ESA Document - Emits - ESA
ESA Document - Emits - ESA ESA Document - Emits - ESA
s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-20(A) February 2004 page 400 of 422
s 5 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-20(A) February 2004 page 401 of 422 A design case for a Human Mission to Mars has been analysed. Although this does not represent a “ reference” ESA mission, it contains several design elements of general applicability. The understanding of the main technical issues and the relevant design elements will allow future definition of a reference mission and a more comprehensive exploration plan. In particular, the issues of life support, radiation, long permanence in space, internal habitats and overall vehicle configurations, entry descent and landing, Martian surface operations, assembly in Earth orbit, etc., as far as the selected design case is concerned, have been tackled in this study and design solutions proposed. Several simplified models have been created to deal with the issues and allow sensitivity analysis of the main mission parameters. Whenever possible, preference in the design has been given to existing technologies or those considered within reach in relatively short time. This is to achieve results that can be trusted in this phase and to not rely on speculations on performance. A few general conclusions can be drawn from the exercise: • Even the simplest mission based on very limited functions and capability leads to extremely large and massive vehicles and requires assembly in Earth orbit before departure. • The most critical technical showstopper for such a mission is the overall vehicle assembly time in LEO that could result in unacceptable phasing of subsequent missions and lead to unacceptable ageing before departure. • A design point exists for an entirely “ chemical” mission (e.g. all based on chemical propulsion). However, this gives a rather high mass in LEO (above 1000 tonnes) and as a consequence, high time of assembly in LEO. • Launcher availability is critical. The study assumed that a launcher with the performance of Energia would be available for most of the launches. If this assumption is wrong, a very high penalty on the mission is expected. • High closure of the life support system (e.g. recycling) is a must. The penalty associated with an open system would be too big for such a mission. • The reason for the high overall mass of the mission stems from the very large dry mass of the Transfer Habitation Module and the relative inefficiency of the chemical propulsion. • Among the possible alternatives not requiring technology leaps, aerobraking and aerocapture have been briefly investigated. It has been discovered that the implementation of these techniques will require large changes in the vehicle designs as compared to the chemical case. The detailed analysis of these options was considered outside the of this first study and will be performed in later phases. • The verification of safety requirements has proven impossible without an overall risk model. However, mission abort cases have been investigated and the design has taken into account failure cases to a certain extent. Failures in the propulsion system cannot be recovered without unacceptable penalty on the mission; therefore systems with very high reliability need to be implemented. As already mentioned, the design case analysed represents an oversimplified mission. Among the limitations of this approach, the following should be emphasised:
- Page 349 and 350: s 4.4.5.3.2 GNC equipment HMM Asses
- Page 351 and 352: s 4.4.5.4 Control laws generation H
- Page 353 and 354: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 355 and 356: s Finally, the Figure 4-97 shown th
- Page 357 and 358: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 359 and 360: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 361 and 362: s velocity (m/sec) altitude (km) 50
- Page 363 and 364: s 4.5 Mars Ascent Vehicle 4.5.1 Tra
- Page 365 and 366: s Term Value Unit Radius of equator
- Page 367 and 368: s 4.5.2.1 Requirements and design d
- Page 369 and 370: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 371 and 372: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 373 and 374: s Inclination (deg) 47.5 47 46.5 46
- Page 375 and 376: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 377 and 378: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 379 and 380: s 4.5.3 Structures HMM Assessment S
- Page 381 and 382: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 383 and 384: s 4.5.5 Thermal HMM Assessment Stud
- Page 385 and 386: s 4.5.5.3 Baseline thermal design H
- Page 387 and 388: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 389 and 390: s Crew Ingress/Egress Hatch: HMM As
- Page 391 and 392: s Element 3: Mars Ascent Vehicle HM
- Page 393 and 394: s 4.5.7.5 Budgets Characteristic Va
- Page 395 and 396: s PER DAY PER MISSION DRINKING WATE
- Page 397 and 398: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 399: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 403 and 404: s 6 APPENDIX A - MARTIAN SURFACE NU
- Page 405 and 406: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 407 and 408: s Figure 6-1: Example of buried rea
- Page 409 and 410: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 411 and 412: s 7 APPENDIX B - REFERENCES [RD1] C
- Page 413 and 414: s [RD26] IES2, Phase A0: Final Repo
- Page 415 and 416: s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-
- Page 417 and 418: s [RD85] Mars Transportation Enviro
- Page 419 and 420: s 8 APPENDIX C - ACRONYMS AAA Avion
- Page 421 and 422: s MLI Multi-Layer Insulation MMH Mo
s<br />
5 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS<br />
HMM<br />
Assessment Study<br />
Report: CDF-20(A)<br />
February 2004<br />
page 401 of 422<br />
A design case for a Human Mission to Mars has been analysed. Although this does not represent<br />
a “ reference” <strong>ESA</strong> mission, it contains several design elements of general applicability.<br />
The understanding of the main technical issues and the relevant design elements will allow<br />
future definition of a reference mission and a more comprehensive exploration plan.<br />
In particular, the issues of life support, radiation, long permanence in space, internal habitats and<br />
overall vehicle configurations, entry descent and landing, Martian surface operations, assembly<br />
in Earth orbit, etc., as far as the selected design case is concerned, have been tackled in this study<br />
and design solutions proposed.<br />
Several simplified models have been created to deal with the issues and allow sensitivity analysis<br />
of the main mission parameters.<br />
Whenever possible, preference in the design has been given to existing technologies or those<br />
considered within reach in relatively short time. This is to achieve results that can be trusted in<br />
this phase and to not rely on speculations on performance.<br />
A few general conclusions can be drawn from the exercise:<br />
• Even the simplest mission based on very limited functions and capability leads to<br />
extremely large and massive vehicles and requires assembly in Earth orbit before<br />
departure.<br />
• The most critical technical showstopper for such a mission is the overall vehicle<br />
assembly time in LEO that could result in unacceptable phasing of subsequent<br />
missions and lead to unacceptable ageing before departure.<br />
• A design point exists for an entirely “ chemical” mission (e.g. all based on chemical<br />
propulsion). However, this gives a rather high mass in LEO (above 1000 tonnes)<br />
and as a consequence, high time of assembly in LEO.<br />
• Launcher availability is critical. The study assumed that a launcher with the<br />
performance of Energia would be available for most of the launches. If this<br />
assumption is wrong, a very high penalty on the mission is expected.<br />
• High closure of the life support system (e.g. recycling) is a must. The penalty<br />
associated with an open system would be too big for such a mission.<br />
• The reason for the high overall mass of the mission stems from the very large dry<br />
mass of the Transfer Habitation Module and the relative inefficiency of the chemical<br />
propulsion.<br />
• Among the possible alternatives not requiring technology leaps, aerobraking and<br />
aerocapture have been briefly investigated. It has been discovered that the<br />
implementation of these techniques will require large changes in the vehicle designs<br />
as compared to the chemical case. The detailed analysis of these options was<br />
considered outside the of this first study and will be performed in later phases.<br />
• The verification of safety requirements has proven impossible without an overall risk<br />
model. However, mission abort cases have been investigated and the design has<br />
taken into account failure cases to a certain extent. Failures in the propulsion system<br />
cannot be recovered without unacceptable penalty on the mission; therefore systems<br />
with very high reliability need to be implemented.<br />
As already mentioned, the design case analysed represents an oversimplified mission. Among<br />
the limitations of this approach, the following should be emphasised: