Kyrgyzstan Country Profile - Naval Postgraduate School

Central Asia Executive Summary Series
Kyrgyzstan Country Profile
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS)
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
No. 2, July 2009

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National Flag:
Program for Culture & Conflict Studies
www.nps.edu/programs/ccs
Formal Name: Republic of Kyrgyzstan
(Kyrgyz Respublikasy in Kyrgyz)
Short Form: Kyrgyzstan
State Emblem:
Source: Lonely Planet: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/asia/kyrgyzstan/
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Table of Contents:
Location 1
Capital 1
Independence from the USSR 2
Territory 4
Weather 4
Population/Demographic data 4
Ethnic Composition of population 4
Public Holidays 5
Languages 5
Administrative Setup 6
Significant Topographic Features 8
Literacy 8
Number of Higher Educational Institutions 8
Health Facilities 9
Political Landscape: 11
The government and list of Cabinet of Ministers 11
Official political parties 17
Banned Religious movements/parties: 18
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) 18
Other non-violent Islamic movements 21
Human Terrain: 22
Kyrgyz Clans Networks 22
Tribal Division of Kyrgyz Ethnos 23
North – South regional divide 24
Major ethnic groups: 24
Uzbeks 24
Russians 24
Religions/Sects 26
Foreign Military bases: 26

Russian military base in Kant 26
US Air Base at Manas International Airport 27
Security Situation: 28
A. Internal developments: 28
1. Presidential elections on July 23, 2009 28
2. Return of a large army of labor migrants put additional pressure
on poor socio-economic conditions 30
3. Criminalization of politics 30
4. Sharpened tensions between powerful political
and business elites 35
B. External developments: 36
1. Political/security situation in Afghanistan 36
2. Kyrgyz – Uzbek relations 37
Water Distribution 37
Border Demarcation 38
Gas Supply 39
APPENDIX 1: Links to news and resources on Uzbekistan/ Central Asia 40

LOCATION:
Kyrgyzstan is a landlocked country located in Central Asia: north of Tajikistan,
east of Uzbekistan, west of China, and south of Kazakhstan.
Kyrgyzstan means a land of Kyrgyz (Stan – land).
Until recently the country used to be referred as the “island of democracy” and
“Switzerland of Asia.”
CAPITAL:
Capital city Bishkek (called Frunze during the Soviet era) is located in the north,
in the Chuy valley near the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border, at an altitude of
approximately 800 m (2624.67 feet), on the edge of the Ala-Too range, which is
an extension of the Tien Shan mountain range. Bishkek is the largest city in the
country with a population of 824,900. 1 Manas International Airport in the
outskirts of Bishkek was home to the U.S. air base established in December 2001
to support the Operation “Enduring Freedom” but was closed in spring of 2009
following the Kyrgyz government’s decision to shut down the base. Bishkek is
also the administrative capital of Chuy Province.
Bishkek, before becoming a capital city, was a fortified Silk Road stop on the
caravan route under the Uzbek khans of large Quqon Khanate. It was then
turned into a Russian garrison when Tsarist troops occupied the region in 1862.
A large influx of ethnic Russians and later Slavs during the Russian and
Bolshevik occupations developed the city and named it Peshpek. With about 70
percent of the population represented by Russians and Slavs the city missed
indigenous historic attributes or traditional architecture making it more of a
Russian and Soviet city.
The city was later given the name Frunze after Mikhail Frunze, the Bolshevik
troop commander of the Eastern Front, ordered the onslaught of thousands of
local people who supported resistance. Commander Frunze was born in
Peshpek and the city that ironically was named in his honor in 1926.
Kyrgyz’s gratitude to the Russians, who gave pastoral nomadic Kyrgyz tribes
and juz (traditional cast based clans) independence from Uzbek Quqon Khanate
and then statehood within the Soviet Union, is expressed in preserving the
monuments of the Soviet period: the Mikhail Frunze Museum, the Monument to
the Martyrs of Revolution (in commemoration of Kyrgyz women who supported
the Bolshevik regime and organized the local mobilization in support of Red
Army) built during the Soviet period; the Lenin Statue on Ala-Too Square in
downtown Bishkek which was moved recently to a less prominent place still
surprise tourists and please old residents of the capital. Many street names and
locations also bear Soviet heritage.
1 As of December 10, 2008, according to the State Internet Portal, see http://eng.gov.kg/
1

INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR:
August 31, 1991 is celebrated as Independence Day.
Present day Kyrgyzstan was formed by the Bolsheviks in 1924, first as Kara-
Kyrgyz (Kara means black) Autonomous province of the Russian Federative
Socialist Republic after the area had been conquered by the Red Army in 1918. In
1926 it became Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and only in late
1936 was given a status of a full fledged republic.
2

Map of Kyrgyzstan
Source: http://geology.com/world/kyrgyzstan-satellite-image.shtml
3

TERRITORY:
Total: 198,500 sq km (slightly smaller than South Dakota)
Water: 7,200 sq km
Land: 191,300 sq km
Border length with China: 858km
Border length with Uzbekistan: 1,099 km
Border length with Kazakhstan: 1,224 km
Border length with Tajikistan: 870km
WEATHER:
The climate of the country varies from sub-tropical at lower altitudes in the
warm valleys, cooler continental in the mountainous valley and cold in the high
peaks of the Tian Shan Mountains. The country’s geographic partition between
north and south also offers a difference in temperature.
The warmest areas in winter are in Osh province in the south of the country. The
area to the north is Issyk-Kyl (means Hot Lake in Kyrgyz) have moderate cold
averaging -5°C in the peak of winter from late December - January.
The Ferghana Valley part of Kyrgyzstan is the warmest region with summer
temperatures reaching up +35 °C in Osh and Jalal-Abad, and just a bit cooler in
Batken. The Issyk-Kyl area never gets too hot attracting thousands of
international and local tourists to its positive health effects and pleasant summer
climate. The Highland mountain regions have short summers where the
temperature does not exceed +13°C, the long winter season lasts from
November - March with lots of snowfall and temperatures down to -20°C.
POPULATION/ DEMOGRAPHIC DATA:
As of January 1, 2008:
Total Population: 5,224,300
Urban population: 1,849,600
Rural residents: 3,402,400 2
Ethnic Composition of population as of January 2008: 3
(in alphabetical order)
Ethnic group Number of people in
thousands
Armenian 1,1 0.0
Azerbaijan 16,4 0.3
Belarus 1,8 0.0
Chechen 2,5 0.1
Percentage from total
number
2 According to the National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan. See Table: ‘Kalktyn Uluttyk Kuramy’
(national composition of population) available in Kyrgyz and Russian at
http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/razd.files/census/3.7.pdf
3 Ibid.
4

Dungan (Muslims of
Chinese origin)
60,3 1.2
Georgian 0,6 0.0
German 11,5 0.2
Jewish 0,6 0.0
Kazakh 38,9 0.7
Korean 18,2 0.4
Kyrgyz 3,616,5 69.2
Russian 456,4 8.7
Tajik 48,0 0.9
Tatar 35,0 0.7
Turkmen 0,5 0.0
Turk 36,4 0.7
Uighur 51,2 1.0
Ukrainian 25,3 0.5
Uzbek 754,5 14.5
Others 32,6 0.9
The total population was estimated: 5,224,300
PUBLIC HOLIDAYS:
January 1 - New Year
March 8 – International Women's Day
March 21 Nooruz (comes from ancient Zoroastrian tradition which many
Central Asians take for an Islamic New Year)
May 1 - International Solidarity Day
May 5 - Constitution Day
May 9 - Victory Day (until recently was celebrated as the Victory Day over
Nazi Germany in the World War II)
August 31 - Independence Day (from the USSR)
The dates of two Islamic holidays Orozo Ait (Eid al-Fitr in Arabic, the feast of
End of Ramadan) and Qurban Ait (Eid al-Adha in Arabic, the feast of the
Sacrifice) change annually depending on the Islamic calendar.
LANGUAGES:
• The official language is Kyrgyz, a Southern Turkic language which
includes many Arabic and Persian words. There are two major dialects:
one from the northern region and the other from the south.
• Russian is widely used in Bishkek, among intelligentsia, political and
business elites. It serves as the common language of communication
between various ethnic groups.
• Uzbek is spoken in Osh, Jalal-Abad and some areas of Batken provinces.
5

• English is in big demand, particularly among the youth for educational
and professional opportunities, and to access information.
ADMINISTRATIVE SETUP:
The country is divided into 7 provinces 4 which are subdivided into rayons. Rayons
are districts similar to counties in the United States; each rayon has its own
administrative center.
Rural areas consist of town type villages (in Russian: posolok gorodskogo tipa)
and ayil keneshi (union of several rural settlements 5 ) which are administered by
ayil ökmötu (village administration).
Each province has a capital. Capital Bishkek and Osh City represent separate
administrative units also being capital cities of provinces giving them special
status. Osh city is also often called “the southern capital.”
Map of administrative units: 6
Administrative Units (sequence: correspond to number on the above map):
No. Administrative Unit Area (in sq. km) Capital City
1 Bishkek city 115,700 hectares
(0.1 sq. km)
-
2 Batken Province7 17,000 (8.5% of
total territory)
Batken
3 Chuy Province 20,200 Bishkek
4 Jalal-Abad Province8 33,700 (16.9% of
total territory)
Jalal-Abad
4 Province in Kyrgyz is called oblast, a loanword from Russian.
5 In Russian: selskiy naselonyi punkt.
6 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_divisions_of_Kyrgyzstan
7 Until 1999 Batken province was a part of Osh oblast until IMU incursions into Kyrgyzstan prompted
more attention of the central government and more resources to Batken district of Osh province.
6

