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The Privatization of Roads and Highways - Ludwig von Mises Institute

The Privatization of Roads and Highways - Ludwig von Mises Institute

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122 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Privatization</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Roads</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Highways</strong><br />

something that can be learned, that must be learned, if the market<br />

is to operate. We cannot first prohibit the operation <strong>of</strong> the<br />

market (by government preemption), <strong>and</strong> then conclude that a<br />

market could not function, because <strong>of</strong> its inability to exclude beneficiaries<br />

who do not pay. Of course it would be very difficult for<br />

a market which hitherto has been prohibited to suddenly begin<br />

effective operation (<strong>and</strong> it is much more difficult, as we have<br />

seen, to envision the operation <strong>of</strong> such a market). But this difficulty<br />

is not the result <strong>of</strong> anything intrinsic. It is because the erection<br />

<strong>of</strong> bigger <strong>and</strong> better fences, the creation <strong>of</strong> more sophisticated<br />

jamming devices, etc., can come only with practice; if there<br />

is no market in operation, there is no chance for the experimentation<br />

with the skills, institutions, <strong>and</strong> management requisite to<br />

its development.<br />

Bish <strong>and</strong> Warren assert that all “public or collective goods . . .<br />

are ‘non-packageable’; that is, in principle, no one can be<br />

excluded from consuming them.” 34 But they are incorrect. As we<br />

have seen, even in the case <strong>of</strong> national defense, the paradigm case<br />

<strong>of</strong> the collective good, there exist potential methods <strong>and</strong> institutions<br />

for excluding nonpayers. 35 <strong>The</strong>re is nothing in principle to<br />

prevent excludability—there is only a lack <strong>of</strong> a past history <strong>of</strong><br />

market operation in this area <strong>and</strong> the limited powers <strong>of</strong> imagination<br />

on the part <strong>of</strong> economists.<br />

An interesting sidelight on the definitional problem <strong>of</strong> using<br />

national defense as an example <strong>of</strong> a public good is considered by<br />

Charles M. Tiebout. Tiebout contrasts national defense with radio<br />

broadcasting, which he holds is not a collective good.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re seems to be a problem connected with the external<br />

economies aspect <strong>of</strong> public goods. Surely a radio broadcast, like<br />

national defense, has the attribute that A’s enjoyment leaves B<br />

34Bish <strong>and</strong> Warren, “Scale <strong>and</strong> Monopoly Problems in Urban Government<br />

Services,” p. 100.<br />

35For examples <strong>of</strong> excludability <strong>of</strong> road users, see Haritos, “<strong>The</strong>ory <strong>of</strong><br />

Road Pricing,” pp. 55–56.

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