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s HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-20(A) February 2004 page 400 of 422

s 5 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS HMM Assessment Study Report: CDF-20(A) February 2004 page 401 of 422 A design case for a Human Mission to Mars has been analysed. Although this does not represent a “ reference” ESA mission, it contains several design elements of general applicability. The understanding of the main technical issues and the relevant design elements will allow future definition of a reference mission and a more comprehensive exploration plan. In particular, the issues of life support, radiation, long permanence in space, internal habitats and overall vehicle configurations, entry descent and landing, Martian surface operations, assembly in Earth orbit, etc., as far as the selected design case is concerned, have been tackled in this study and design solutions proposed. Several simplified models have been created to deal with the issues and allow sensitivity analysis of the main mission parameters. Whenever possible, preference in the design has been given to existing technologies or those considered within reach in relatively short time. This is to achieve results that can be trusted in this phase and to not rely on speculations on performance. A few general conclusions can be drawn from the exercise: • Even the simplest mission based on very limited functions and capability leads to extremely large and massive vehicles and requires assembly in Earth orbit before departure. • The most critical technical showstopper for such a mission is the overall vehicle assembly time in LEO that could result in unacceptable phasing of subsequent missions and lead to unacceptable ageing before departure. • A design point exists for an entirely “ chemical” mission (e.g. all based on chemical propulsion). However, this gives a rather high mass in LEO (above 1000 tonnes) and as a consequence, high time of assembly in LEO. • Launcher availability is critical. The study assumed that a launcher with the performance of Energia would be available for most of the launches. If this assumption is wrong, a very high penalty on the mission is expected. • High closure of the life support system (e.g. recycling) is a must. The penalty associated with an open system would be too big for such a mission. • The reason for the high overall mass of the mission stems from the very large dry mass of the Transfer Habitation Module and the relative inefficiency of the chemical propulsion. • Among the possible alternatives not requiring technology leaps, aerobraking and aerocapture have been briefly investigated. It has been discovered that the implementation of these techniques will require large changes in the vehicle designs as compared to the chemical case. The detailed analysis of these options was considered outside the of this first study and will be performed in later phases. • The verification of safety requirements has proven impossible without an overall risk model. However, mission abort cases have been investigated and the design has taken into account failure cases to a certain extent. Failures in the propulsion system cannot be recovered without unacceptable penalty on the mission; therefore systems with very high reliability need to be implemented. As already mentioned, the design case analysed represents an oversimplified mission. Among the limitations of this approach, the following should be emphasised:

s<br />

5 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS<br />

HMM<br />

Assessment Study<br />

Report: CDF-20(A)<br />

February 2004<br />

page 401 of 422<br />

A design case for a Human Mission to Mars has been analysed. Although this does not represent<br />

a “ reference” <strong>ESA</strong> mission, it contains several design elements of general applicability.<br />

The understanding of the main technical issues and the relevant design elements will allow<br />

future definition of a reference mission and a more comprehensive exploration plan.<br />

In particular, the issues of life support, radiation, long permanence in space, internal habitats and<br />

overall vehicle configurations, entry descent and landing, Martian surface operations, assembly<br />

in Earth orbit, etc., as far as the selected design case is concerned, have been tackled in this study<br />

and design solutions proposed.<br />

Several simplified models have been created to deal with the issues and allow sensitivity analysis<br />

of the main mission parameters.<br />

Whenever possible, preference in the design has been given to existing technologies or those<br />

considered within reach in relatively short time. This is to achieve results that can be trusted in<br />

this phase and to not rely on speculations on performance.<br />

A few general conclusions can be drawn from the exercise:<br />

• Even the simplest mission based on very limited functions and capability leads to<br />

extremely large and massive vehicles and requires assembly in Earth orbit before<br />

departure.<br />

• The most critical technical showstopper for such a mission is the overall vehicle<br />

assembly time in LEO that could result in unacceptable phasing of subsequent<br />

missions and lead to unacceptable ageing before departure.<br />

• A design point exists for an entirely “ chemical” mission (e.g. all based on chemical<br />

propulsion). However, this gives a rather high mass in LEO (above 1000 tonnes)<br />

and as a consequence, high time of assembly in LEO.<br />

• Launcher availability is critical. The study assumed that a launcher with the<br />

performance of Energia would be available for most of the launches. If this<br />

assumption is wrong, a very high penalty on the mission is expected.<br />

• High closure of the life support system (e.g. recycling) is a must. The penalty<br />

associated with an open system would be too big for such a mission.<br />

• The reason for the high overall mass of the mission stems from the very large dry<br />

mass of the Transfer Habitation Module and the relative inefficiency of the chemical<br />

propulsion.<br />

• Among the possible alternatives not requiring technology leaps, aerobraking and<br />

aerocapture have been briefly investigated. It has been discovered that the<br />

implementation of these techniques will require large changes in the vehicle designs<br />

as compared to the chemical case. The detailed analysis of these options was<br />

considered outside the of this first study and will be performed in later phases.<br />

• The verification of safety requirements has proven impossible without an overall risk<br />

model. However, mission abort cases have been investigated and the design has<br />

taken into account failure cases to a certain extent. Failures in the propulsion system<br />

cannot be recovered without unacceptable penalty on the mission; therefore systems<br />

with very high reliability need to be implemented.<br />

As already mentioned, the design case analysed represents an oversimplified mission. Among<br />

the limitations of this approach, the following should be emphasised:

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