Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society

Friday Evening Posters 3051–3056
WEAR, High Point University, DAVID S. GORFEIN, University of
Texas, Arlington, & CHARLES J. BRAINERD, Cornell University
(sponsored by David S. Gorfein)—Contrasting predictions for false
recall were generated for the retrieval-induced-forgetting model (Anderson,
2003) and the recollection rejection model (Brainerd, Reyna,
Wright, & Mojardin, 2003). These predictions were tested by having
participants differentially practice different portions of DRM lists
(Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999). Retrieval-induced forgetting
(Anderson, 2003) predicts that the practice of any item will suppress
its strongest competitors. Therefore, practicing items highly associated
to the critical lure should suppress the recall of the lure. Recollection
rejection (Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003) predicts that
the practice of low associates forms a different gist than that of high
associates and that the resulting gist is not similar enough to include
the critical lure. In a test phase, free recall of previously studied items
was collected to assess the effects of differential practice.
• DIVIDED ATTENTION AND AUTOMATIC PROCESSING •
(3051)
The Involuntary Attentional Blink May Be an All-or-None Phenomenon.
VERONICA J. DARK & AMY L. RAMOS, Iowa State
University—An involuntary attentional blink (AB) is observed when
participants alternate between an imagery task (form an image of the
object named by a word) and a digit identification task (identify the
masked digit in an RSVP stream of pictures). The digit is the only target,
but identification is lower if a picture of the imagined object occurs
before the digit, suggesting that the picture captures attention as
if it were another target. Last year, we showed that, unlike a standard
AB, the magnitude of the involuntary AB does not vary with SOA.
However, picture duration and SOA were confounded. Follow-up
studies are reported in which this confound was removed and in which
the picture actually was an intentional target. The take-home message
remains substantially unchanged: The involuntary AB is relatively stable
in magnitude. It functions more like an all-or-none phenomenon
than does the standard AB obtained in two-target procedures.
(3052)
The Attentional Blink: Control Procedures and Relationship to
Contingent Capture. LAURA J. FALCON, THOMAS M. SPALEK,
& VINCENT DI LOLLO, Simon Fraser University—Identification of
the second of two targets is impaired if it is presented less than about
500 msec after the first. This attentional blink (AB) occurs under
dual-task conditions in which observers are required to report both
targets. AB magnitude has been estimated by subtracting the accuracy
scores in the dual task from the corresponding scores in a single task
in which observers are instructed to ignore the first target. Four experiments
showed this subtraction procedure to be inappropriate, because
the single task reveals a second-target deficit similar to that in
the dual task, implying that the first target cannot be ignored. In addition,
as is the case in dual tasks, the single-task deficit is directly
related to target–distractor similarity, suggesting that the two deficits
may stem from common underlying mechanisms. A parallel with the
deficit obtained with the contingent-capture paradigm is discussed.
(3053)
Absence of Perceptual Processing During Task Set Reconfiguration:
Evidence From the Attentional Blink and Associative Priming.
FRANÇOIS VACHON, MARIE-LAURE B. LAPOINTE, & SÉBAS-
TIEN TREMBLAY, Université Laval, & DYLAN M. JONES, Cardiff
University—When two visual targets (T1 and T2) are presented in a
rapid sequence of distractors, processing of T1 produces an attentional
blink. Typically, processing of T2 is markedly impaired, except
when the targets are adjacent (Lag 1). However, if a shift of task set—
a change in task requirements from T1 to T2—occurs, performance
at Lag 1 is substantially reduced. The present study sought to determine
the fate of T2, when presented during reconfiguration, due to
task switching (i.e., at Lag 1). We used an associative priming tech-
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nique in which T1 could be either related or unrelated to T2. Priming
of T2 by T1 diminished dramatically at Lag 1 when a switch in location
(Experiment 1) or in task (Experiment 2) was involved between
the targets but remained unaffected at other lags. These results suggest
that perceptual processing of T2 cannot be carried out in parallel
with task set reconfiguration.
(3054)
A Psychological Refractory Period Investigation of Mental Hand Rotation.
ELIZABETH A. FRANZ, TOM NORRIS, & SHELLEY FORD,
University of Otago—A psychological refractory period (PRP) approach
was applied to investigate whether observation of biologically realistic
hands might result in direct response activation of the corresponding
motor systems. Task 1 required high–low tone discriminations, and
Task 2 consisted of left-hand–right-hand discriminations performed
under egocentric (easy) and allocentric (difficult) orientations. The interaction
between the PRP effect and task difficulty was additive when
the response mode involved multiple levels of response selection, referred
to as hierarchical selection (Experiments 2A and 2B). This interaction
was strongly underadditive when a direct stimulus–response
(S–R) mapping was used rather than hierarchical selection (Experiments
3A and 3B). Replacing hand stimuli with symbolic arrows (Experiments
4A and 4B) again resulted in strict additivity. We conclude
that some central bottleneck operations can be bypassed, provided that
hands are used as stimuli and the S–R mapping is direct. These findings
provide a cognitive framework for understanding the operation
of mirror neurons.
(3055)
The Psychological Refractory Period: Is Response Execution Part
of the Processing Bottleneck? ROLF ULRICH & SUSANA RUIZ,
University of Tübingen, INES JENTZSCH, University of St. Andrews,
BETTINA ROLKE & HANNES SCHRÖTER, University of Tübingen,
& HARTMUT LEUTHOLD, University of Glasgow—The standard
bottleneck model of the psychological refractory period (PRP) assumes
that the selection of the second response is postponed until the
selection of the first response has been finished. Accordingly, dualtask
interference is attributed to a single central processing bottleneck
involving decision and response selection, but not the execution of the
response itself. In order to critically examine the assumption that response
execution is no part of this bottleneck, we systematically manipulated
the temporal demand for executing the first response, in a
classical PRP paradigm. Contrary to the assumption of the standard
bottleneck model, this manipulation affected the reaction time for
Task 2. Specifically, reaction time in Task 2 increased with the execution
time in Task 1. This carryover effect from Task 1 to 2 provides
strong evidence for the notion that response execution is part of the
processing bottleneck, at least when Task 1 involves a continuous
movement.
(3056)
The Role of Singleton Priming in Visual Search for a Known Feature.
DOMINIQUE LAMY & YOAV BAR-ANAN, Tel Aviv University, &
HOWARD EGETH, Johns Hopkins University—We examined three
visual search tasks in which the target was defined by a known feature.
The target was a singleton on only a minority of the trials, so that
singletonness was not a defining feature of the target. We report a new
type of intertrial repetition priming that we call singleton priming
(SP), by which visual search is speeded if the target is a singleton on
consecutive trials. We observed SP regardless of whether the target
was a singleton on the defining dimension or on an irrelevant dimension.
We also provide support for an alternative interpretation of previous
findings held to demonstrate that subjects adopt a default singleton
detection or salience-based search mode in search for a known
singleton: We propose that search for a known singleton relies on a
feature-based search mechanism and benefits from implicit memory
of the target’s salience on previous trials—that is, from singleton
priming.