Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society
Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society
Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society
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Papers 242–248 Saturday Afternoon<br />
ROEDIGER III, & JEFFREY D. KARPICKE, Washington University<br />
(read by Henry L. Roediger III)—Free recall is often assumed to be a<br />
direct index of recollection. However, some research suggests that automatic<br />
activation contributes to free recall. In three experiments, we<br />
examined the contribution of controlled and automatic processes to<br />
recall using the process dissociation procedure. Subjects studied categorized<br />
word lists under full- or divided-attention conditions. Later,<br />
they were forced to try to recall all of the words they studied, guessing<br />
if necessary (i.e., an inclusion condition). <strong>The</strong>y also were required<br />
to produce an equal number of new category exemplars (i.e., exclusion).<br />
Results indicate that divided-attention reduced the recollection<br />
estimate (R), but the automaticity estimate (A) was equivalent for both<br />
full- and divided-attention conditions. Follow-up experiments estimating<br />
R and A using forced recall with subjective memory reports<br />
(remember/know/guess) and traditional free recall instructions led to<br />
identical results. <strong>The</strong>se data indicate that, contrary to conventional<br />
wisdom, automatic processes makes a substantial contribution to free<br />
recall.<br />
4:10–4:25 (242)<br />
On the Status of Unconscious Memory: Merikle and Reingold (1991)<br />
Revisited. DAVID R. SHANKS & CHRISTOPHER J. BERRY, University<br />
College London, & RICHARD N. A. HENSON, MRC Cognition<br />
& Brain Sciences Unit—Merikle and Reingold (1991) reported priming<br />
for words in the absence of recognition memory in matched indirect<br />
(implicit) and direct (explicit) memory tests. <strong>The</strong>ir striking result<br />
provides powerful and widely cited support for unconscious memory<br />
processes in normal subjects. Using the same paradigm, we report a<br />
series of experiments failing to replicate this key result. After a study<br />
phase, new and previously unattended words were presented against<br />
a background mask. Participants decided whether each word was old<br />
or new (direct task) or whether the contrast between the word and the<br />
background was high or low (indirect task). Unlike Merikle and Reingold,<br />
we consistently found that the magnitude of recognition memory<br />
was greater than or equal to that of priming. <strong>The</strong>se results question<br />
the existence of implicit memory and are, instead, compatible<br />
with the view that performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks<br />
is mediated by a single conscious process.<br />
4:30–4:45 (243)<br />
Using Remember–Know Estimates Versus Categories to Explore<br />
the Wane of Childhood Amnesia. KRISTI S. MULTHAUP, DIANA<br />
AIKEN, ALLISON KAVANAGH, & CATHERINE JAHNES, Davidson<br />
College—To determine the wane of childhood amnesia, recent studies<br />
have used a threshold procedure in which participants classify<br />
childhood memories as remember or know memories (e.g., Bruce,<br />
Dolan, & Phillips-Grant, 2000; Multhaup, Johnson, & Tetirick, <strong>2005</strong>).<br />
<strong>The</strong>se studies have yielded a consistent finding of roughly 4.7 years<br />
as the transition point from childhood amnesia to the development of<br />
autobiographical memories. However, autobiographical memories are so<br />
complex, it is likely that a given childhood memory has aspects that are<br />
remembered and other aspects that are known. <strong>The</strong> present research<br />
modified prior procedures by allowing participants to estimate the percentages<br />
of given childhood memories that were remembered or known,<br />
rather than forcing participants to place their memories entirely into<br />
either category. <strong>The</strong> transition point with the modified estimation procedure<br />
is roughly 4.7 years of age, replicating the prior findings.<br />
4:50–5:05 (244)<br />
Using Sampling and Recovery to Estimate Context and Item Effects<br />
in Memory. DAVID E. HUBER, YOONHEE JANG, & JAMES P.<br />
VAN OVERSCHELDE, University of Maryland, College Park—Many<br />
global memory models assume that memory retrieval consists of two<br />
