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Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society

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Posters 1113–1119 Thursday Evening<br />

A number of studies examining predictive inferences have found evidence<br />

that they can be activated immediately after a biasing story<br />

context. More recent research has also shown that in some situations,<br />

predictive inferences can be encoded into memory. Although the nature<br />

of the memory representation for predictive inferences is somewhat<br />

unclear (i.e., specific inferences vs. general state changes), it is<br />

clear that predictive inferences can be stored in memory. <strong>The</strong> present<br />

study expanded upon earlier research and examined how inference<br />

specificity affects the encoding of predictive inferences. Participants<br />

read stories that have previously been shown to result in the encoding<br />

of predictive inferences in one of three versions: one that was altered<br />

to make the inference less compelling, one that mentioned a general<br />

“state change” outcome, or one that explicitly mentioned the inference<br />

outcome. Following a backgrounding second paragraph, a target line<br />

explicitly mentioned the inference outcome, and reading times were<br />

measured. Results are compared with previous findings and implications<br />

for theories of discourse processing are considered.<br />

(1113)<br />

Predictive Inferences: <strong>The</strong> Interacting Influence of Context and<br />

General World Knowledge. SABINE GUERAUD, University of New<br />

Hampshire, ISABELLE TAPIERO, University of Lyon 2, & EDWARD J.<br />

O’BRIEN, University of New Hampshire—Previous research has<br />

demonstrated that the activation of predictive inferences can be affected<br />

both by the immediately preceding context and information<br />

contained in an earlier portion of the discourse model. Experiments 1<br />

and 2 demonstrated that the same immediate context can result in the<br />

activation of very different inferences when different character trait<br />

descriptions of the protagonist are presented in an early portion of the<br />

passage. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the trait descriptions were<br />

sufficient to produce activation of only one specific inference; this occurred<br />

even though the immediately preceding context in isolation lead<br />

to the activation of a very different inference. Results of all three experiments<br />

are discussed within the memory-based view of text processing.<br />

(1114)<br />

Resolving Inconsistencies During Reading. ANNE E. COOK, University<br />

of Utah, & SABINE GUERAUD & EDWARD J. O’BRIEN,<br />

University of New Hampshire—Previous research has shown a slowdown<br />

in reading times on a target sentence (e.g., Mary ordered a<br />

cheeseburger and fries) when that sentence was inconsistent with earlier<br />

information (e.g., Mary was a vegetarian). <strong>The</strong> present study investigated<br />

how readers resolved that inconsistency. A second target<br />

sentence was added later in the text that was also inconsistent (e.g.,<br />

Mary decided she wanted to eat a steak). In Experiment 1, reading<br />

times did not slow down on this second target sentence, but did slow<br />

down on the spillover sentence. In Experiment 2, the degree of inconsistency<br />

was explicitly reduced (e.g., with the information that<br />

Mary used to be a vegetarian). <strong>The</strong> slowdown in reading times became<br />

evident on the target sentence. Thus, the slowdown in reading<br />

for the second-target-sentence conditions was greater and more immediate<br />

when the text provided a resolution for the first target sentence<br />

than when the reader needed to generate one.<br />

(1115)<br />

Visual Perspective Taking in Narratives. ANGELA S. RALANO &<br />

CELIA M. KLIN, SUNY, Binghamton—Horton and Rapp (2003) found<br />

that readers sometimes encode information from the visual perspective<br />

of story protagonists. <strong>The</strong> goal of the present research was to<br />

