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The Privatization of Roads and Highways - Ludwig von Mises Institute

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92 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Privatization</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Roads</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Highways</strong><br />

Another str<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the argument in favor <strong>of</strong> free public transit<br />

proceeds gradually from the attempt to speed up vehicle movements.<br />

Instead <strong>of</strong> going directly to free fares, the first step is the<br />

call for exact fare collection, as an intermediary. Owen’s statement<br />

that “Requiring exact fare collection on the buses has also<br />

introduced inconveniences that suggest eliminating fares altogether<br />

as a logical next step,” 69 is a fair portrayal <strong>of</strong> this view.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se arguments, or ones like them, may have had some<br />

influence, for the free-fare idea has become a reality. Seattle’s<br />

“Magic Carpet” <strong>and</strong> Dayton’s “Downtown Area Short Hop”<br />

(DASH) are described as “no fare-zones” if not “full-fledged freefare<br />

transit programs.” 70 But, as in the case <strong>of</strong> Wilkes-Barre’s<br />

experiment with free fares in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the destruction <strong>of</strong><br />

Hurricane Agnes in 1972, the evidence for or against the program<br />

is conceded, even by its proponents, to be inconclusive.<br />

<strong>The</strong> free-fare arguments have not gone unchallenged. <strong>The</strong><br />

difficulty is that:<br />

<strong>The</strong> present patrons <strong>of</strong> mass transportation are really a more-orless<br />

captive group who cannot use an automobile for one reason<br />

or another, (thus) their dem<strong>and</strong> for transit service is relatively<br />

inelastic. Cutting or eliminating the fare would not<br />

increase ridership significantly, except perhaps for some odd<br />

peak, short distance riding as a substitute for walking. 71<br />

69Owen, <strong>The</strong> Accessible City, p. 47. Another reason for the exact fare is to<br />

reduce robbery <strong>of</strong> the bus driver’s cash, since fares can go directly into a<br />

locked box which the driver cannot open.<br />

70Ibid., pp. 175–76. For a description <strong>of</strong> the Toledo experiment, see<br />

Owen, <strong>The</strong> Metropolitan Transportation Problem, p. 121.<br />

71George M. Smerk, “Subsidies for Urban Mass Transportation,” L<strong>and</strong><br />

Economics 41 (February 1965): 65. Scheiner <strong>and</strong> Starling (“<strong>The</strong> Political<br />

Economy <strong>of</strong> Free-Fare Transit,” pp. 175–76) cite elasticities <strong>of</strong> I-34 for Denver<br />

<strong>and</strong> I-90 for San Diego. Kraft <strong>and</strong> Domencich cited a study by the<br />

Charles River Associates to the effect that “free transit might divert 13.810<br />

<strong>of</strong> the trips to work from auto to public transit, but few or no shopping trips

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