5 Naryn Province 45,200 (25% of total
territory)
Naryn
6 Osh Province 29,200 Osh9 7 Talas Province 11,400 (5.7% of
total territory)
Talas
8 Issyk Kul Province 43,100 (21.6% of
total territory)
Karakol
Map: Provinces and districts of Kyrgyzstan: 10
The numbers on the map above represent districts in each province:
Jalal-Abad province Talas province Ysyk-Köl province
Centre - Jalal-Abad Centre-Talas Centre-Karakol
No District Center No District Center No District Center
1 Aksy Kerben 1 Bakay-Ata Leninpol` 1 Ak-Suu Karakol
2 Ala-Buka Ala-Buka 2 Kara-Buura Kyzyl-Adyr 2 Jeti-Ögüz Kyzyl-Suu
3 Bazar- Bazar- 3 Manas Pokrovka 3 Tong Bökönbaev
Korgon Korgon
4 Chatkal Kanysh-
Kyya
4 Talas Talas 4 Tüp Tüp
5 Nooken Massy Naryn province 5 Ysyk-Köl Cholpon-Ata
6 Suzak Suzak Centre- Naryn Chüy province
7 Toguz-Toro Kazarman N o District Center
Centre- Bishkek
8 Toktogul Toktogul 1 Ak-Talaa Baetov N o District Center
8
From 1959 to 1990 was part of Osh province.
9
As of June 2003 Osh city is a separate administrative unit; at the same time it is also a capital of Osh
province.
10
Source: http://enrin.grida.no/htmls/kyrghiz/soe2/english/map/map3.htm
7

Osh province 2 At-Bashy At-Bashy 1 Alamüdün Lebedinovka
Centre - Osh 3 Jumgal Chaek 2 Chüy Chüy
No District Center 4 Kochkor Kochkor 3 Jayyl Kara-Balta
1 Alay Gülchö 5 Tyan`-Shan` Naryn 4 Kemin Kemin
2 Aravan Aravan Batken province 5 Moskva Belovodskoe
3 Chong- Daroot- Centre-Batken 6 Panfilov Kayyngdy
Alay Korgon
4 Kara-Kulja Kara-Kulja No District Center 7 Sokuluk Sokuluk
5 Kara-Suu Kara-Suu 1 Batken Batken 8 Ysyk-Ata Kant
6 Nookat Eski-Nookat 2 Kadamjay Pülgön
7 Özgön Özgön 3 Leilek Isfana
SIGNIFICANT TOPOGRAPHIC FEATURES:
The Tian Shan (in Chinese means Heavenly Mountains), Pamir and Alay
Mountain Ranges constitute most of Kyrgyzstan’s landscape. The country is rich
in lakes, rivers and glaciers which provide abundant water resources for the
country. Lake Issyk Kul is the famous tourist place in Central Asia. Song Kyl and
Chatyr Kul are other major lakes; Naryn (535 km, longest river in Kyrgyzstan),
Talas, Chuy, and Kara Darya are the longest rivers. In the southern part of the
country is the fertile soil and warm climate of the Ferghana Valley ideal for
producing agricultural products. The Chu and Talas Valleys are other areas of
irrigated land. Nearly 5 percent of the country’s total geography is woodlands.
Most of Kyrgyzstan’s area is above 1,000 m; average altitude is above 2,500 m; 40
percent is above 3,000 m; and the highest point is Peak Pobedy 11 (7,439 m).
LITERACY:
Kyrgyzstan has a legacy of high literacy achieved in Central Asia during 70 years
of Moscow’s rule over the region. According to official national census of 1999,
only 40,129 out of 3,090,680 people (population whose age was 15 years old and
older) were illiterate. 12
Due to a lack of funding in the education sector, and low pay wages for teachers
there is a shortage of teachers in both regular and vocational schools
11 In Russian pobeda means victory.
12 National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan. See Table in Russian: 5.03.00.19 Gramotnost’ naseleniya
(po dannym perepisei naseleniya) (Literacy of population (according to census). Available at:
http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/din.files/education/5030019.pdf
8

throughout the country. A 2007 report suggested the number of teachers was
only 3,000 nationwide. 13
Number of Higher Educational Institutions:
From 1990 (a year before independence) to 2007 the number of academic
institutes and universities had grown from 9 to 49, according to the National
Statistics Committee. 14 Since Kyrgyzstan allows private education almost onethird
of higher education schools are privately owned. 33 schools are public and
16 are private (including foreign/international) institutes and universities.
In the 2007-08 academic year 250,460 students were enrolled in 49 higher
education schools throughout the country. 15 The number of schools and students
are high for such a small country. Students represent nearly 5 percent of total
population (477 students per 10,000 citizens). Forms of study include full-time,
evening and distance learning taught by 14,400 teachers. Female students
constituted 56.3 percent of all students. About 55,000 applicants are accepted in
universities and institutes every year.
In 2009 the number of higher education schools grew to 55. There have been
concerns about the quality of private universities and institutes in particular
where bribes for exams are widely known. 16 A few university teachers in Osh
and Bishkek admitted to taking bribes to survive due to low wages. 17 Presently,
the position of rector (president) of a prestigious university is among the most
lucrative jobs in the country as they control the hierarchy of the bribe taking
chain.
HEALTH FACILITIES:
The Ministry of Healthcare provides official statistics on healthcare indicators
which show decline in the number of services including hospital beds, medical
personnel and healthcare facilities. 18
Hospital beds:
Number of beds per 10,000 population 19
13 “Kuda dvizhetsa sistema obrazovaniya Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki?”(Where is the education system of
Kyrgyz Republic moving to?), Emil Kanimetov, July 7, 2007. Available in Russian at:
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1189112220
14 See Table: 5.03.01.01 Chislo uchebnyx zavedeniy po vidam uchrishdenii (The number academic schools
per level of education) available in Russian, National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan at
http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/din.files/education/5030101.pdf
15 See Table: 5.03.01.04 Chislo detei i uchashihsa po vidam uchrishdenii ( Number of children and students
per level of education) available in Russian, National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan at
http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/din.files/education/5030104.pdf
16 The list of all 55 institutions in Russian is available at
http://www.minedu.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=34
17 CCCS’ interviews in Bishkek and Osh in 2005 and phone interviews in May of 2009.
18 See Report of the Ministry of Healthcare of Kyrgyzstan on reform in healthcare, in English, at
http://eng.med.kg/Files/R2004Eng.pdf
9

Province 2000 2001 2002 2003
Kyrgyz Republic 70,4 61,9 55,3 52,9
Batken 64,3 61,3 56,0 49,8
Jalal-Abad 62,2 54,8 47,3 45,7
Issyk-Kul 53,8 36,1 31,8 29,9
Naryn 59,9 57,8 34,3 31,6
Osh 60,2 56,2 52,2 53,2
Talas 58,8 55,8 40,0 27,3
Chui 56,2 34,9 32,3 31,4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bishkek city 29,5 28,8 27,1 26,4
Osh city 36,5
Doctors:
Doctors of all specialties including dentists per 10,000 populations, by
regions: 20
Year: 1996 2001 2002 2003
Administrative
Unit:
Kyrgyzstan 32,9
27,2 26,0 25,7
Bishkek city 46,2 30,7 28,7 30,1
Osh city - - - 25,2
Chui oblast 24,3 19,2 18,5 18,3
Issyk-Kul
province
27,8 22,8 21,4 20,2
Naryn
province
25,7 23,1 19,9 18,8
Talas
province
25,0 20,8 19,4 18,7
Osh
province
20,2 17,8 17,3 14,5
Jalal-Abad 20,7 16,6 15,8 15,4
province
Batken
province
- 16,3 15,7 15,4
Due to deficiency in state’s funding in the healthcare sector and widespread
poverty, access to private healthcare facilities resulted in increase of problems
related to people’s health and well being, weakening confidence in the country’s
19 Ibid, p. 14, Table 2-4. Total number of beds and number of beds per 10 000 population, by regions
(indicator 1.2/3.2) at http://eng.med.kg/Files/R2004Eng.pdf
20 Ibid, Table 2-6. Health personnel (doctors) per 10000 population, by regions (indicator
1.4.1.).
10

health facilities. The mortality rate increased from 675.3 per 100,000 in 1999 to
717.3 in 2003. 21 The child and maternal mortality rates and other indicators are
among highest in the former Soviet Union zone. Babies, children and women
while in hospitals in southern cities of Osh and Nookat were infected with HIV
via tainted blood and the reuse of needles.
As reported in U.S. press in April of 2008, 72 children and 16 mothers were
infected with HIV due to professional negligence in the Osh and Nookat state
hospitals. This illustrates the alarming state of affairs in the health sector. The
government does not provide free treatment for mother victims and only pays
$29.00 to parents of infected children for treatment. 22
According to the healthcare minister Marat Mabetov, Kyrgyzstan lacks almost 50
percent of medical cadres particularly in rural areas. 23
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE:
The government: 24
Title/position Name of person holding the position
President of Republic of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiev25 Prime Minister, Chairman of the
Cabinet of Ministers
Igor Chudinov
21 Ibid, Table 1.6. Indicator 6: Leading causes of mortality, including mortality rate per
100000 population and percent of total mortality attributable to each cause. Available at:
http://eng.med.kg/Files/R2004Eng.pdf
22 For instance read: Associated Press, April 9, 2008, ‘Kyrgyz mothers catching HIV from babies: After
contracting virus in hospitals, infants pass disease by breast-feeding’ at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24034536/
23 “Marat Mambetov: Zdravooharanenie v Kyrgyzstane ispytyvaet pochti 50-ii protsentnyi defetsit kadrov”
(Marat Mambetov: Healthcare in Kyrgyzstan experiences almost 50 percent lack of cadres), Information
Agency “24.kg,” May 29, 2009. Available in Russian at: http://www.paruskg.info/?p=10398
24 The list of members of Cabinet of Ministers as of April 25, 2009
25 Official web site of the President Bakiev: http://www.president.kg/en/
11