replicate and extend these findings. In Experiment 1, we found that<br />

after reading a narrative, participants responded more slowly to a<br />

question about a target object if that object had been visually occluded<br />

from the protagonist’s view (e.g., surfers occluded by fog). In Experiment<br />

2, we used a recognition probe task and found that participants<br />

responded more slowly in the occluded version than in a nonoccluded<br />

version to a probe word representing the target object (e.g., surfers).<br />

In Experiment 3, we measured reading time on a line that reintroduced<br />

the targeted object. As in Experiments 1 and 2, reading times were<br />

68<br />

slower in the occluded version. We conclude that occluded objects are<br />

less accessible in readers’ memory representations.<br />

(1116)<br />

Interactions Between Reader Characteristics and Text Properties in<br />

Comprehension of Scientific Principles. PANAYIOTA KENDEOU<br />

& PAUL VAN DEN BROEK, University of Minnesota—We investigated<br />

the effects of accuracy of prior knowledge and text structure on comprehension<br />

of scientific texts. Think-aloud and reading-time results<br />

indicated that differences in prior knowledge affected online inferential<br />

processing, but only in terms of content and not in terms of the<br />

processes per se. In addition, readers with inaccurate knowledge engaged<br />

in conceptual change processes, but only when the text structure<br />

foregrounded misconceptions (refutation structure). <strong>The</strong>se online<br />

effects were independent of readers’ working memory capacity and<br />

need for cognition, although each of these factors influenced specific<br />

reading situations (e.g., when the text was difficult). <strong>The</strong> results of a<br />

recall task indicated that differences in prior knowledge, but not in<br />

text structure, influenced readers’ memory for the texts. <strong>The</strong>se offline<br />

effects were also independent of readers’ working memory capacity<br />

and need for cognition.<br />

(1117)<br />

Inferences and Cognitive Resources: A Knowledge Domain Issue?<br />

CONNIE SHEARS, Chapman University—Cognitive resources are<br />

required to form knowledge-based inferences. Comprehension relies<br />

on our ability to form inferences from many knowledge domains.<br />

Thus, specifying the resource differences between domains of knowledge<br />

is important for understanding when comprehension processes<br />

may be slowed or unsuccessful. Claims that cognitive resources are<br />

differentially relied upon for types of inferences (predictive vs. explanatory)<br />

have been examined, yet resource requirements may differ<br />

at a more fundamental level. <strong>The</strong> knowledge drawn upon to form inferences<br />

may itself depend on varying amounts of cognitive resources<br />

to support the formation of causal inferences. I hypothesized that brief<br />

narrative texts based on physical versus planning knowledge would<br />

elicit differences in comprehension if these two knowledge domains<br />

require varying amounts of cognitive resources. Results indicated that<br />

answers to comprehension questions were faster and more accurate for<br />

texts based on physical knowledge rather than planning knowledge.<br />

However, probe measures of inference processing were not different<br />

between knowledge domains. <strong>The</strong>se findings suggest that cognitive<br />

resource differences may be specific to knowledge domains rather<br />

than to the inference process itself.<br />

(1118)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Role of Attention in Perspective Taking. SHUHONG LIN &<br />

BOAZ KEYSAR, University of Chicago—Dual-process theories of cognitive<br />

processing state that two systems—automatic versus controlled—<br />

interact and affect behavior. We propose that perspective taking in<br />

conversation uses a similar dual process. Failure to take another’s perspective<br />

happens when one relies on automatic, readily accessible processing;<br />

taking another’s perspective requires more effortful, controlled<br />

processing. We tested this hypothesis through two experiments that manipulated<br />

the attentional capacity of the participants while they played<br />

a referential communication game. In Experiment 1, participants performed<br />

a concurrent secondary task, inducing either a high or low cognitive<br />

load. In Experiment 2, participants with either high or low working<br />

memory span played the same communication game. We found that<br />

participants’ comprehension is more egocentric when under a high-load<br />

manipulation than under low load, and participants with lower working<br />

memory span behave more egocentrically than those with high span.<br />

This demonstrates that perspective taking is an effortful process.<br />

(1119)<br />

Does Mental Imagery Improve Text Comprehension? LAURA<br />

MOTYKA & DAVID W. ALLBRITTON, DePaul University—An experiment<br />

investigated the effectiveness of mental imagery instructions

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