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The Privatization of Roads and Highways - Ludwig von Mises Institute

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108 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Privatization</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Roads</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Highways</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> unique power <strong>of</strong> the reductio ad absurdum is that it casts<br />

doubts on the externalities argument, as used by Baumol, Roth,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Peterson. If a nationalized industry can be justified on the<br />

basis <strong>of</strong> externalities, but this phenomenon applies as well to<br />

areas where no one wants to see the spread <strong>of</strong> government enterprise,<br />

then one may question just how seriously its advocates<br />

take their own argument. <strong>The</strong>y cannot have it both ways. Either<br />

externalities justify state enterprise on roads <strong>and</strong> in practically<br />

every other industry as well, or they justify it in no case. It is completely<br />

illogical to apply an argument in one case <strong>and</strong> to fail to<br />

apply it in all other cases in which it is just as relevant. 13<br />

EXTERNAL DISECONOMIES<br />

One phenomenon that particularly infuriates those who see<br />

externalities as a justification for intervention is the fact that,<br />

under congested road conditions, each additional motorist<br />

imposes extra costs on all others, costs which he does not take<br />

fully into account, resulting in uneconomic use <strong>of</strong> resources. Roth<br />

states the problem as follows:<br />

the level <strong>of</strong> traffic flow will depend on decisions taken by individuals<br />

taking account <strong>of</strong> the costs <strong>and</strong> benefits to them associated<br />

with road use. But from the point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong> the traffic as<br />

Assuming, however, operation <strong>of</strong> merry-go-rounds to reflect the general<br />

interests <strong>of</strong> the public, <strong>and</strong> assuming also, as is the case, that these mechanisms,<br />

too, are replete with external benefits, does it follow that merry-goround<br />

output therefore seems most justifiably geared to public rather than<br />

private enterprise? If so, then it would seem that there is nothing that cannot<br />

be claimed for government operation.<br />

13It would be consistent, although nonsensical, to accept the externality<br />

argument in favor <strong>of</strong> government road monopoly—<strong>and</strong> nationalization <strong>of</strong><br />

all other industries wherein externalities obtain as well. For opposing positions,<br />

however, the reader might consult F.A. Hayek’s <strong>The</strong> Road to Serfdom<br />

(Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1944) <strong>and</strong> Collectivist Economic Planning<br />

(Clifton, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley, 1975), <strong>and</strong> three books by <strong>Ludwig</strong> <strong>von</strong><br />

<strong>Mises</strong>, Bureaucracy (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969), Planning<br />

for Freedom (South Holl<strong>and</strong>, Ill.: Libertarian Press, 1974), <strong>and</strong> Human Action,<br />

3rd ed. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966).

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