First
Deputy Prime-Minister
Omurbek Babanov
Deputy Prime-Minister Uktomkhan Abdullaeva
Ministers:
Minister of Economic Development
and Trade
Akylbek Japarov
Minister of Finance Marat Sultanov
12

Minister of Industry, Energy, & Fuel
Resources
Ilyas Davydov
Minister of Justice Nurlan Tursunkulov
Minister of Internal Affairs (police) Moldomusa Kongantiev
Minister of Foreign Affairs Kadyrbek Sarbaev
13

Minister of Education and Science Abdulda Musaev
Minister of Healthcare Marat Mambetov
Minister of Labor and Social
Development
Nazgul Tashpaeva
Minister of Culture and Information Sultan Raev
Minister of Defense Bakytbek Kalyev
14

Minister of Emergency Situations Kamchybek Tashiev
Minister of Agriculture, Water
Management, and Processing Industry
Minister of Transportation &
Communications
Iskenderbek Aydaraliev
Nurlan Sulaymanov
Chairpersons of the State Committees:
State Committee for National Security Murat Sutalinov
(formerly Kyrgyzstan branch of KGB)
15

State Committee for State Property
Management
State Committee for Migration and
Employment
Tursun Turdymambetov
Aigul Ryskulova
State Tax and Duties Committee Ahmatbek Keldibekov
State Committee on Customs Nurlan Akmatov
16

Official Political Parties:
Kyrgyzstan, which in the recent past was called an “island of democracy”, had
more than 100 registered political parties and movements before last
parliamentary elections in December of 2007. Easy party registration laws
allowed people to organize political groups of various orientations. Many parties
had small membership while others were even unknown by the general public.
Many parties critical of the executive branch had representation in the
legislation.
The recent amendment to the Constitution states that parliament members are
elected on the party lists basis for 5 year terms.
• Ak-Jol Eldik Partiyasi: Ak-Jol (literally translates as white road or bright path)
and Eldik Partiyasi means people’s party). Short form used: Ak-Jol. The party
was created in 2007 by the merger of Ata –Jurt (Fatherland), El Kelechegi
(Great Future), Menin Olkom (My Country), Republican Party of Labor and
Unity, and a few smaller parties informally headed by President Bakiev.
Bakiev resigned from his official chairmanship of the party because officially
the head of the executive branch cannot be a member of a political party.
President Bakiev was involved in establishing a new party which would be
loyal to the leader of the country who faced growing disagreement with the
legislative branch.
The Jogorku Kenesh (means Great Council; the name of Kyrgyz parliament)
was dissolved in 2007 by the president and his party received 71 seats out of
90 at the last parliamentary elections in December of 2007 which were
criticized by international and local observers for breaching the international
elections norms.
Many local and international experts view Bakiev’s efforts in creating a party
based parliament with a strong pro-president presence in the legislation as a way
to politically weaken traditionally independent Jogorku Kenesh and minimize
the presence of influential parties critical of the government. The victory of Ak-
Jol Party at the 2007 elections was a successful step in strengthening the power of
the executive branch.
President Bakiev’s justification for creation of a new party was announced at the
Ak-Jol party founding ceremony speech in October of 2007: “In the best cases,
they simply criticize the authorities for their mistakes. But who will, who should,
take care of affairs? Which political forces [or] political parties have done real
17

work, have made progress toward those goals that stand before the country? Up
until today, there haven't been any." 26
In reality, considering the development of political events in the country, it is
obvious that the example of the Russian former president Putin’s domination in
the Duma through “Unified Russia” Party is a motivation for legal changes in the
election of parliamentarians.
Other dominant Kyrgyz parties with large membership nationwide are:
• Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan
The party has 8 seats in the parliament.
• Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan
The party has second largest representation in the Jogorku Kenesh by occupying
11 out 90 seats.
• Socialist Party Ata-Meken (Fatherland)
• Ar-Namys (Dignity) Party
• Erkindik (Freedom)
In early May the Socialist Party Ata-Meken and the Social Democratic Party of
Kyrgyzstan decided to merge. This is most probably explained by the opposition
parties’ efforts to defeat the current president.
Jany Kyrgyzstan (New Kyrgyzstan) Party faces a split among those who call for
support of President Bakiev and those who are inclined to support opposition.
Banned Religious movements/parties:
According to the constitution, Kyrgyzstan is a secular state and no parties based
on religious platform may function legally, regardless whether they use violent
or peaceful means.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation)
The party’s goal is rebuilding the single Islamic Kilafah State (Caliphate) through
propagation and peaceful transformation of Muslim society and finally
establishing ‘Islamic household.’ 27 The radical party which is predominatly
Sunni, with Islam as an ideology, does not employ violent means but Central
Asian governments have accused HT in terrorism.
HT is anti-Western, anti-Semitic, anti-secular, considers democracy a Kufr
system, and calls for overthrow of Muslim governments which do not obey the
party’s vision of the Islamic governance and according to them, the country is
currently a ‘Kufr household.’ 28
26 “Kyrgyz President Aims to Build Ruling Party,” October 17, 2007, RFE/RL, Bruce Pannier, available at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078973.html
27 See ‘About Hizb-ut-Tahrir’ at the official web site of the party: http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/index.php
28 Ibid.
18

Hizb-ut-Tahrir members first appeared in Central Asia in mid1990s in
Uzbekistan. The massive arrest campaign launched by the government
aftermath the Tashkent February 1999 bombings brought the party in spotlight
which has been unknown for Central Asians. The government blamed IMU and
Hizb-ut-Tahrir but arrested not only alleged members of these organizations but
anybody who regularly attended prayers and was known for religious piety.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s regular members openly criticized the unpopular government
of Karimov and did not accept the offer to ask pardon from President Karimov
for pardon. The bravery brought respect of many people who might have not
shared the ideology of the organization but agreed with critical statements
towards the ruling regime.
Although the party claims to be peaceful some members left the party and either
joined the militant movements or created their separate cells (not associated with
HT) which use violence. The organization is banned in all Central Asian states.
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, despite its popularity in early stages of its appearance in Central
Asia, failed to become a popular movement due to highly secretive recruitment,
heavy repressions, little interest among populace in political Islam and
theological discrepancies with mainstream Islamic doctrine called Aqidah in
Arabic. Differences in doctrine of Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama‘ah (majority of
Muslims) and of HT is a significant obstacle for broad public support and
recruitment of new members, particularly among religiously educated Muslims.
Regular members are more preoccupied with political work and often do have
much of religious knowledge that us believe the organization is more of a secular
political party, despite religious rhetoric, than a religious organization. The
frequency and quantity of leaflet distribution among populace in the region has
been decreasing and the number of arrests of alleged members of HT has
dropped down which in combination indicate the party loses the ground in
Central Asia.
Traditionally, HT was popular among ethnic Uzbeks; besides Uzbekistan the
organization was also active in the border areas of neighboring counties
populated by ethnic Uzbeks. Currently the group is most active in Kyrgyz and
Tajik sections of the Ferghana Valley and southern regions of Kazakhstan.
HT in Kyrgyzstan: an aggressive public diplomacy
The most recent significant conflict between the authorities and HT occurred in
the city of Nookat in southern Kyrgyzstan on October 1, 2008 when locals
celebrated Islamic religious holiday Orozo Ait but the government suddenly
refused to provide the center of the city for festivities and charity which
traditionally have been held every year. The government’s refusal to allow
public celebration led to a peaceful rally to the district administration building
and then turned into mass riots. The security forces launched mass arrests: 32
individuals (25 ethnic Uzbeks and 7 ethnic Kyrgyz) had been arrested and 90
19

