October 2000 Newsletter - Naval Postgraduate School

MISSILE DEFENSE RESEARCH, continued from page 4
based backfit strategies for launch point determination have
been explored and the Kalman-based strategies have proven
superior.
An interactive multiple model (IMM) approach has been
developed to boost phase tracking that will track through
booster cutoff and even multiple stage booster firings with
small errors in the track due to abrupt changes in the missile
acceleration profile. Algorithms have been tested using both
simulation data and actual theater ballistic missile trajectories
representing a variety of third world missiles.
Via simulation, the feasibility of early detection and tracking
over North Korea has been studied. These results used
actual Aegis radar specifications for single ping and multiping
target localization. Specific conclusions about the
earliest expected detection of a launch, given an alerted ship,
were drawn, taking into account both radar horizon and
surface terrain.
An aerodynamic missile interceptor based on the Standard
missile is currently being modeled. The model includes
missile aerodynamics and guidance laws for target intercept.
The objective is to assess the feasibility of hitting the TBM
during its ascent given early detection and adequate tracking.
Testing is planned for various guidance laws, as well as
different launch platforms (i.e., ground-launched vs. airlaunched
interceptor studies).
Statistical Research in Joint Interoperability Testing of
Theater Missile Defense Systems
It is well known that there are substantial technical issues that
must be resolved in order to bring a fully workable theater
missile defense (TMD) into fruition. Problems of operability
arise when the components of a single system (e.g. PA-
TRIOT) are considered in isolation. Problems of
interoperability arise when the components of a single TMD
system, or multiple systems within the same service branch,
are considered as a whole. Problems of joint interoperability
arise in the context of TMD families of systems (FoS) that are
configured to provide coherent engagement, across systems
that span service branches, of a theater-area ballistic missile
threat. It is the mission of the Joint Interoperability Test
Command (JITC) to evaluate, and certify, the joint
interoperability of a TMD FoS.
Assistant Professor Robert Koyak, Department of Operations
Research, has focused research on the development of
concepts for measuring the effectiveness and performance of
the communication aspects of a TMD FoS. Communication
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
of potential missile tracks by individual systems to a network
participation group follows protocols set forth in military
standards. The information that is communicated for a
missile track includes position, velocity, estimated launch
point, estimated impact point, and error measures for these
quantities. Questions being addressed include: 1) Is the
information that is communicated timely and accurate? 2)
What level of joint interoperability is achievable under
current standards? 3) What is needed to improve joint
interoperability under a TMD FoS concept?
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use
Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons
During the summer of 1997, David Altwegg, a senior official
in the Navy’s Theater Missile Defense program posed several
questions to Associate Professor James Wirtz and Assistant
Professor Peter Lavoy, Department of National Security
Affairs. Altwegg was concerned about assessing the threat
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
long-range ballistic missiles, brought about by the limited
effectiveness of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Lavoy and Wirtz determined that the most pressing issue
faced by Navy officials was to determine what those actors
were now planning to do with recently acquired weapons
systems. Working with Dr. Scott Sagan, from the Center for
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Wirtz and
Lavoy launched a three-year project to address what former
Secretary of Defense William Perry has called “the greatest
challenge confronting security policymakers today: understanding
the risks of current and future proliferation.”
The results of their research, sponsored by the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, the Naval Treaty Implementation
Program, USAF Institute of National Security Studies, Navy
Theater Air Defense Program, Naval Information Warfare
Activity, the Carnegie Corporation and the Smith Richardson
Foundation, have recently been published by Cornell University
Press. With the help of eight contributors who explored
the unconventional weapons programs of Iraq, Iran, Israel,
India, Pakistan, North Korea and the Aum Shinrikyo, Lavoy,
Sagan, and Wirtz posed several questions. How do states and
nonstate groups integrate unconventional weapons into their
military infrastructure, delivery systems, command and
control procedures, and war plans? What will be the future
impact of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons on
regional and international politics? And what does the
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NPS Research page 5
October 2000