Remembering the Space Age. - Black Vault Radio Network (BVRN)

Remembering the Space Age. - Black Vault Radio Network (BVRN) Remembering the Space Age. - Black Vault Radio Network (BVRN)

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BUILdINg SpaCe CapaBILIty thrOUgh eUrOpeaN regIONaL COLLaBOratION the UNIted StateS aNd eUrOpeaN INtegratION IN SpaCe I have discussed at length the role and the interests of the United States in fostering international collaboration in space with Western europe at two previous NaSa conferences. 20 I do not want to repeat myself here. the central point to bear in mind is that NaSa, in consultation with the State department and other arms of the administration have, loosely speaking, two modes of interaction with their international partners. One involves sharing: the sharing of data, skills, and technology. the other involves denial of these self-same assets. the boundary between the two is fuid, and NaSa may often be unwilling to share a particularly advanced version of a technology, but be quite happy with allowing partners access to an earlier, less sophisticated variant (e.g. inertial guidance technology). the boundary also shifts depending on the domestic situation in the United States, the availability of the technology from other nations, and the strength of potential partners. NaSa’s role, after all, is to promote both international collaboration and american space leadership. On the face of it, these two goals are contradictory unless the partners are relatively weak and pose no threat to american leadership. policy fuctuations between sharing and denial have marked NaSa- Western european relations over the last 50 years. In the early 1960s, as I have explained, most Western european countries depended on international col laboration with NaSa to acquire the basic skills required to kick-start key parts of their space programs. NaSa gladly collaborated, and the europeans enthu siastically appreciated their gesture. 21 ­ ­ this willingness to work with europe was politically easy in science, which was eminently suited to international col­ laboration and posed no threat to U.S. leadership; indeed, leadership was made manifest in generosity and openness. But it also extended to more sensitive areas like rocket technology when, in 1966, NaSa seriously considered ofer­ ing a wide-ranging package of technological assistance, including cryogenic technology, to keep eLdO afoat. the proposals defned at this time inge­ niously respected national security constraints, furthered U.S. foreign policy 20. John Krige, “technology, Foreign policy, and International Cooperation in Space,” in Steven J. dick and roger d. Launius, eds., Critical Issues in the History of Space Flight (Washington, dC: National aeronautics and Space administration Special publication-2006-4702), pp. 239–260; John Krige, “NaSa as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign policy,” in Steven J. dick and roger d. Launius, eds., Societal Impact of Spacefight (National aeronautics and Space administration Special publication-2007-4801). 21. Jacques Blamont,“La creation d’une agence spatiale: les Français à goddard Spacefight Center, en 1962-1963,” and Jean-pierre Causse, “Le programme Fr1,” in hervé Moulin, Les relations franco-américaines dans le domaine spatial (1957 – 1975), Quatrième rencontre de l’IFhe sur l’essor des recherches spatiales en France, 8-9 décembre 2005, paris, France (paris: Institut Français de l’histoire de l’Éspace, in press). 51

BUILdINg SpaCe CapaBILIty thrOUgh<br />

eUrOpeaN regIONaL COLLaBOratION<br />

<strong>the</strong> UNIted StateS aNd eUrOpeaN INtegratION IN SpaCe<br />

I have discussed at length <strong>the</strong> role and <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> United States<br />

in fostering international collaboration in space with Western europe at<br />

two previous NaSa conferences. 20 I do not want to repeat myself here. <strong>the</strong><br />

central point to bear in mind is that NaSa, in consultation with <strong>the</strong> State<br />

department and o<strong>the</strong>r arms of <strong>the</strong> administration have, loosely speaking, two<br />

modes of interaction with <strong>the</strong>ir international partners. One involves sharing:<br />

<strong>the</strong> sharing of data, skills, and technology. <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r involves denial of <strong>the</strong>se<br />

self-same assets. <strong>the</strong> boundary between <strong>the</strong> two is fuid, and NaSa may often<br />

be unwilling to share a particularly advanced version of a technology, but be<br />

quite happy with allowing partners access to an earlier, less sophisticated variant<br />

(e.g. inertial guidance technology). <strong>the</strong> boundary also shifts depending on <strong>the</strong><br />

domestic situation in <strong>the</strong> United States, <strong>the</strong> availability of <strong>the</strong> technology from<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r nations, and <strong>the</strong> strength of potential partners. NaSa’s role, after all, is to<br />

promote both international collaboration and american space leadership. On<br />

<strong>the</strong> face of it, <strong>the</strong>se two goals are contradictory unless <strong>the</strong> partners are relatively<br />

weak and pose no threat to american leadership.<br />

policy fuctuations between sharing and denial have marked NaSa-<br />

Western european relations over <strong>the</strong> last 50 years. In <strong>the</strong> early 1960s, as I have<br />

explained, most Western european countries depended on international col<br />

laboration with NaSa to acquire <strong>the</strong> basic skills required to kick-start key parts<br />

of <strong>the</strong>ir space programs. NaSa gladly collaborated, and <strong>the</strong> europeans enthu<br />

siastically appreciated <strong>the</strong>ir gesture. 21 ­<br />

­<br />

this willingness to work with europe<br />

was politically easy in science, which was eminently suited to international col­<br />

laboration and posed no threat to U.S. leadership; indeed, leadership was made<br />

manifest in generosity and openness. But it also extended to more sensitive<br />

areas like rocket technology when, in 1966, NaSa seriously considered ofer­<br />

ing a wide-ranging package of technological assistance, including cryogenic<br />

technology, to keep eLdO afoat. <strong>the</strong> proposals defned at this time inge­<br />

niously respected national security constraints, fur<strong>the</strong>red U.S. foreign policy<br />

20. John Krige, “technology, Foreign policy, and International Cooperation in <strong>Space</strong>,” in Steven J.<br />

dick and roger d. Launius, eds., Critical Issues in <strong>the</strong> History of <strong>Space</strong> Flight (Washington, dC:<br />

National aeronautics and <strong>Space</strong> administration Special publication-2006-4702), pp. 239–260;<br />

John Krige, “NaSa as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign policy,” in Steven J. dick and roger d.<br />

Launius, eds., Societal Impact of <strong>Space</strong>fight (National aeronautics and <strong>Space</strong> administration Special<br />

publication-2007-4801).<br />

21. Jacques Blamont,“La creation d’une agence spatiale: les Français à goddard <strong>Space</strong>fight Center,<br />

en 1962-1963,” and Jean-pierre Causse, “Le programme Fr1,” in hervé Moulin, Les relations<br />

franco-américaines dans le domaine spatial (1957 – 1975), Quatrième rencontre de l’IFhe sur l’essor<br />

des recherches spatiales en France, 8-9 décembre 2005, paris, France (paris: Institut Français de<br />

l’histoire de l’Éspace, in press).<br />

51

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