Remembering the Space Age. - Black Vault Radio Network (BVRN)

the Great Leap UpWarD: ChINa’S hUMaN SpaCeFLIGht
prOGraM aND ChINeSe NatIONaL IDeNtItY
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frustration over an “unjustifed” international order, with many in China
seeing Western interests around the world as anything but benign and Western
states as anything but innocent in their intentions toward China. In the past
decade Chinese leadership has worked hard to better integrate their country
into the international community. admittedly, China’s January 2007 aSat test
appeared to contradict Beijing’s oft-stated opposition to the “weaponization” of
space, but, following Zheng’s thesis, one should not leap to the conclusion that
China’s insistence on testing a missile defense system is a “reckless move” driven
predominantly by China’s “traditional Sino-centrism” or by its “dangerously
aggressive aspirations” for great power status. 5 For the past several years, the
Chinese have chafed at what they have seen as eforts by the United States to
exclude it from full membership in the world’s elite space club. So by early
2007, Beijing set out to establish a club of its own—as the primary “space
benefactor” to the developing world.
Some of this came quickly to fruition. In May 2007, the Chinese launched
a communications satellite for Nigeria. 6 For the central african country, Beijing
not only designed, built, and launched the satellite but also provided a large loan
to help pay the bill. China also signed a satellite contract with another big oil
producer, Venezuela, and also began to develop an earth-observation satellite
system—and alternative to GpS—in association with Bangladesh, Indonesia,
pakistan, peru, thailand, and Iran. 7 In the next several years, most observers of
the prC believe that China could launch as many as 100 satellites, not only to
create a digital navigational system but also to help deliver television to rural areas,
improve mapping and weather monitoring, and facilitate scientifc research.
the Chinese have also chafed at not being allowed to participate in the
U.S.-led ISS, a feeling of prejudice against China that became abundantly clear
to NaSa administrator Michael Grifn and other members of his NaSa
entourage when they made an ofcial visit to China in September 2006.
Following an agreement between president hu Jintao and president George
W. Bush and U.S. acceptance of a special invitation from Dr. Laiyun Sun,
5. Initially declining to confrm or deny that any aSat test had happened, Beijing eventually made
an ofcial declaration that “the test was not directed at any country and does not constitute
a threat to any country. . . . China has always advocated the peaceful use of space, opposes the
weaponization of space . . ., and has never participated and will never participate in any arms
race in outer space.” Naturally, Western observers refused to accept that China’s destruction of its
weather satellite did not have any military associations driven by strategic objectives.
6. associated press, “China Launches Satellite for Nigeria,” May 14, 2007, accessed at http://www.
space.com/missionlaunches/070514_china_nigcomsat1.html.
7. See Zhao huanxin (China Daily), “China to develop Venezuela satellite,” November 3, 2005,
accessed at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-11/03/content_490429.htm; “Venezuela
to increase oil sales to China,” august 17, 2006, accessed at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/
doc/2006-08/17/content_666707.htm; and “China signs 16 international space cooperation
agreements, memorandums in fve years,” October 12, 2006, accessed at http://english.peopledaily.
com.cn/200610/12/eng20061012_311154.html.