more people are on the government wanted list. Surprisingly the authorities
included children of 10 and even 4 years old and elderly who are 71, 74 and even
81 years old. Human rights organizations claim the police used torture during
investigation and demanded money for release among many other violations of
human rights. 29
The reason behind government’s ban on publicly celebrating Orozo Ait was fear
that HT would exploit this holiday for its pubic relations campaign when the
party members provide free meal to poor and agitate masses to join the
organization and change the government. In Kyrgyzstan’s more liberal
conditions then in other states of the region HT utilized the opportunity to
propagate its ideas more ambitiously. HT’s materials in Kyrgyz provided by
ethnic Kyrgyz were able to reach the audience in northern regions of the country,
including, Chuy, Bishkek and Naryn. In February 2007 the law enforcement
arrested 11 members of HT who came from the south to Naryn to help rebuild
the area hit by the earthquake. Despite that the party had been banned the
leadership of the outlawed group shifted from closed secretive tactics to openly
mass agitation via words and deeds to gain support.
The new government of President Bakiev is less tolerant of decent and more even
so towards Islamists of any kind. Recently the government banned headscarves
in public schools, prevented school children from attending Friday prayers and
extradited refugees from Uzbekistan. Bakiev’s policy reflects his own
authoritarian style and attempts to please the regime of Uzbekistan which
demands from Bishkek to destroy Uzbek president’s critics residing in
Kyrgyzstan when discussing the natural gas export.
According to a leading expert on Islamist organizations in Kyrgyzstan Ikbaljan
Mirsaitov, there are currently about 2,000 members of HT which is much less
than the number cited by authorities. 30 Some experts on HT in Kyrgyzstan,
including official estimates, claim the party has 15,000 members in Kyrgyzstan
and 20percent of them are representatives of various ethnic groups besides
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz: Tatars, Russians, Chechens, Meskhetian Turks and others. 31
The party is banned since 2003.
According to Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 by the U.S. State Department,
“Kyrgyz officials reported growing support for and bolder public outreach by
HT. Supporters of terrorist groups the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) were also believed to maintain a presence in
29 For more details on the conflict read the report of Human Right Center “Memorial” at
http://www.memo.ru/2009/03/02/0203091.htm
30 I. Mirsaitov, “Information on members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir is lifted up few fold,” 12 March 2009.
available at: http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1236808020
31 “Osobennosti proyavleniya politicheskogo Islama v Kyrgyzstane” (Peculiarities of development of
political Islam in Kyrgyzstan), N Kurbanova, April 28, 2009, Centrasia.ru News Agency. Available at:
http://www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1240897920
20

Kyrgyzstan, and Kyrgyz authorities alleged that both groups received material
support from HT.” 32
Other Islamist organizations banned in Kyrgyzstan:
The Kyrgyz Government and other Central Asian states, members of Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, all include the following ethnic Uyghur separatist
groups in the list of Central Asian terrorist organizations:
1. Sharqiy Turkestan Islamiy Harakati
[in English - Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement]
(a.k.a. Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party; ETIM; ETIP)
2. Sharqiy Turkestan Azatliq Teshkilati
[in English - East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO)]
China uses its power to curtail support for any Uyghur separatist group and
ethnic Uyghurs from the local governments. The region has comparatively large
economic influential Uyghur Diasporas, particularly in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan which share borders with China.
Most of Uyghurs in Central Asia are disillusioned over the Chinese
government’s policy towards approximately 18 million Turkic Muslims of the
Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), historically known as Eastern
Turkistan. Muslim ethnic groups of Kyrgyzstan and from neighboring states are
sympathetic with Uyghurs as they share common religion, culture and history
viewing China’s presence as illegitimate while Central Asian leaders extradite
“the enemies of Chinese State” without much investigation as to whether the
person was actually involved in separatist, terrorist or extremist activities. In
2006, Huseyin Celil, a naturalized Canadian citizen of Uyghur origin who fled
China in mid-1990s, has been sent back to the People’s Republic of China by the
Uzbek authorities despite the protests of human rights organizations and the
Canadian authorities. The extradition of Uyghurs to China is a matter of tensions
between Uyghur Diasporas and the local governments.
32 Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, U.S. State Department, Chapter 2. Country Reports: South and
Central Asia Overview, Kyrgyzstan, available at: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122434.htm
21

HUMAN TERRAIN:
Kyrgyz are the dominant ethnic group in the country estimated at 3,616,500 or
69.2 percent of population as of January 2008. 33 The nation is predominantly
Sunni Muslim of Hanafi School of Jurisprudence.
There are traditional kin-based and regional cleavages beneath the modern
structure of the Kyrgyz society which dominate the political culture and explain
the trajectory of events.
Kyrgyz Clans Networks
Kyrgyz people received statehood only after the arrival of Russian Bolshevik
administration. It divided the territory ruled by Central Asian Khanates along
the ethnic lines resulting in creation of an autonomous republic in 1926. In 1936
it became a full fledged member of the union of 15 Soviet states. Disjoined
nomadic tribal group identities were represented in the pre-Soviet period rather
than one unified national identity.
The outcomes of the Tulip Revolution reveal the significance of clanship and
political culture. A wished overthrow of the Akaev’s old corrupt and nepotistic
network and the re-installment of another clan occurred when the more vicious
group of Bakiev’s family members and friends came to power and redistributed
resources.
Although tribal or regional affiliations might not matter in relation to various
issues of everyday life, they are important for politicians in Bishkek. Igor
Chudinov believes his ethnicity (Russian) was an important factor when he was
appointed as Prime Minister: “I’ll say openly: I am the least one in this country
under the influence of local clans and regional groupings.” 34 Most Kyrgyz are
attached to certain regional and tribal groupings. Slavs, who migrated to the
country during the Soviet period, have no local roots and are considered neutral
in local rivalries and are regarded as good professionals.
Today kin based clanship and regionalism, important elements of political
culture of Kyrgyz, still exist and play a significant role in political life in the
rivalry for access to economic assets. To residents of rural areas the extended
family is still an important part of self-identity, less so for urbanized Kyrgyz.
Clanship:
TRIBAL DIVISION OF KYRGYZ ETHNOS
Kyrgyz are divided into 3 major tribal confederations:
33 According to the National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan the total population was estimated
5,224,300. See Table: ‘Kalktyn Uluttyk Kuramy’ (national composition of population) available in Kyrgyz
and Russian at http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/razd.files/census/3.7.pdf
34 Intervyi na temy, Moskovskii Komsomolets, January 28, 2008, posted by Tazar.kg. Available at:
http://www.tazar.kg/news.php?i=7723
22

“Sol kanat”
(the left wing)
also called “Arkalyk”
Ichkilik
(internal)
“Ong kanat”
(the right wing)
also called “Otuz Uul”
According to North – South informal regional divide the tribal groupings are
informally associated with :
“Northerners” “Southerners” “Southerners”
Has 7 tribes in the north
and west of the country:
1. Sary Bagysh
2. Kushchu
3. Solto
4. Tynay
5. Sayak
6. Saru
Each of the seven has a
dominant characteristic,
and all have fought each
other for influence.
Majority of the country’s
leaders, including Askar
Akaev came from
the Sarybagysh clan.
Sarybagysh clan in
Akayev’s government
was represented by many
government officials. The
list includes:
- Temirbek Akmataliev,
minister of finance,
comes from
Akayev’svillage and clan;
-Tashtemir Aitbaev,
minister of Interior;
-Cholpon Baekova,
chairperson of
Constitutional Court;
Osmanakun Ibraimov,
secretary of state;
- Bolot Dzhanuzakov,
chairman of National
This group includes
several tribes, some of
which were not of ethnic
Kyrgyz origin (for
instance Kypchaks) but
have assimilated with
ethnic Kyrgyz and now
view themselves as
Kyrgyz.
Reside in Osh, Batken
and parts of Jalal -Abad
provinces in thee south.
Some locals believe that
President Bakiev is of
Uighur origin.
Has less and smaller
ribes than northerners.
Geographically based in
Jalal-Abad and partially
Osh provinces of
southern part of the
country.
Southern Osh province had 5 governors from the
northern part of the country appointed by Akaev.
Former president’s frequent reshuffling of northern
governors, who were perceived by southerners as
rivals against the southerners coming to extract
resources for personal enrichment, had increased
frustration in the south.
During Akaev era prominent public figures and MPs
Azimbek Beknazarov, Adahan Madumarov,
Omurbek Tekebaev, Dooronbek Sadyrbaev,
Masaliev, Bekturn Asanov and Alisher
Abdimomjunov all have ties with Ichkilik clans
based either in Osh, Jalalabad or Batken regions in
south. Once prime Minister under Akaev and current
president Bakiev is also an Ichkilik southerner.
23

Security service;
- Amanbek Karypkulov,
chief of presidential staff.
A group of Kypchaks, a Turkic sub-ethnic group within Kyrgyz, demanded a
separate status of nationality as a sovereign ethnic group during the national
census conducted in Kyrgyzstan in March – April of 2009. Kypchaks, once a
powerful confederation of pastoral steppe tribes and brave warriors, migrated to
Central Asia from the Irtysh River basin. They constitute a sub-ethnic group
either within larger Kyrgyz or Kazakh ethnic groups. The Kypchak language is
lost and they speak the language of the dominant ethnicity of the locality:
Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh in Kazakhstan and Uzbek in Uzbekistan. Today
most of Kypchaks reside in the Ferghana Valley.
North – South regional divide:
High mountainous landscapes divide the Chuy, Talass, Issyk-Kul and Naryn
provinces in the north from Osh, Bakten and Jalal-Abad provinces in the south.
The two regions of the country are linked by the Bishkek – Osh road. Costly
flights run daily between the two major cities and less frequent flights between
Bishkek to Batken and Jalal-Abad cities. Despite comparatively new unifying
common ethnic identity, the differences in historical, political and economic
developments impact relationships between regional and kinship affiliations.
The Bolsheviks did not disrupt the internal political rivalry between local elites
as long as they were loyal to Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
political battle of the former nomadic horse shepherds in the north which
undergone forceful urbanization and embraced Russification against the settled
tribes of the agricultural south, where Islam and close interaction with Uzbek
and Tajik cultures had a significant influence, reemerged and the appearance of
little known Askar Akaev became a result of an inter-regional political
settlement.
North and South have their regional dialects of the Kyrgyz language.
Major ethnic minorities
Uzbeks:
Ethnic Uzbeks represent 14.5 percent of the total population. Uzbeks constitute
the majority of important southern cities such as Osh, Kar-Suu and Jalal – Abad.
Uzbeks were the largest indigenous minority since the region was under the
Uzbek Qoqon Khanate until the Bolsheviks divided the major local ethnic groups
into separate republics but the borders were drawn with a high degree of
planned arbitrariness.
Inter-ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz which erupted in June of 1990
in the Osh province resulted in nearly 1,000 casualties, most of whom were
Uzbeks. Sponsored by the KGB, which tried to instigate inter-ethnic conflicts to
regain control of the colonies, Kyrgyz nationalists organized violent attacks on
24

