (Miller, Gill, 1976). Crosscompliance
is likely to benefit large, high equity operators
rolative to small young farmers (Ervln, Hoffornon, Groan, 1984).
The impact of cross-compliance walks a fine lino; tho more
drastic the reduction for non-compliance tho more sorlous the
Inequalities, but if reductions are only marginal pollution will
continue.