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The basic intention of prevention is to identify and minimise the risks posed by the building, its equipment and
fittings, and the natural hazards o f the area. This involves building inspection, routine housekeeping and
maintenance measures, making security copies of vital records and storing them off-site, and providing uninterrupted
power supply for computers, comprehensive insurance, etc. (Brandt-Grau, 2000).
A case study on managing disaster risk in Mexico shows that, despite the frequency with which a variety of
natural disasters strike, the Mexicans invest inadequately in mitigation efforts. In addition, insufficient funds are set
aside to pay for relief and reconstruction efforts. As a result, when a disaster occurs, the government is often forced
to use funds that had been allocated to other programmes, disrupting the operations of those programmes. The effect
is a reduction in growth and the derailment of important development efforts (Kreimer et al., 1999).
Funding disaster control can be split in two areas of expenditure; one area is associated with providing protection
through preventive measures and another is associated with reacting to an incident (Fröjd et al., 1997).
As stated by the World Bank's Disaster Management Facility the three main components of effective disaster
risk management are risk identification, risk reduction, and risk financing and transfer. Numerous economic factors
are involved when disaster strikes in developing countries. The World Bank looks at strategies for developing
countries to share and transfer disaster risk more effectively from the angles of risk and insurance by the poor in
developing countries (Kreimer et al., 2000).
Risk analysis or identification, which is part of a disaster plan, is a way to identify the risks of a specific location
or building. The outcome of a disaster is basically twofold. A disaster can affect (Lyall, 1997):
• the institution only;
• the entire area in which the institution is located.
Risks can also be identified according to their probability and effect (Lyall, 1997). When the risks are fully analysed
it is time to plan and eliminate as many risks as possible or at least start to reduce the impact. This process does not
stop the event but m erely eliminates or reduces the risks causing the disaster. As the world changes, so will the risks,
they vary as conditions change (Lyall, 1997).
6.2.1.1 Buildings
The building, again, is the first line of defence in protecting the records. For that reason natural calamities such as
storms, earthquakes and floods have to be taken into consideration in the design of a building (Gut, 1993). When
contemplating a purpose-built repository, the archivist and architect ideally aim for a total preservation environment.
An archive building should provide a secure, safe, and stable environment in which to store records. The choice of
a site for an archive is influenced by all kinds of factors (see more in section on Building). The local climatic
conditions of possible sites should be studied carefully and preference should be given to ones that are on high
ground, have a cool and dry climate and are protected against sun and storms. The archive should not be placed close
to dangerous industries and in area s that are freque ntly the scene of so cial unrest (Thomas, 19 87). Geographic
location, political situation, construction and condition of the building are the main factors, which influence the risk
for the records. To turn a deaf ear to this piece of advice is asking for trouble.
At a world conference on Natural Hazards in February 2001 in Awaji, Japan the American delegate Shirley
Mattingley argued that we should refer rather to killer-buildings instead of killer earthquakes. In her o pinion it is
the building, i.e. the construction of the building that is the main cause of the damage and not so much the
earthquake itself. Her notion was shared by the delegates from India and Turkey, countries that were both victims
of heavy earthquakes the year before. The point is that in general it is unclear whether the cause of hazards is natural
or man-made. Deforestation of hillsides, bad building regulations, corrupt and irresponsible contractors, all cause
much more damage than necessary (Lugt, 2001).
In the USA FEMA has published a brochure on multihazards and architecture. The document presents general
background information about a variety of natural hazards, phenomena associated with fire, and an architectural
concept called MPD, M ulti Protection Design (FEMA, 1986).
The greatest potential for catastrophic loss of archival holdings comes from fire and water damage. No matter
what has been done to ensure safety and to minimise enviro nmental damage to the materials, all is for naught if
through carelessness, accident, or natural causes a disaster strikes the repository (Trinkaus-Randell, 1995).
Generally, the damage on records resulting from any disaster can be divided into four groups:
• water-related damage;
• fire-related damage;
• mechanical damage;
• chemical reactions.
For further reading see Bucha nan, 19 88; Du chein, 19 88; Fröjd et al., 1997; Ling, 1998; Tending, 1993; Thomas,
1987.
6.2.1.2 Fire
Fire is regarded one of the biggest hazard s for archives, museums and libraries and it occurs much more freq uently
than is often thought (Trinkaus-Randall, 1995). It can be caused by natural disasters as well as by humans. In case
of war, terrorism or vandalism p eople purposely set fire to the repository but often it is just carelessness or neglect.
Also during building activities there is a greater risk of fire. As in all archive buildings both people and records need
to be protected against fire, although ob viously not all materials ke pt in archives and libraries are equally susceptible
to the flames and they all have different combustion characteristics (Sepilova et al., 1992). Arson is the single
greatest cause of fires in records repositories throughout the United States. Because records centres represent
government, they may be targets of deliberate or random violence. In some cases, the arsonist is kno wn to staff.
Arsonists may use whatever combustible material is to hand or they may collect combustible material and bring it
to their chosen site (Read, 1994).