Uzbeks with the epicenter in Uzgen, an ancient Uzbek city. Violence was
characterized by brutality towards women, children and the elderly. This event
planted the seeds of mistrust between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the south.
Although there is status quo in relationship between the two it is more fragile
than it may appear on the surface.
Since Kurmabek Bakiev assumed the presidency, arrests and kidnappings of
ethnic Uzbeks allegedly linked to Hizb-ut-Tahrir and IMU by the National
Security of Uzbekistan with permission of the Kyrgyz authorities have increased
and have led to at least two killings of prominent Uzbeks. These developments
along with the underrepresentation of Uzbeks in the government and in law
enforcement add to the level of tensions between two ethnic groups.
Russians:
Currently, less than a half million ethnic Russians reside in Kyrgyzstan while in
1999 they numbered 603, 201. 35 During the years of independence every third
Russian (or nearly 700,000) left the country. Most Russians (Slavs in general)
reside in major cities, primarily Bishkek and Osh.
The first wave of emigration started in 1989 and in the early years of
independence in the early 1990s. The inter-ethnic clashes in the Ferghana Valley
during Gorbachov’s political relaxation period, although not anti-Russian, raised
fear among Russian Diaspora which forced more than 100,000 Russians to leave
Kyrgyzstan.
With independence most government positions were transferred to ethnic
Kyrgyz and many Russians realized their dominant status was lost. Anti-
Russian statements by Kyrgyz nationalists on the community level made
Russians feel threatened politically and sometimes physically which contributed
to departure of thousands of ethnic Russians and Slavs from the country.
However, high unemployment and low wages became the major factor of the
second wave of emigration which started in the late 1990s. Worsening socioeconomic
conditions, corruption, police abuse and lack of employment
opportunities continue motivating many Russians to depart the Kyrgyz
Republic.
Kyrgyz - Russian relations are usually stable and positive. Closer relations
between the two states were solidified by closer of the U.S. air base at Manas
International Airport which was aimed at receiving economic compensation
from Russia.
In comparison with Uzbekistan the Kyrgyz government has tried to preserve
Russian Diaspora which consisted of highly trained professionals the country
lacked with the departure of thousands of qualified personnel.
35 Table 5.01.00.03 ‘Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniya’ (Ethnic composition of population), available at:
http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/din.files/census/5010003.pdf
25

RELIGIONS/SECTS:
Ethnic Kyrgyz constitute the majority of population and the second largest
ethnic group Uzbeks are both Sunni Muslims of Hanafi School of Jurisprudence.
Ethnic Russians belong to the Russian Orthodox Church.
Nominally Muslim nomadic tribes of Kyrgyz, more in the past than at present,
also practiced their ancient local religious traditions, including shamanism,
which were at odds with Islam. Kyrgyz in the south are generally more religious
than in the north due to the influence of the Uzbeks and Tajiks of the Ferghana
valley. Although Quqon Khanate ruled from 1710 to 1876 over all Kyrgyz tribes
the modern southern Kyrgyzstan is geographically closer to the capital of the
Khanate in the Ferghana Valley city of Quqon. In recent years the north has seen
an increase in the percentage of Kyrgyz who have strong religious sentiments
towards Islam in comparison with previous years. The Central Mosque in capital
Bishkek is overcrowded at Friday prayers and now donations are being collected
for construction of a new mosque for 10,000 worshipers in the capital. Many
mosques have been built in other cities in the north during the independence.
Uzbeks, residing in the south, have traditionally been religious and are viewed
by Kyrgyz nationalists and the secular government with suspicion. The southern
Kyrgyzstan with its center city of Osh was an epicenter of anti-Bolshevik
resistance in 1920s.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union Western Evangelist Christian missionaries,
mostly from America, descended on the Kyrgyz soil in an effort to recruit
converts from among formerly atheist Soviet populations.
FOREIGN MILITARY BASES:
Russian military base in Kant
Located only 20 km from the capital Bishkek is the military base originally
established in 1941 (after the invasion of German Nazi forces into the USSR) as a
Soviet air force base. It also served as a military pilot training school for military
air crews for the Soviet Air Force.
The Russian-Kyrgyz agreement of 2003 authorized Russian military to rent the
base for 15 years with a 5 year extension term. The Russian Federation spent US
$2.6 million in upgrading the base in 2003 and intends to invest even more to
reconstruct the runways which should be able to accept heavy TU-160 and TU-95
(“Bear”) bombers.
The airbase, under command of the Russian 5 th Air Army based in Uralsk
Military District, is also used by the Collective Security Treaty Organization
26

[CSTO], a security alliance of some post-Soviet states 36 led by Russia aiming to
foster its influence over the region.
The Kant base presently hosts about 500 Russian troops, four L-39 combat
training jets, two MI-8 combat transport helicopters, five SU-25 attack aircrafts
and five SU-27 fighters and six IL-76 transport aircrafts.
In late April of 2009 Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary-General of CSTO, during a
visit to Kyrgyzstan said that Russia's leadership plans to increase the number of
military aircraft at Kant. He explained the decision is dictated by the situation in
the region, including Afghanistan. 37
In late May of 2009 the Russian Government proposed 49 years long lease
contract with 25 years of automatic prolongation if no sides decides to end the
deal. The Kyrgyz side expressed its readiness to accept the offer. President
Medvedev is to sign the document which will then be sent to Bishkek for
consideration.
Kyrgyzstan receives US$ 4,5 million and military and technical aid from Russia
as a compensation for rent of the Kant base. 38
US Air Base at Manas International Airport
The US base was established in support of Operation “Enduring freedom” in
December of 2001 on the territory of the Manas International Airport in the
outskirts of capital Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan, threatened by Taliban’s expansion close
to the borders of the former Soviet Central Asian states and in expectation of
financial compensation, expressed its willingness to host the American and
NATO forces targeting Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan.
American Manas Air Base was home to the 376th Air Expeditionary Wing and
approximately 1,000 military personnel from the United States, Spain and France
are assigned to the wing, along with 650 U.S. and host-nation contractor
personnel. Coalition aircrafts supporting the mission includes U.S. KC-135s,
Spanish C-130s and French C135FRs. 39
36 Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are members of this
organization. There are rumors that Uzbekistan is considering to leave CSTO.
37 “Russian will beef up Kyrgyz base,” April 21, 2009, The Moscow Times.com. Available at:
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/376415.htm
38 “News: Russian Govt. Approves Kyrgyz Airbase Lease Extension to 49 Years,” May 29, 2009. Available
at: http://defense-technologynews.blogspot.com/2009/05/dtn-news-russian-govt-approves-kyrgyz.html
39 More information on the US Manas Air base can be obtained from its official web site:
http://www.manas.afcent.af.mil/
27

On February 20, 2009 the Foreign Ministry of Kyrgyzstan delivered an official
letter to the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek demanding the base to be closed within 6
months. Although Russian and Kyrgyz authorities deny the closure of the
American base was the result of Russia’s financial assistance package promised
to an impoverished country. Since the region depends heavily on foreign aid,
many observers believe Russians promised to provide 2,150 million in loans to
cement Moscow’s diplomatic efforts to oust the U.S. bases from the region.
There were long negotiations between the United States and Kyrgyzstan
interceded by Afghan President Karzai who asked Kyrgyz president to allow
Americans to continue renting the base. The American side offered to pay a
higher rent if the Kyrgyz government reconsiders its decision to evict US and
NATO troops.
In result of the extensive talks between the two sides the agreement was reached:
the military base will turn into a cargo transit center of non-military items into
Afghanistan. The Kyrgyz government agreed to use the Manas airport in
exchange for higher rent in the amount of US$ 60 million and aid to Kyrgyzstan
in the amount of US$ 41, 5 million. 40
During the meeting between Russian President Medvedev and President Obama
in Moscow in early July Moscow the deal was signed that will allow U.S. military
cargo aircrafts to overfly Russian airspace and transit overland necessary
military and non-military deliveries to Afghanistan which most probably will
lead to Kyrgyzstan’s permission to transport military shipments despite “nonmilitary
items only” agreement.
SECURITY SITUATION
There are currently several important internal and external developments which
will influence the security situation in the country:
A. Internal developments:
1. Presidential elections on July 23, 2009;
2. Criminalization of politics;
3. Sharpened tensions between powerful political and business elites;
4. Return of a large army of labor migrants put additional pressure on poor
socio-economic conditions
B. External developments:
1. Political/security situation in Afghanistan;
2. Kyrgyz – Uzbek relations
40 "МК": С "Ганси" выдачи нет. Киргизия заработала на одной базе дважды, Igor Karmazin,
Moskovskiy Komsomlotes, June 24, 2009. Available at: http://www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1245796800
28

