Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society

Saturday Morning Papers 182–187
mantically related lure probes were consistently mistaken as members
of the memory set. Related lures took longer to correctly reject than
did unrelated negative probes, suggesting interference due to the semantic
relatedness of the lure. The false working memory effect on
accuracy increased when a distractor task performed during the retention
interval interfered with subvocal rehearsal. Our results demonstrate
the existence of “false” working memories and suggest that the
working memory system is highly susceptible to rapid distortion, presumably
due to the effects of spreading semantic activation.
11:20–11:35 (182)
Proactive Interference Slows Retrieval in Recognition Memory by
Eliminating Fast Assessments of Familiarity. BRIAN MCELREE &
ILKE ÖZTEKIN, New York University—The response signal speed–
accuracy tradeoff procedure was used to investigate how proactive interference
(PI) affects retrieval from working memory. Participants
were presented with six-item study lists, followed by a recognition
probe. A classic release from PI procedure was used: All items in a
list were from the same category (e.g., fruits), and the category was
changed (e.g., tools) after three consecutive trials with the same category.
Analysis of the retrieval functions demonstrated that PI decreased
asymptotic accuracy and, crucially, also decreased the growth
of accuracy over retrieval time, indicating that PI slowed retrieval
speed. Analysis of false alarms to recent negatives (lures drawn from
the previous study list) and distant negatives (lures not studied for
168+ trials) demonstrated that PI slows retrieval by selectively eliminating
fast assessments based on familiarity. There was no evidence
indicating that PI affects recollection.
11:40–11:55 (183)
Working Memory and Mathematical Computation: Does Problem
Representation Shift With Increasing Expertise? SHAKTHI D.
KUMAR, Michigan State University, SIAN L. BEILOCK, University
of Chicago, & THOMAS H. CARR, Vanderbilt University (read by
Thomas H. Carr)—The representation of mental arithmetic in working
memory has been shown to vary as a function of a number of factors
(e.g., presentation orientation, duration, modality). We investigated
whether math skill level also affects working memory representation,
using a selective interference paradigm. Participants solved complex
mental arithmetic problems under three conditions: single-task baseline,
dual-task performance with a verbal concurrent task requiring
overt repetition of heard words, and dual-task performance with a visuospatial
concurrent task requiring joystick movement in the directions
indicated by visually presented arrows. Baseline math performance
predicted patterns of selective interference. At lower levels of
math skill, the relative amount of verbal dual-task interference was
greater than visuospatial dual-task interference. At higher skill levels,
this pattern was reversed. These results demonstrate that problem representation
varies not only as a function of the constraints imposed by
the problems themselves, but also as a function of constraints imposed
by the performers solving the problems.
Metacognition
Dominion Ballroom, Saturday Morning, 10:20–12:00
Chaired by Christopher Hertzog, Georgia Institute of Technology
10:20–10:35 (184)
Metacognition and the Updating of Strategy Knowledge From Task
Experience. CHRISTOPHER HERTZOG, AILIS BURPEE, & JODI
PRICE, Georgia Institute of Technology, & JOHN DUNLOSKY, Kent
State University—We studied learning about the differential effectiveness
of two strategies (rote repetition and interactive imagery) for mediating
paired-associate learning, using metacognitive judgments and
questionnaire ratings to measure strategy knowledge acquisition for
two recall trials. Do people learn that interactive imagery produces superior
recall? Task goal (control, goal intention, or goal implementation)
instructions and recall presentation type (random vs. blocked)
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were manipulated to see whether explicitly instructing participants to
learn about the strategies or providing strategy-homogeneous blocks
of PA recall would result in improved absolute accuracy of participants’
monitoring. The joint manipulation of goal intention instructions
and blocked testing resulted in the best absolute accuracy for
participants’ global predictions. Blocked testing improved the absolute
accuracy of performance monitoring (global postdictions). Participants’
judgments of learning were unaffected and showed limited
knowledge updating. Ratings of strategy effectiveness before and after
task experience yielded substantial knowledge updating effects not
fully reflected in metacognitive judgments.
10:40–10:55 (185)
The Strategic Regulation of Memory Reporting: Monitoring and
Control of Informativeness. MORRIS GOLDSMITH, ASHER KO-
RIAT, RAKEFET ACKERMAN, & AINAT PANSKY, University of
Haifa—Rememberers do not report all items of information that come
to mind. Rather, they use metacognitive monitoring and control
processes to decide whether to report the item (report option) and, if
so, at what level of precision–coarseness (grain size). Previous work
on control of grain size (Goldsmith et al., 2002, 2005) supported a
“satisficing” model, in which people trade informativeness for accuracy,
coarsening their answers until subjective probability-correct
passes a preset accuracy criterion. What happens, however, when satisfying
the accuracy criterion requires a ridiculously coarse, uninformative
answer? New results suggest that an “informativeness criterion”
must also be satisfied: When the quality of memory is
insufficient to simultaneously satisfy both criteria, the accuracy criterion
may be violated, or, given report option, a “don’t-know” response
may be preferred. The results point to a unified model of report
option and grain regulation that includes monitoring and control
of informativeness in accordance with social-pragmatic norms.
11:00–11:15 (186)
Metacognitive Processes Underlying the Inflation of Conditional
Predictions. ASHER KORIAT, University of Haifa, KLAUS FIEDLER,
University of Heidelberg, & ROBERT A. BJORK, UCLA—Several experiments
will be reported that indicate that conditional predictions—
the assessed probability that a certain specified outcome will occur,
given a certain specific condition—tend to be markedly inflated. The
results suggest that prediction inflation derives, in part, from a backward
activation process in which the specified outcome highlights aspects
of the condition that support the likelihood of occurrence of that
outcome. One consequence is that alternative outcomes do not compete
as fully as they should. Another is that the inflation of conditional
predictions is resistant to manipulations that induce participants to
consider alternatives to the target outcome. The results illustrate the
contributions of a posteriori associations to metacognitive biases—
especially foresight bias (Koriat & Bjork, 2005)—which act to induce
overconfidence in monitoring one’s knowledge during study.
11:20–11:35 (187)
Separating Bias and Sensitivity in Judgments of Associative Memory.
WILLIAM S. MAKI, Texas Tech University—Human subjects overestimate
the associative strength binding a pair of words. We have
found that a linear function relates numerical estimates (JAM) to associative
strength obtained from free association norms (FSG);
roughly, JAM = 50 + 0.4 FSG. This JAM function is characterized by
a high intercept (overestimation bias) and a shallow slope (diminished
sensitivity to associative differences). In Experiment 1, subjects were
trained with error-correcting feedback on many pairs of words. No effects
on the slope were found, but lower intercepts were shown by
those groups who received training and feedback instructions. In Experiment
2, subjects simultaneously rated four associates of each cue
word, but ratings were constrained to add to 100%. Despite the
(forced) reduction in bias, the slope remained shallow. The invariance
of the slope is the basis for concluding that low sensitivity is not
merely a ceiling effect caused by the bias.