components, with sampling depending on the effectiveness of contextual<br />
cuing and the relative strength of encoding and recovery depending<br />
on the adequacy of lexical–semantic knowledge for target<br />
items. Using data from two different sets of experiments, we applied<br />
a simplified version of sampling and recovery to describe data pat-<br />
38<br />
terns in terms of the respective contributions of context and item. In<br />
two recall experiments, we measured the effects of preexposure training<br />
on recall of high- and low-frequency words in pure and mixed<br />
lists. In other experiments, we tested recall and recognition for the<br />
“list before the last,” examining interference as a function of intervening<br />
list length and target list length. Similar to signal detection theory,<br />
this descriptive memory modeling is applied to individual subject<br />
data, with the resultant parameters analyzed using standard<br />
inferential statistics.<br />
5:10–5:25 (245)<br />
On Jost’s Law, Individual Differences, and Asymptotes. ANDREW J.<br />
HEATHCOTE, University of Newcastle, & MICHAEL S. HUMPHREYS,<br />
University of Queensland—On the basis of an analysis of participantaverage<br />
retention functions, Wixted (2004) rejected exponential forgetting<br />
and supported Jost’s law. His conclusions depend on two assumptions,<br />
that eventually forgetting is complete (asymptotically,<br />
retention is zero) and that participant averaging does not cause bias.<br />
We show that participant averaging did bias his analyses, and that<br />
when this bias is avoided by analyzing individual participant retention<br />
functions, results support an asymptote greater than zero and exponential<br />
forgetting for most participants. We propose a model of forgetting<br />
based on retrieval failure that is consistent with exponential<br />
forgetting, nonzero asymptotes, and individual differences.<br />
Attention During Tracking and Motion<br />
Grand Ballroom West, Saturday Afternoon, 4:10–5:30<br />
Chaired by Todd S. Horowitz<br />
Brigham & Women’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School<br />
4:10–4:25 (246)<br />
How Do Distractors Affect Performance on the Multiple-Object<br />
Tracking Task? TODD S. HOROWITZ, Brigham & Women’s Hospital<br />
and Harvard Medical School, & SKYLER S. PLACE, Brigham & Women’s<br />
Hospital—Recent evidence from multiple-object tracking (MOT)<br />
experiments suggests that distractors must be actively suppressed.<br />
Does distractor suppression require the same attentional resource as<br />
target tracking? To answer this question, we developed a new MOT<br />
task that allows us to vary target and distractor load independently.<br />
Observers tracked one, four, or eight target disks moving against a<br />
grid of stationary disks. After 2–4 sec, moving disks stopped coincident<br />
with the grid, then all disks changed color to mask targets. One<br />
stationary disk was probed, requiring a yes or no response. We tested<br />
the effect of the mere presence of distractors by comparing performance<br />
with zero distractors and one distractor; there was no effect. Next, observers<br />
tracked four targets with zero, one, two, three, or four distractors.<br />
<strong>The</strong> number of distractors had no effect. Segregating targets<br />
from distractors does not draw on the resource used to track targets.<br />
4:30–4:45 (247)<br />
<strong>The</strong> Dynamics of Time-Sharing Control. PAMELA S. TSANG, JEFF<br />
T. FLINN, BRYAN V. STORK, & JEFF M. DEVRIES, Wright State<br />
University—This study examined the cognitive and motor control of<br />
time-sharing a continuous tracking task and a discrete spatial processing<br />
task. A dynamic task difficulty manipulation and the relative<br />
priority manipulation were used to induce resource allocation between<br />
the time-shared tasks. Difficulty of the tracking task was manipulated<br />
dynamically within a trial. Task difficulty and response modality of<br />
the spatial task were manipulated between trials. A microanalysis of<br />
the continuous performance time locked to the response of the discrete<br />
task was used to examine the structural constraints and strategic<br />
control of the time-sharing performance. Forty-two subjects completed<br />
approximately 20 h of task performance each.<br />
4:50–5:05 (248)<br />
<strong>The</strong> Role of Attention in Processing Rotary Motion Across Fixations.<br />
ALEXANDER POLLATSEK, IBRAHIM DAHLSTROM-HAKKI, &