Internal Developments:
Presidential Elections (July 23, 2009)
The important event for Kyrgyzstan in 2009 and beyond is the election of the
president for next 4 years. Considering the present tendency towards
authoritarianism, the outcomes of the elections will have serious implications for
the political trajectory of the country. The authorities and the political parties in
parliament worry that the funding which NGOs receive from abroad will
influence the course of elections and ultimately may sponsor President Bakiev’s
defeat.
The Ak-Jol and the Communist parties are sponsoring a new legislation to ban
NGOs from engagement in political activity and elections, including election
monitoring which should be enacted before the July 23rd presidential election.
Pro-President party Ak-Jol which holds 71 seats and its ally - the Communists
occupying 8 seat out of total 90 in the parliament, have been suspicious of links
between local NGOs. They also view the West as an orchestrating force of color
revolutions in the post-Soviet space. Considering the pro-Russian sentiments
prevailing in the Jogorky Kenesh (Kyrgyz parliament) the government and its
allies in the legislature have taken all measures to oppose the opposition’s
victory during the election.
There are additional changes in the election process which will help the
president:
• According to Constitution, no less than 50,000 signatures must be
presented in the application for official registration of presidential
candidates;
• The Government banned local NGOs and the country representation
offices of international organizations from monitoring the election process
at the ballots;
• Ink marks on hands during the election which prevented people from
voting several times for their candidates will not be used this time;
• Driver license which is not a significant ID as it is in the United States and
which is easier to obtain than the passport will be sufficient to vote.
President Bakiev submitted his application to the Central Commission on
Elections and Referendums [CCER] 41 to run for elections for the second term.
As of June 15, 2009 CCER registered the applications from the following
candidates, besides the president:
1. Temir Sariev - the leader of “Ak- Shumkar” political party;
41 Official web site of the Commission: http://www.shailoo.gov.kg/
29

2. Jenishbek Nazaraliev - a famous doctor and the head of a well known clinic
in Bishkek;
Other three politicians have submitted the applications but are still waiting the
decision of Central Commission on Elections and Referendums which presently
checks the applications and signatures of their supporters and conducts the
Kyrgyz language knowledge test of candidates:
1. Nurlan Motuev, a businessman informally called a “coal king” and also the
leader of the “Zhoomart” people’s patriotic movement;
2. Toktayim Umetalieva – chairperson of the Association of non-governmental
and non-commercial oranizations;
3. Almazbek Atambaev - the chairman of Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan.
He was chosen as a candidate from United People’s Movement that brought
together opposition fractions aimed at defeating the current president.
CCER rejected the application documents from Akbaraly Aitikeev, a
businessman and chairman of the Party for protection of interests of agriculture
industry employees and low income families. CCER claimed many signatures of
his supporters were forged.
Among all candidates the strongest political challenge to President Bakiev is
expected from Almazbek Atambaev.
At the meeting between President Bakiev and some NGOs participants in May,
they agreed to create a Coordinative Council of government structures and
NGOs. It is expected that the meetings between the government and the civil
society sector will be held regularly. However leading NGOs linked to political
opposition and human rights groups did not join the event. The creation of the
council is perceived by critics as the government’s instrument of pacifying the
disparagement from opposition rather than a sincere attempt to solve the
problems of authoritarianism, corruption, criminality, unsolved cases of political
assassinations.
The largest party in the parliament Ak-Jol announced it will fully support
President Bakiev at the presidential elections. The Party of Communists of
Kyrgyzstan stated they would not have a candidate from the party but will
support the incumbent president. The Communist Party which had been in
opposition to the former President Akaev is loyal to the current president who
allowed the party to get few seats in the parliament in exchange for loyalty.
The growing number of candidates and a split among opposition parties make it
easy for current president to win the elections.
Issue of Returning Labor Migrants
Up to 300,000 Kyrgyzstan’s labor migrants are expected to return from Russia
and Kazakhstan in 2009. The influx of a large number of unemployed who will
30

need jobs or welfare is a serious concern for national and local authorities. The
population heavily suffering from unemployment and low wages now will face
even further social problems and economic hardships. People also expect a price
increase for major food items like bread and flour of 15-20 percent. Housing
services are expected to increase up to 45 percent. 42
Criminalization of Politics
Employing criminal groups by the new leadership that needed broader public
support and access to economic resources in early stages of Bakiev’s realm has
led to legitimization of some powerful criminal figures attempting to dominate
politics and state assets. Since Kurmanbek Bakiev became president in 2005 the
killings and unresolved mysterious deaths of politicians and journalists has
become a part of political life in the country. In the first two years after the Tulip
Revolution contract killings took the lives of 25 famous public figures, including
businessmen, politicians, a famous actor and a well known sportsman. 43
On April 4, 2009 the murder of the fifth parliamentarian within last four years
sparked a lot of debate and claims within the Kyrgyz society about President
Bakiev’s close ties with the criminal world: Tashbolot Baltabaev, a leading
member of the opposition party ‘Ata Meken’ and a parliamentarian, suspects
that “The criminal world and [political] power go hand in hand, and that is
regarded as being in the order of things.” He further warns that “… the
shootouts and contract killings will continue.” 44
The list of individuals involved in politics killed/ dead/ disappeared since
2005:
1. Parliamentarian Sanjarbek Kadyraliev, killed outside his home on April 14,
2009 by an unidentified lone gunman who shot him once in the back of the head.
Politician and businessman Kadyraliev was close to the president and belonged
to pro-presidential political party Ak Zhol (White Path). Kadyraliev is known for
his criminal past when he confronted another gang group leader in the south
Bayaman Erkinbayev who was also MP. Many believe Kadyraliev is responsible
for the assassination of his major mafia rival Erkinbayev.
2. Former head of the president’s administration Medet Sadyrkulov was killed in
a car incident on March 13, 2009. The investigation is under way. Some
opposition figures accused the government in organizing the car crash to
42 “Kyrgyzstan: Returning Labor Migrants are a Cause for concern,” Eurasianet.org, April 3, 2009.
Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav040309e.shtml
43 “Kyrgyzstan: Impediments to State-Building,” Johan Engvall, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=34004
44 ‘Politician’s Murder Shakes Kyrgyzstan,’ Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Anara Yusupova and
Ayday Tokonova, RCA, No.573, April 16, 2009, Available at:
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=351794&apc_state=henprca
31

eliminate an influential politician who joined the opponents of President Bakiev
and a former presidential aide who knew “too much” about his former boss. 45
3. The political observer of ‘Reporter – Bishkek’ independent newspaper Syrgak
Abdyldaev was knifed on March 3, 2009 by unidentified individuals. The
journalist produced critical reports about the government’s policies which many
observers believe became the reason for the authorities’ vendetta against
Abdyldaev. He is in critical conditions.
4. Parliamentarian Ruslan Shabatoev a member of the opposition Social
Democratic Party, disappeared in late of 2008. The police investigation produced
no results.
5. A well-known journalist for Voice of America Alisher Saipov (an ethnic
Uzbek) was shot outside of his office in Osh in late October 2007. He is believed
to be have been killed by Uzbek National Security Service on the territory of
Kyrgyzstan for critical reporting about Uzbek president with illicit approval of
President Bakiev. This was inn exchange for a better natural gas supply deal
from Uzbekistan for natural gas hungry Kyrgyzstan.
6. In August of 2006 the Kyrgyz security service officers shot a famous Imam
Rafiq Qori Kamoluddin, an ethnic Uzbek preacher whose mosque attracted up to
10,000 people at a Friday prayer in the border city of Kara-Suu. Imam was well
known for his criticism of Karimov’s foreign and internal policies. Qori
Kamoluddin’s supporters believe he was killed by the Kyrgyz troops but on the
request from an Uzbek counterpart.
7. Chairman of the Kyrgyz parliament's committee for legal affairs, defense and
law and order Tynychbek Akmatbaev was shot dead in Moldavanovka prison
near the capital on October 22, 2005 when he tried to pacify prisoners’ protest
against bad conditions in Kyrgyz jail. Experts on Kyrgyz politics believe the
newly appointed president relied on support of Tynychbek Akmatbaev’s brother
Rysbek who was allegedly a mafia baron in the north of the country where
southerner President Bakiev had little support. Prime Minister Kulov had an
alliance with the rival underworld gang leader Azizbek Batukaev, an ethnic
Chechen accused in killing MP Akmatbaev who also had ties with the criminal
world in the past. The conflict between two powerful criminal groups led to
conflict between President Bakiev and then Prime Minister Kulov which
indicates the ability of influential criminal figures to project power on the
government. Following the death of Tynychbek his brother, a mafia baron
Rysbek, became MP after being cleared of triple homicide. During Akaev
45 Read ‘Kyrgyz Politician’s Death Widens Opposition-Government Gulf,’ Institute for War & Peace
Reporting, Anara Yusupova and Ayday Tokonova, RCA, No.570, March 16, 2009, Available at:
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=351039&apc_state=henprca
32

