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Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society

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Papers 242–248 Saturday Afternoon<br />

ROEDIGER III, & JEFFREY D. KARPICKE, Washington University<br />

(read by Henry L. Roediger III)—Free recall is often assumed to be a<br />

direct index of recollection. However, some research suggests that automatic<br />

activation contributes to free recall. In three experiments, we<br />

examined the contribution of controlled and automatic processes to<br />

recall using the process dissociation procedure. Subjects studied categorized<br />

word lists under full- or divided-attention conditions. Later,<br />

they were forced to try to recall all of the words they studied, guessing<br />

if necessary (i.e., an inclusion condition). <strong>The</strong>y also were required<br />

to produce an equal number of new category exemplars (i.e., exclusion).<br />

Results indicate that divided-attention reduced the recollection<br />

estimate (R), but the automaticity estimate (A) was equivalent for both<br />

full- and divided-attention conditions. Follow-up experiments estimating<br />

R and A using forced recall with subjective memory reports<br />

(remember/know/guess) and traditional free recall instructions led to<br />

identical results. <strong>The</strong>se data indicate that, contrary to conventional<br />

wisdom, automatic processes makes a substantial contribution to free<br />

recall.<br />

4:10–4:25 (242)<br />

On the Status of Unconscious Memory: Merikle and Reingold (1991)<br />

Revisited. DAVID R. SHANKS & CHRISTOPHER J. BERRY, University<br />

College London, & RICHARD N. A. HENSON, MRC Cognition<br />

& Brain Sciences Unit—Merikle and Reingold (1991) reported priming<br />

for words in the absence of recognition memory in matched indirect<br />

(implicit) and direct (explicit) memory tests. <strong>The</strong>ir striking result<br />

provides powerful and widely cited support for unconscious memory<br />

processes in normal subjects. Using the same paradigm, we report a<br />

series of experiments failing to replicate this key result. After a study<br />

phase, new and previously unattended words were presented against<br />

a background mask. Participants decided whether each word was old<br />

or new (direct task) or whether the contrast between the word and the<br />

background was high or low (indirect task). Unlike Merikle and Reingold,<br />

we consistently found that the magnitude of recognition memory<br />

was greater than or equal to that of priming. <strong>The</strong>se results question<br />

the existence of implicit memory and are, instead, compatible<br />

with the view that performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks<br />

is mediated by a single conscious process.<br />

4:30–4:45 (243)<br />

Using Remember–Know Estimates Versus Categories to Explore<br />

the Wane of Childhood Amnesia. KRISTI S. MULTHAUP, DIANA<br />

AIKEN, ALLISON KAVANAGH, & CATHERINE JAHNES, Davidson<br />

College—To determine the wane of childhood amnesia, recent studies<br />

have used a threshold procedure in which participants classify<br />

childhood memories as remember or know memories (e.g., Bruce,<br />

Dolan, & Phillips-Grant, 2000; Multhaup, Johnson, & Tetirick, <strong>2005</strong>).<br />

<strong>The</strong>se studies have yielded a consistent finding of roughly 4.7 years<br />

as the transition point from childhood amnesia to the development of<br />

autobiographical memories. However, autobiographical memories are so<br />

complex, it is likely that a given childhood memory has aspects that are<br />

remembered and other aspects that are known. <strong>The</strong> present research<br />

modified prior procedures by allowing participants to estimate the percentages<br />

of given childhood memories that were remembered or known,<br />

rather than forcing participants to place their memories entirely into<br />

either category. <strong>The</strong> transition point with the modified estimation procedure<br />

