Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society

Friday Noon Posters 2119–2122
(2119)
Goal-Induced Decrements in the Accuracy of Action- and Observation-
Based Problem Solving. MAGDA M. OSMAN, University College
London (sponsored by David Shanks)—Recently, studies of problem
solving that used a dynamic environment (e.g., Burns & Vollmeyer,
2002) have shown that performance is adversely affected by a specific
goal instruction, as compared with a nonspecific goal instruction. We
discuss findings from an experiment that was designed to replicate
and extend the original work of Burns and Vollmeyer. In Burns and
Vollmeyer’s study, the learning phase of the problem-solving task was
action based, whereas in the present study, participants learned to
solve the task under either observational or action conditions. In accord
with the original findings, this study shows that goal specificity
affects the accuracy of problem solving in the same way when the
learning phase of the task is observational, rather than action based.
Contrary to previous findings in problem solving and causal structure
learning, the present study did not find differences in performance between
action and observation learning conditions.
(2120)
Representational Change and the Selective Activation of Problem
Constituents. MICHAEL ÖLLINGER & ANDREAS WOHL-
SCHLÄGER, Max Planck Institute for Cognitive and Brain Sciences—
As Knoblich et al. (1999) have suggested, for solving insight problems,
a representational change is necessary. They identified two
processes that can trigger a representational change: constraint relaxation,
which breaks constraints imposed by prior knowledge, and
chunk decomposition, which decomposes the automatically built-up
constituents of the problem. Little is known about how the activation
of particular problem constituents interact with representational
change. In four groups (N = 4 * 30), participants solved matchstick
arithmetic tasks that required representational changes to a different
extent. Between the groups, we varied the direct perceptual access of
problem elements, by removing systematically parts of the equation.
That is, the values (Group 1), the operators (Group 2), or the whole
equation (Group 3) disappeared after an initial encoding phase,
whereupon in the control group, the equation remained unchanged.
We found that the probability of a representational change depends
critically on the selectively activated elements.
87
(2121)
A Behavioral Assessment of Relations Between Handedness and
Magical Ideation. GINA M. GRIMSHAW, California State University,
San Marcos—Magical ideation (MI) is a hallmark of schizotypal disorders,
but it is also prevalent in the general population, even among
individuals with advanced levels of education. Although MI has been
linked to personality, social, and cultural factors, recent theorists have
suggested that MI has neuropsychological origins. Specifically, MI
has been associated with a reduced degree of handedness and with an
increase in right-hemisphere activity. However, previous handedness
research has assessed both handedness and MI with questionnaire
measures. It is possible that the same people who are willing to consider
the possibility of “magical” events are also willing to consider
the possibility of using their nondominant hand. Thus, the association
between MI and handedness could be an artifact caused by a questionnaire
effect. The present study circumvented this problem by
using a behavioral measure of handedness, a skilled pegboard task.
Implications for the neuropsychology of belief are discussed.
(2122)
Sentences Compared With Pictures as Clues for Solving Pictorial
Insight Problems. PATRICIA M. SCHWERT, SUNY, Brockport (sponsored
by Robert James Miller)—Sentences and pictures, designed to
be equivalent in information content, were compared as clues for solving
pictorial insight problems (droodles). A 3 (test condition: informed,
uninformed, control) � 2 (clue type: sentence, picture) design was
used. Participants completed, in order, an information acquisition
task, a droodle problem-solving task, free recall of acquisition stimuli,
and a questionnaire. This methodology extended prior research by
using pictorial, rather than verbal, insight problems and comparing
sentences and pictures as clues. Pictures clues were equally useful for
informed and uninformed participants. The functional utility of sentence
clues was reliably higher for informed participants. Recall rates
were higher for picture clues. An explanation consistent with these
findings is that picture clues, which have similar surface features to
the problems, are used automatically by all problem solvers. Sentence
clue use is not automatic. Sentence clues are more useful when problem
solvers are aware that there is a connection between clues and
problems.