Remembering the Space Age. - Black Vault Radio Network (BVRN)

Great (UNFULFILLeD) expeCtatIONS: tO BOLDLY GO Where NO 153
SOCIaL SCIeNtISt aND hIStOrIaN have GONe BeFOre
Nor have historians embarked on many future impact studies. Indeed,
rarely do historians work in groups or with other disciplines. 74 When they do,
which requires fnding funding on a much larger scale than they are accustomed,
the best analogy may be that of herding cats. a notable exception is the tensions
of europe network and research collaboration funded by the european Science
Foundation to encourage cooperation among european academics. 75
Yet history and historical analogies are powerful tools, especially when
used well. 76 historical understanding, analogy, and questioning can be employed
proftably and wisely. 77 It behooves historians and social scientists to try to
accomplish this because we know that if we don’t, history will be misused
to infuence and justify policy. Look at the widely used example of Munich:
appeasement is bad, an argument used by supporters of the vietnam War in the
1960s and the second Iraq war in the 2000s. as peter Stearns noted in 1981,
Munich in 1938 was not vietnam in 1968. the same is true for Iraq in 2007. 78
Good history, good analogies, and good guidance are necessary, but they
are not enough. What also must be considered is if anyone is listening, not just
in NaSa but also in the legislative branch and wider public. Organizations
like history News Service (http://www.h-net.org/~hns/index.htm) and history
News Network (http://hnn.us/) provide historians with a public forum to address
contemporary issues within a historical context. the problem of audience,
unfortunately, is not confned to historians and social scientists. 79 We should think
more about our responsibilities as public intellectuals and act accordingly.
We expect leaders and administrators to make errors. We want them,
however, to make smart rather than dumb ones. Good history—accurate and
aimed at policymakers—can and should help them to avoid dumb errors.
academics tend to end papers with calls for further research. I shall continue
this tradition with two recommendations. First, the history profession and NaSa
should examine the Department of Defense history programs and the feld of
military history to learn what the military and military historians are doing right
74. the situation since 1981 has not changed signifcantly (peter N. Stearns, “applied history and
Social history,” Journal of Social History 14, 4 (Summer, 1981): 533-537.
75. accessed at http://www.histech.nl/tensions/ (downloaded august 7, 2007).
76. For a fascinating study of how physicists used analogy, see Daniel Kennefck, Traveling at
the Speed of Thought. Einstein and the Quest for Gravitational Waves (princeton, NJ: princeton
University press, 2007).
77. richard e. Neustadt and ernest r. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers
(New York, NY: Free press, 1986).
78. peter N. Stearns, “applied history and Social history,” Journal of Social History 14, 4 (Summer,
1981): 533. a less used but equally important lesson of Munich is that all the major players should
be at the negotiating table. the inclusion of up-and-coming as well as established spacefaring
nations in discussions about coordinating future Moon exploration is a good sign that that lesson
has been learned.
79. Barbara Kline pope, “Because Science Matters,” Science. (June 1, 2007): 1286.