Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society
Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society
Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society
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Posters 2112–2118 Friday Noon<br />
(2112)<br />
Motivational Influences on Rule-Based and Information Integration<br />
Category Learning. GRANT C. BALDWIN, W. TODD MADDOX,<br />
& ARTHUR B. MARKMAN, University of Texas, Austin—Markman,<br />
Baldwin, and Maddox (in press; Psychological Science) have shown<br />
more nearly optimal decision criterion learning when the motivational<br />
focus “fit” the environmental conditions. Promotion focus people are<br />
more sensitive to gains in the environment and performed best when<br />
gains were emphasized. Prevention focus people are more sensitive to<br />
losses in the environment and performed better when avoiding losses<br />
was emphasized. We report results that extend this work to classification<br />
learning—in particular, to rule-based and information integration<br />
category learning. One set of studies examined deterministic<br />
rule-based and information integration category learning, focusing<br />
primarily on trials to criterion. Prevention subjects reached criterion<br />
sooner than promotion subjects in an information integration, but not<br />
in a rule-based, task. A second set examined probabilistic rule-based<br />
and information integration category learning, focusing on percent<br />
correct. Promotion subjects performed better in rule-based, but not information<br />
integration, category learning. Implications for the neurobiology<br />
of motivation and category learning are discussed.<br />
• PROBLEM SOLVING •<br />
(2113)<br />
Individual Differences in Cognitive Abilities: A Component<br />
Processes Account. MEREDYTH DANEMAN, University of Toronto,<br />
Mississauga, & BRENDA A. HANNON, University of Texas, San Antonio—In<br />
this study, we examined the extent to which the ability to integrate<br />
prior knowledge with new information can account for the variance<br />
that is typically shared among tests of cognitive abilities. Participants<br />
completed Hannon and Daneman’s (2001) component processes task<br />
that includes a measure of knowledge integration ability, as well as a<br />
battery of cognitive tests that assessed general fluid intelligence (e.g.,<br />
Raven’s matrices) and specific abilities (e.g., verbal and spatial abilities).<br />
Not only was knowledge integration an excellent predictor of<br />
performance on the general and specific abilities tests, but it also<br />
tended to have better predictive power than two measures of working<br />
memory capacity (reading span, operation span). We argue that integrating<br />
prior knowledge with new information is a fundamental<br />
process that underlies skill in a range of complex cognitive tasks.<br />
(2114)<br />
<strong>The</strong> Adaptiveness of Strategy Choices and the Effect of Strategy<br />
Use Experience. AYAKA WATANABE & YUJI ITOH, Keio University<br />
(sponsored by Kathy Pezdek)—This study investigated the effect<br />
of strategy use experience on strategy choice. Participants were required<br />
to determine the number of target cells in a 7 � 7 matrix of<br />
black and gray cells. Two strategies could be applied: the counting<br />
strategy, in which the number of the target cells are counted, and the<br />
subtracting strategy, in which the number of the nontargets are subtracted<br />
from the total number of cells. When participants could<br />
choose the strategies freely, they adaptively chose the strategy that<br />
made the RT shorter. However, letting the participants use one of the<br />
strategies tended to increase the choice of strategy inadaptively in the<br />
subsequent phase, in which they could choose strategies freely. <strong>The</strong>se<br />
tendencies were observed only for the condition in which there were<br />
no preferences between two strategies in the free-choice condition,<br />
and were greater when the participants had never used the other strategy<br />
in the previous phase.<br />
(2115)<br />
Verbal Intelligence or Verbal Expertise? Explaining Individual<br />
Differences in Scrabble Problem-Solving Performance. MICHAEL<br />
TUFFIASH, ROY W. RORING, & K. ANDERS ERICSSON, Florida<br />
State University—Although numerous laboratory studies have found<br />
strong relations between general cognitive abilities and verbal problemsolving<br />
