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The Privatization of Roads and Highways - Ludwig von Mises Institute

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110 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Privatization</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Roads</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Highways</strong><br />

is ludicrous. <strong>The</strong> traffic jams endemic to urban rush hours are<br />

eloquent testimony to this fact.<br />

Why does such antisocial behavior take place on our highways,<br />

<strong>and</strong> not in other areas where it might be expected? <strong>The</strong> reason<br />

is that our roadway network is in a state <strong>of</strong> chaotic nonownership<br />

run by the government, while other settings in which such<br />

behavior might be expected, but does not appear, are run by private<br />

enterprise.<br />

We can ask, for example, why it is that economists <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Roth-Walters-Haveman stamp never spare a worry about movie<br />

goers who impose crowding costs on others? Why do not the<br />

“externality economists” wax eloquent in describing the individual<br />

movie goer (or opera patron, punk rock devotee, supermarket<br />

shopper, hotel patron, department store customer, airplane<br />

traveler, or indeed any person who utilizes a resource which is<br />

actively sought by many others at the same time) who shows callous<br />

disregard for the costs he imposes on others?<br />

One reason is that the institution <strong>of</strong> private property16 is<br />

allowed to function in these other areas, so that the so-called<br />

externalities can be internalized. Externalities are said to be internalized<br />

when A, the source <strong>of</strong> the externality, <strong>and</strong> B, the recipient,<br />

interact on privately owned property, <strong>and</strong> can be appropriately<br />

penalized or compensated for the externalities through fees<br />

imposed by C, the owner. In the case <strong>of</strong> nonownership <strong>of</strong> the<br />

roads, which presently obtains, each additional driver, A,<br />

imposes congestion costs on all other drivers, B, <strong>and</strong> there is little<br />

or no reason for A to desist. But if the road were privately<br />

owned, then it would be possible (<strong>and</strong> indeed pr<strong>of</strong>itable) for the<br />

owner, C, to reduce negative externalities such as crowding, by<br />

raising charges for rush hour use. C’s pr<strong>of</strong>it potentialities are in<br />

16 If the government charged a price for highway use, such a user fee<br />

might deter congestion <strong>and</strong> lead motorists, in effect, to take account <strong>of</strong> the<br />

congestion costs they impose on others. For an analysis <strong>of</strong> why a privately<br />

owned road system is preferable even to a government pricing mechanism,<br />

see Block, “Free-Market Transportation: Denationalizing the <strong>Roads</strong>,” chapter<br />

1 in this volume.

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