is roughly 4.7 years of age, replicating the prior findings.<br />

4:50–5:05 (244)<br />

Using Sampling and Recovery to Estimate Context and Item Effects<br />

in Memory. DAVID E. HUBER, YOONHEE JANG, & JAMES P.<br />

VAN OVERSCHELDE, University of Maryland, College Park—Many<br />

global memory models assume that memory retrieval consists of two<br />

components, with sampling depending on the effectiveness of contextual<br />

cuing and the relative strength of encoding and recovery depending<br />

on the adequacy of lexical–semantic knowledge for target<br />

items. Using data from two different sets of experiments, we applied<br />

a simplified version of sampling and recovery to describe data pat-<br />

38<br />

terns in terms of the respective contributions of context and item. In<br />

two recall experiments, we measured the effects of preexposure training<br />

on recall of high- and low-frequency words in pure and mixed<br />

lists. In other experiments, we tested recall and recognition for the<br />

“list before the last,” examining interference as a function of intervening<br />

list length and target list length. Similar to signal detection theory,<br />

this descriptive memory modeling is applied to individual subject<br />

data, with the resultant parameters analyzed using standard<br />

inferential statistics.<br />

5:10–5:25 (245)<br />

On Jost’s Law, Individual Differences, and Asymptotes. ANDREW J.<br />

HEATHCOTE, University of Newcastle, & MICHAEL S. HUMPHREYS,<br />

University of Queensland—On the basis of an analysis of participantaverage<br />

retention functions, Wixted (2004) rejected exponential forgetting<br />

and supported Jost’s law. His conclusions depend on two assumptions,<br />

that eventually forgetting is complete (asymptotically,<br />

retention is zero) and that participant averaging does not cause bias.<br />

We show that participant averaging did bias his analyses, and that<br />

when this bias is avoided by analyzing individual participant retention<br />

functions, results support an asymptote greater than zero and exponential<br />

forgetting for most participants. We propose a model of forgetting<br />

based on retrieval failure that is consistent with exponential<br />

forgetting, nonzero asymptotes, and individual differences.<br />

Attention During Tracking and Motion<br />

Grand Ballroom West, Saturday Afternoon, 4:10–5:30<br />

Chaired by Todd S. Horowitz<br />

Brigham & Women’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School<br />

4:10–4:25 (246)<br />

How Do Distractors Affect Performance on the Multiple-Object<br />

Tracking Task? TODD S. HOROWITZ, Brigham & Women’s Hospital<br />

and Harvard Medical School, & SKYLER S. PLACE, Brigham & Women’s<br />

Hospital—Recent evidence from multiple-object tracking (MOT)<br />

experiments suggests that distractors must be actively suppressed.<br />

Does distractor suppression require the same attentional resource as<br />

target tracking? To answer this question, we developed a new MOT<br />

task that allows us to vary target and distractor load independently.<br />

Observers tracked one, four, or eight target disks moving against a<br />

grid of stationary disks. After 2–4 sec, moving disks stopped coincident<br />

with the grid, then all disks changed color to mask targets. One<br />

stationary disk was probed, requiring a yes or no response. We tested<br />

the effect of the mere presence of distractors by comparing performance<br />

with zero distractors and one distractor; there was no effect. Next, observers<br />

tracked four targets with zero, one, two, three, or four distractors.<br />

<strong>The</strong> number of distractors had no effect. Segregating targets<br />

from distractors does not draw on the resource used to track targets.<br />

4:30–4:45 (247)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Dynamics of Time-Sharing Control. PAMELA S. TSANG, JEFF<br />

T. FLINN, BRYAN V. STORK, & JEFF M. DEVRIES, Wright State<br />

University—This study examined the cognitive and motor control of<br />

time-sharing a continuous tracking task and a discrete spatial processing<br />

task. A dynamic task difficulty manipulation and the relative<br />

priority manipulation were used to induce resource allocation between<br />

the time-shared tasks. Difficulty of the tracking task was manipulated<br />

dynamically within a trial. Task difficulty and response modality of<br />

the spatial task were manipulated between trials. A microanalysis of<br />

the continuous performance time locked to the response of the discrete<br />

task was used to examine the structural constraints and strategic<br />

control of the time-sharing performance. Forty-two subjects completed<br />

approximately 20 h of task performance each.<br />

4:50–5:05 (248)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Role of Attention in Processing Rotary Motion Across Fixations.<br />

ALEXANDER POLLATSEK, IBRAHIM DAHLSTROM-HAKKI, &

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