performance, few investigators have studied experts in socially<br />
86<br />
recognized skill domains. We examined the relationship between general<br />
cognitive abilities and verbal problem-solving skill in the game<br />
of Scrabble. Elite- and average-level tournament-rated Scrabble players<br />
were asked to solve a series of realistic Scrabble game problems,<br />
as well as a series of anagrams of varying length. Each player also<br />
completed a battery of standardized verbal ability measures and a selfreport<br />
survey of their past and present Scrabble-related practice activities.<br />
Preliminary analyses (23 elite and 14 average players) indicated<br />
strong positive relations between measures of Scrabble tournament<br />
performance and Scrabble-related problem-solving skills, but much<br />
weaker relations between measures of Scrabble problem-solving skills<br />
and aspects of general verbal intelligence. Additional analyses of biographical<br />
data suggested that Scrabble experts’ exceptional domainspecific<br />
problem-solving skills were largely a product of accumulated<br />
deliberate practice.<br />
(2116)<br />
Predicting Expert and Novice Anagram Solution. LAURA R.<br />
NOVICK, Vanderbilt University, & STEVEN J. SHERMAN, Indiana<br />
University—Several experiments examined the predictors of two measures<br />
of anagram solution: solution time and the proportion of subjects<br />
who generated pop-out solutions (defined as solutions that occurred<br />
within 2 sec of stimulus presentation). <strong>The</strong> subjects were<br />
college students who were selected on the basis of their performance<br />
on a scrambled words pretest: <strong>The</strong>y were either quite good or not good<br />
at solving anagrams. Of particular interest is whether different aspects<br />
of the solution words (e.g., fit to the constraints of English spelling,<br />
word frequency, number of syllables) and the anagrams (e.g., similarity<br />
to the solution word) predict measures of performance for experts<br />
versus novices.<br />
(2117)<br />
Traveling Salesman Problem: <strong>The</strong> Role of Clustering Operations.<br />
ZYGMUNT PIZLO, JOHN SAALWEACHTER, & EMIL STEFANOV,<br />
Purdue University—We will present a pyramid model, which provides<br />
near-optimal solutions to the traveling salesman problem (TSP) in a<br />
time that is a low-degree polynomial function of the problem size. In<br />
this model, hierarchical clustering of cities is first performed by using<br />
an adaptive method. <strong>The</strong> solution tour is then produced by a sequence<br />
of coarse-to-fine approximations, during which the model has highresolution<br />
access to the problem representation only within a small<br />
area, simulating the nonuniform distribution of visual acuity across<br />
the visual field. <strong>The</strong> tour is produced by simulated movements of the<br />
eyes. We will discuss the role of two types of clustering operations:<br />
detecting blobs and detecting smooth contours. <strong>The</strong> model was applied<br />
to TSPs of size 6, 10, 20, and 50, and its performance was fitted<br />
to that of 5 subjects by using one free parameter representing the<br />
extent of local search.<br />
(2118)<br />
Models of Human Performance on the Traveling Salesperson<br />
Problem: <strong>The</strong> Shortest Route to Falsification. SUSANNE TAK,<br />
MARCO PLAISIER, & IRIS VAN ROOIJ, Technische Universiteit<br />
Eindhoven—<strong>The</strong> task of finding the shortest tour visiting a set of<br />
points, known as the traveling salesperson problem (TSP), is notorious<br />
for its computational complexity. Nonetheless, people show remarkably<br />
good performance on the task. MacGregor, Ormerod, and<br />
Chronicle (2000) have proposed a computational model to describe<br />
the human strategy for solving TSPs. Studying only random point<br />
sets, these authors claimed empirical support for their model. We<br />
argue that random point sets do not instantiate critical tests of model<br />
performance, since both the model and people are known to perform<br />
well on random TSPs. We designed six (nonrandom) point sets as a<br />
critical test bed for the MacGregor et al. model. We observed a systematic<br />
misfit between human and model performance for five of the<br />
six points sets. Our findings falsify the MacGregor et al. model. We<br />
discuss some methodological lessons for testing computational models<br />
of human problem solving in general.