Remembering the Space Age. - Black Vault Radio Network (BVRN)

58 reMeMBerING the SpaCe aGe
were largely approached from within a framework of atomic energy, thereby
limiting the range of discourse and infuencing the shape of the new agency.
While NaSa grew by orders of magnitude in the 1960s, the features that
specifcally identifed NaSa as technocratic were frozen into the bureaucracy
in this formative period. the sudden infux of money after Kennedy’s famous
decision to set NaSa’s sights on a Moon landing merely infated NaSa’s existing
latent potential.
the rOLe OF preStIGe
a large debate in the historiography of NaSa centers on the question
of prestige. Is NaSa’s mission coincident with or even driven by american
political imperialism? how did national prestige come to be measured by a
cosmic yardstick? these questions are often posed in light of the two temporal
sides of the Sputnik rupture. On the one hand, the eisenhower administration
was seemingly caught unawares of the worldwide impact the launch of Sputnik
would have on public perceptions of american strength. On the other hand,
John F. Kennedy would soon after catapult his career on the program to send
humans to the Moon, a program that “transformed NaSa from a scientifc
research agency into a goal-oriented bureaucracy.” 10
In the fall of 1957, high-level ofcials extrapolated the Sputnik launch into
an across-the-board american defciency in scientifc ability. the Democratic
majority under Senator Lyndon B. Johnson jumped on the opportunity to place
blame on the republican eisenhower administration and relaunched hearings
by the preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on armed
Services in the Senate in late November. General James h. Doolittle provided
one of the early testimonies. 11 In his testimony, Doolittle felt convinced “that
the rate of russian progress is much more rapid than ours; that, in some areas,
she has already passed us. If the rate continues, she will pass us in all.” 12
In a meeting of the Ofce of Defense Mobilization Science advisory
Committee (SaC) with president eisenhower on October 15, edward h. Land
explained to the president the reasons for Soviet success: 13
10. Giles alston; Shirley ann Warshaw, ed., Chap. “eisenhower: Leadership in Space policy” in
Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency (Westport, Ct: Greenwood, 1993), p. 117.
11. Doolittle was already famous for his bombing raid on tokyo shortly after the initiation of
hostilities between the United States and Japan in 1942. he later went on to become Chairman
of the NaCa board, a position he held at the time of his testimony.
12. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 85th
Congress, 1st and 2nd sessions, pt. 1, p. 111.
13. at the meeting, I. I. rabi noted “most matters of policy coming before the president have a
very strong scientifc component” and “he didn’t see around the president any personality who
would help keep the president aware of this point of view.” eisenhower concurred and “said that
he had felt the need for such assistance time and again.”this discussion led to the suggestion by