presidency Rysbek Akmatbaev was wanted on a list of charges at home but
President Bakiev’s alleged support for Rysbek set the notorious criminal and his
six accomplices free of all charges. In May of 2006 mafia boss and newly elected
MP Rysbek Akmatbaev was shot dead in outskirts of capital Bishkek, however
there were rumors that he is alive but faked his assassination.
8. Bayaman Erkinbayev, a member of the Kyrgyz parliament since 1995 and a
supporter of President Akaev who was also known as a leader of a powerful
criminal group in the south, did not survive the third assassination attempt.
Bishkek died on September 21 and various explanations were rumored about
who killed Erkinbayev but the law enforcement offered no credible conclusions
of the official investigation. Some experts believe Erkinbayev was killed by a
rival criminal group that tried to seize the strategic economic asset - Kara-Suu
bazaar on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border which brought lucrative profits to the
owner of this market. Others suspect the new political leadership got rid of a
pro-Akaev politician and a powerful gang leader to control the rich resources of
the southern region. By installing new criminal leaders loyal to a new
government the president ensures political support in the south and access to
wealth for his family.
9. Parlamentarian Jyrgalbek Surabaldiev, who was known for his sympathy with
former president Akaev, was killed by unidentified gunmen on June 10, 2005 in
the centre of Bishkek. The assailants have not been found. MP Surabaldiev head
of the “Union of Entrepreneurs –New Step” and a powerful businessman was
also suspected in having ties with criminal groups that caused suspicion that
criminal groups behind then Acting President Bakiev were redistributing
resources and eliminating competitors. This is the first case of an MP murder in
Kyrgyzstan.
A well recognized expert on Kyrgyzstan Erica Marat says new hybrids of power
relations developed within the state after the Tulip Revolution, “Common
economic interests between criminal and political actors merged within the state
apparatus. Both groups could operate in sync in maintaining licit and illicit
businesses while simultaneously representing the state and enjoying legal
status.” 46
Many observers claim Bakiev’s family members are involved in illegal business
activities occupying important positions in the government while formally
engaging in the private sector. Many Kyrgyzstanis say that Bakiev’s family is
much larger than of the former president (Askar Akaev has no brothers; Bakiev
has seven brothers) and therefore the current president and his family has
significantly higher financial and political appetite. 47
46 “The State Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime, and Corruption in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,” Erica Marat, Silk Road Paper, October 2006, p. 93. Available at:
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0610EMarat.pdf
47 CCS’s phone interviews with several residents in Bishkek and Osh, April 2009.
33

Local and foreign journalists cite that businessman Maxim Bakiev, President’s
younger son whose nickname is ‘prince”, is connected to the criminal world and
engaged in extortion and other illegal economic crimes. 48 The famous case of
Maxim’s efforts to seize a profitable TV Radio company ‘Pyramida’ in December
of 2005 symbolized the aims and tactics of President Bakiev’s family clan. These
are more dangerous than of the family of former President Akaev.
Despite that Maxim denies his involvement in politics and claims he’s only a
businessman there are allegations of Maxim’s political pressure on his father’s
opponents. Former head of the Central Election Commission (CEC) Klara
Kabilova in a video address to citizens of Kyrgyzstan 49 accused Maksim Bakiev
of threatening her in front of employees. This threat was made in front of
employees of the CEC one week before the elections for 491 city and town
council positions. 50
There are rumors that the president’s brother Janybek (more often called Janysh)
Bakiev is controlling drug trafficking in the south. In 2006 Janysh was fired as
deputy head of the National Security Service after the parliament learned he was
helping his brother to get rid of powerful critics. Janysh allegedly ordered the
deputy head of Manas International Airport to plant drugs in the luggage of
highly respected Parliamentarian Tekebaev who was travelling to Poland in
2006. 51 Since his brother acme president Major General Janybek Bakiev has
installed many corrupt police officers on key positions in law enforcement in the
south to arrange the smooth delivery of drugs. 52
In general crimes of various types are on the rise. According to statistics from
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as of February of 2009, 2,600 crimes were
reported which is 5.1 percent higher than in February of 2008 and 18.6 percent
higher than the previous month. Murder rate increased to 14.8 percent from
48
For instance read articles: “Kyrgyz TV Station alleges takeover attempt,” Eurasianet.org Daily Digest,
December 9, 2005. Available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200512/0006.shtml or read in Russian “Delo
Poroskuna-Sirotinoy nesot risk dla kirgizkix elit: Vsesilnyi mladshiy syn prezidenta Kirgizii ‘prins’
Maksim Bakiev otobral u zakonnyx vladeltsev pansionat ‘Utos’ na beregu Issyk-Kyla” ( The case of
Poroskun-Sirotina bears a serious risk for the Kyrgyz elites: almighty younger son of Kyrgyz president
‘prince’ Maxim Bakiev forcefully took over ‘Utos’ resort on the beach of Issyk-Kul Lake) by Viktor
nesinov, December 13, 2007. Available at http://compromat.ru/page_24966.htm
49
Video address of Klara Kabilova in Russian is available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQbC1VhzI50
50
Read “Local Kyrgyz elections spark national uproar, amid fraud allegations and threats” The ISCIP
Analyst Volume XV Number 2 (9 October 2008), Section: Central Asia, at
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol15/ed1502.html
51
For details on this case read “Kyrgyzstan Rocked by Smear Scandal,” Institute for War & Peace
Reporting, RCA No. 463, 12-Sep-06, at
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=323794&apc_state=henirca2006
52
“Narkotiki vygodnee amerikanskoy bazy” (Drugs are more profitable than American base), Positsiya.ru
Internet news agency, April 24, 2009. Available at: http://www.posit.kz/?lan=ru&id=105&pub=23920
34

February 2008 to February of 2009; an increase is also cited for other type of
offenses: rape up 3.8 percent, hooliganism up 1.7 percent; burglary up 3.9 percent
and economic crimes up 1.4 percent. 53
Anara Tabyshalieva, a well - established specialist on Kyrgyz politics, claimed
that there were 24 known organized criminal groups and four criminal networks
in the country in 2006. 54
President Bakiev’s attempts to strengthen his grip on power and secure his reelection
in July of 2009 are managed by his family members and friends
occupying lucrative positions in the government and seizing maximum assets
from the private sector. More than former president Akaev the current president
relies on services of the criminal authorities in pacifying resistance to his political
and financial advancement throughout the country. Although the nexus between
the political elite and the criminal groups existed before the 2005 Tulip
Revolution, the mafia barons have never been as influential as they are now. This
threatens the country by shifting the balance towards further criminalization of
state institutions and monopolizing the economic policies which will ultimately
lead to turning the republic into a criminal state.
Sharpened Tensions between
Powerful Political and Business Elites
The 2005 Tulip Revolution disrupted the inter-clan equilibrium established
during the Akaev era and triggered the attention of political and business elites
whose well-being depends on new parity between the players.
Surprisingly even for opposition leaders to Akaev, their bet on Kurmanbek
Bakiev brought disillusionment when the new president dismantled the old king
and now tries to become a new one.
The emergence of new people in the political and business arena associated with
the new president and their gains at the expense of the old powerful figures is
still an ongoing process and needs careful attention. Resource are scarce and the
country cannot satisfy economic demands of all interested parties while general
socio-economic conditions of the common people do not improve. The
traditional thirst for political power in Kyrgyz society is explained by the
centralized distribution of resources by the executive branch with the private
sector largely dependent on ties with powerful politicians. Therefore access to
political power gives access to economic resources and exemption from the law.
53 Kyrgyz Respublikasynyn sotsialdyk-ekonomikalyk abaly (Social-economic situation in Kyrgyz
Republic), January – February 2009, National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyz Republic, Monthly
Publication, Bishkek 2009, Section Prestupnost’ (Crime), pp. 110-111. Report is available in Kyrgyz and
Russian at: http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/doclad/obzor2.pdf
54 See “Political violence on the rise in Kyrgyzstan,” Anara Tabyshalieva, 01/25/2006 issue of the CACI
Analyst, at http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3691
35

Along with economic contention between powerful elites there is growing
political opposition to President Bakiev. Although unable to unite the opposition
parties and the NGOs intend to confront the current president during the
elections.
There are growing fears in Kyrgyzstan that Kurmanbek Bakiev will be willing to
use force against demonstrators if unfair elections in July spark public revolt.
The July presidential elections will be the test for Bakiev and his clan’s strategy to
neutralize rivals and weaken political opposition. His victory in the elections will
allow him to further strengthen his personal grip on power and widen Bakiev
clan’s access to national assets.
External Developments:
Kyrgyzstan’s security and economic conditions are subject to a significant
influence from external relations with next door neighbors, regional and global
players. Poor in natural resources and technologically disadvantaged, a nation is
isolated from seaports and dependant on neighbors for communication and
energy and totally reliant on larger players like Russia and China for security.
At this moment of the history Kyrgyz Republic faces challenges in relations with
Uzbekistan and has growing concerns over the situation in Afghanistan.
Political/security situation in Afghanistan
Starting 1999 the Kyrgyz Republic has been affected by the instability in
Afghanistan. During the conflict between the Northern Alliance and Taliban,
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, in an attempt to overthrow the regime of
President Karimov in Uzbekistan, tried to infiltrate southern Batken province on
their way to Uzbekistan. Uzbek Islamists also crossed Kyrgyz border and clashed
with the law enforcement in 2000 and 2006.
Kyrgyz military is underequipped and poorly trained which makes it incapable
defending the republic from external threats. Kyrgyzstan heavily relies on
security and military aid from Russia, China and the U.S.
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan views southern Kyrgyzstan, which is a part
of the Ferghana Valley, as a recruiting ground for support and an integral part of
the Islamic state they aim to build in Central Asia.
Incursions of Central Asian Islamist groups linked with Taliban and Al-Qaida
into Kyrgyzstan and other states of the region might intensify due to military
operations against Taliban and Al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Authorities of Kyrgyzstan claimed on June 23, 2009 the units of Kyrgyz National
Security Committee clashed with and killed 5 well trained and equipped fighters
of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in a private house full of explosives and
ammunition in Tashbulak settlement of Suzak District of Jalal-Abad province
36

neighboring with Uzbekistan – the prime target of IMU and IJU. 55 The Kyrgyz
officials identified the militants but refused to announce the names but admitted
they are not citizens of Uzbekistan and belong to IMU. 56 Although the Kyrgyz
officials believe the Islamist group linked with Taliban was IMU it is possible
that the five member group identified in Ferghana Valley was a cell of Islamic
Jihad Union fighters which launched attack on law-enforcement in Andijan
province of Uzbekistan on May 26.
Kyrgyz – Uzbek Relations
The relations between the two have a significant impact on Kyrgyzstan’s
economic development and security. Several important issues impede healthy
relations between the neighbors: water distribution, hydro-electric stations,
border demarcation, and water supply.
• Water distribution
Water sharing between upstream countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on one
side and downstream states Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the
other side becomes a cornerstone issue for regional stability. Decrease of water
levels, mainly coming from Syr Darya and Amy Darya and continuous growth of
water consumption due to increase of population in the region, Kyrgyzstan’s
(Kambarata -1 and Kambarata -2) and Tajikistan’s (Rogun) plans to build giant
hydro-electric stations are of great concern for downstream countries. These
issues along with the Aral Sea disaster are serious problems the leaders from five
states have enormous difficulties to resolve.
The Kyrgyz authorities seem to be very determined to build the gigantic
Kambarata hydroelectric stations despite strong resentment from Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. Addressing the meeting with NGOs in Bishkek on May 5
President Bakiev announced: "We will build the Kambarata hydroelectric power
stations in Kyrgyzstan whether one likes it or not." 57
Kyrgyzstan tries to establish the new terms for water, which should be treated as
commodity with a price set by upstream countries. Uzbekistan strongly objects
to this notion and demands that water be treated as a common good for the
entire region.
55
“Kyrgyzstan says killed five Islamist militants,” Reuters news Agency, June 24, 2009, available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/featuredCrisis/idUSLO876210
56
“Kyrgyzstan Says Slain Militants Were Uzbek Nationals,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 25,
2009, available at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyzstan_Says_Slain_Militants_Were_Uzbek_Nationals_/1762715.html
57
“KYRGYZSTAN: BAKIYEV STANDS UP TO UZBEKISTAN AND TURKMENISTAN ON
HYDROPOWER PROJECTS,” Eurasianet.org, May 7, 2009, available at:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav050709d.shtml
37

Uzbekistan, for lack of payment, cuts supply of natural gas to Kyrgyzstan during
the winter season. The Kyrgyz hydro- energy sector has to let water run through
the Toktogul Dam to generate power but this causes flooding in Uzbekistan
which experiences shortage of water during the summer season. The Kyrgyz side
is frustrated that Uzbekistan sells natural gas to Kyrgyzstan at almost world
price (US $240 per 1,000 cubic meters) without any discount. Also not allowing
Bishkek to use its internal hydro energy capacity, the Kyrgyz authorities have to
maintain water reservoirs to hold water until summer for downstream states.
Tashkent’s view is that natural gas is a commodity and requires investment into
production, transportation and maintenance of pipelines while water is a God
given resource running from the Mother Earth’s mountains to all and upstream
countries should not take control of this common good.
• Border demarcation
On April 19 approximately 40 police and border patrol troops of Uzbekistan
illegally entered Kyrgyz territory and searched homes of residents in the village
of Chek of Jalal-Abad province. The Uzbek officers behaved rudely claiming
they were conducting anti-terrorism operations.
Kyrgyz Prime Minister Chudinov informed the parliament that 80 percent of
Uzbek-Kyrgyz border is agreed to. The remaining 20 percent is a difficult
portion of areas in Kugart, Shahimardan, Sokh enclave and few other places. The
Prime Minister explained that the border agreement is complicated due to
conflicting documents and maps that mark the border of Central Asian states
first in 1924 and then in 1956. 58
This border incident highlighted the importance and urgency of resolving the
border demarcation issue. The unfinished demarcation of the border often sparks
local conflicts between Uzbek law enforcement and Kyrgyz residents.
Amid the attacks of Islamic Jihad Union fighters on law enforcement facilities
and 2 suicide attacks on police officers in Andijan and Khanabad cities on May
26 near Uzbek –Kyrgyz border in volatile Ferghana Valley, the Uzbek
government ordered digging 3 meters wide and 3 meters (in some areas, such as
Madaniyat, Bekabad - up to 5 meters) deep trenches along the border. Along
some border areas such as Chek-2 the Uzbek authorities remove the houses of
locals in order to create a buffer zone to protect the border - the Uzbek
authorities fear new incursions of Islamic militants into Uzbekistan from Kyrgyz
territory. One sided security measure of the Uzbek side triggered frustration in
Bishkek which view the unfriendly action of neighbor as illegal since the both
sided have not completed the delimitation process.
58 “Igor Chudinov: 80 protsentov granitsy Kyrgyzstana s Uzvekistanom soglasovany” (Igor Chudinov: 80
percent of Uzbek-Kyrgyz border is agreed upon), Nargiza Yuldasheva, Information Agency “24kg”, April
22, 2009. Available at: http://www.24.kg/parliament/2009/04/22/112622.html
38

Inflexible and unfriendly border policy of the Uzbek government have caused
obstacles for trade, water supply, travel and even led to a death of a local trader.
On June 7, Ulug Usmanov, an ethnic Uzbek from Kyrgyzstan was shot by Uzbek
border guards when he tried to cross the border into Uzbekistan in the point not
designated for trespassing near the commercial town of Karasuu. The Uzbek
authorities seized the body of the killed 29 years old resident of the border town
and had not returned it to relatives for several days. Ulug Usmanov and many
other local traders used to cross the Uzbek border to buy fruits and vegetables
and other food stuffs and return to Kyrgyzstan after paying bribes to Uzbek
border guards but this time he became a victim of Tashkent’s barbaric treatment
of local residents living in the valley that linked three republics of Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Even when the Soviets formally introduced borders
between these brotherly nations, locals would travel without restrictions.
• Gas supply
Power cuts for many hours during winter season threaten the government’s
ability to provide energy. Energy is critical and a matter of survival for any
regime in power in Bishkek. Every year the Kyrgyz authorities face uncertainty
about Tashkent’s willingness to sell the volume needed for Kyrgyzstan and
annual increase of price for this strategic commodity.
In 2009 the price of natural gas from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan was set at US $
240 per 1,000 cubic meters while Uzbekistan was demanding US$ 300 and the
2009 price is US$ 95 higher than in 2008. Irregularities with timely payment
have been another problem with energy trade relations between the two states.
39

APPENDIX 1
Links to news and resources on Kyrgyzstan/ Central Asia
Official sources:
Official Web site of the President
www.president.kg
State Portal
www.government.gov.kg
Ministry of the Foreign Affairs
www.mfa.kg
Ministry of Finance
www.minfin.kg
State Customs Committee
www.customs.gov.kg
State Committee for taxes and fees
www.sti.gov.kg
State National News Agency “Kabar
www.kabar.kg
Kyrgyz Diplomatic Services
http://www.kds.kg/main_en.html
State Committee on State Property
www.spf.gov.kg
News Agency “Gazeta.kg”
www.gazeta.kg
News Agency “24.kg”
www.24.kg
News on Kyrgyzstan/ Central Asia in English, Russian and Uzbek:
Information Agency Ferghana.ru:
http://www.ferghana.ru/
40

News on Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia in English and Russian:
EurasiaNet:
http://www.eurasianet.org/index.shtml
CentralAsiaNews:
http://en.ca-news.org/
News on Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia in Russian:
Russian news web site Centrasia.ru:
http://www.centrasia.ru/
FreeDoilnanet, radio news in Russian, Uzbek and Kyrgyz:
http://www.freedolina.net/
News on Kyrgyzstan/Central Asia in English:
RFE/RL in English:
http://www.rferl.org/section/Kyrgyzstan/159.html
BBC Asia:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/default.stm
Institute for War & Peace Reporting:
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=346738&apc_state=henprca
The Times of Central Asia:
http://www.timesca.com/
CentralasiaNews.net:
http://www.centralasianews.net/
Transitions On Line News:
http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/section.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=
4&tpid=16
Turkish Weekly:
http://www.turkishweekly.net/category/5/central-asia.html
Central Asia – Caucasus Institute Analyst:
http://www.cacianalyst.org/
41

News on Kyrgyzstan in Kyrgyz only:
RFE/RL in Kyrgyz:
http://www.azattyk.kg/
BBC in Kyrgyz:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/kyrgyz/
Zaman:
http://kg.zaman.com.tr/kg/
Analytical Reports:
International Crisis Group:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1251&l=1
Russian and Eurasian Security Network:
http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/sw/index.cfm
National Bureau of Asian Research:
http://www.nbr.org/
RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy:
http://www.rand.org/international_programs/capp/pubs/central.html
Official Web sites of ministries, international organization:
Regional International Organizations:
Shanghai Cooperation Organization:
http://www.sectsco.org/
Eurasian Economic Community:
http://www.evrazes.com/
Collective Security Treaty Organization:
http://www.dkb.gov.ru/
42