Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society

Friday Afternoon Papers 119–125
natives. Observers viewed a patch of dynamic random dots in which
a fraction of the dots moved coherently to the left or right. The task
was to indicate the net direction of motion by an eye movement to a
peripheral target. Sensory evidence was manipulated by varying the
motion coherence, and prior knowledge was manipulated by varying
the probability of a particular direction of motion. We found that the
effect of prior probability is similar to the effect of motion coherence.
By traditional sequential-sampling models, prior probability is assumed
to affect the decision criterion, and not the sampling process.
Our results are inconsistent with these models but can be explained
by prior probability’s modulating the input into the decision process.
5:10–5:25 (119)
How Does Naming the Task Help Task Set Reconfiguration?
STEPHEN MONSELL & GUY A. MIZON, University of Exeter—In
the task-cuing paradigm, the cost of switching tasks and its reduction
as cue–stimulus interval increases can (despite some recent skepticism)
provide separate indices of anticipatory task set reconfiguration
and “residual” interference from the previous task that is not eliminable
by preparation. If, as some have claimed, covert verbal selfinstruction
is a critical component of task set preparation, a verbal cue
matching that instruction could result in more rapid anticipatory reconfiguration,
reduce the residual cost, or both. The task switched between
classifying the color or shape of objects and classifying the age
and gender of faces. We compared the effect of a spoken cue naming
the dimension to be classified with the effect of a matched cue arbitrarily
related to the dimension. We also examined the effect of hearing
the cue in the subject’s own voice versus another’s voice.
Spatial Cognition
Dominion Ballroom, Friday Afternoon, 3:50–5:30
Chaired by Ranxiao Frances Wang
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
3:50–4:05 (120)
How Real Is Virtual Reality? XIAOANG IRENE WAN, RANXIAO
FRANCES WANG, & JAMES A. CROWELL, University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign (read by Ranxiao Frances Wang)—Virtual reality
provides vivid sensory experience, but it is fictitious at a conceptual
level. Two experiments examined whether the perceptual system
treats virtual reality as “real” or “fictitious” environments in a spatial
updating task. Participants viewed objects in both a real room and a
virtual kitchen. Then they turned to face targets, either in the room or
in the kitchen, while blindfolded and pointed to the targets before and
after turning. Participants updated both environments equally well regardless
of instruction conditions, suggesting that they automatically
updated their relation to the virtual kitchen as the real room. In contrast,
when the real environment was described verbally but not perceived,
participants automatically updated their relation to the virtual
kitchen, but not to the real room, suggesting that the virtual environment
is more “real” than a verbally described real environment. These
results suggest that automatic spatial updating is determined by participants’
perceptual experience, not conceptual knowledge.
4:10–4:25 (121)
Human Spatial Representation: Egocentric Updating and Cognitive
Maps. DAVID WALLER & ERIC HODGSON, Miami University—
Two competing theories describe how humans mentally represent spatial
information about their environment. By one account, we represent
our environment transiently and egocentrically; by another,
environments are represented by means of enduring cognitive maps.
Recently, Wang and Spelke (2000) have shown that knowledge of the
directional relationships among objects in one’s environment decreases
as a result of disorientation. They interpreted this finding as
evidence for transient egocentric representations. In several experiments,
we replicate Wang and Spelke’s results but show that they are
limited to recently learned, immediate environments. We then provide
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direct evidence for two systems of spatial representation by means of
a double dissociation involving egocentric pointing (which is impaired
by disorientation) and judgments of relative direction (which
are improved by disorientation). This two-systems account encourages
additional research examining the conditions under which people
are more or less likely to represent their environment egocentrically
versus with a cognitive map.
4:30–4:45 (122)
Are Interobject Spatial Relations Coded Allocentrically in Novel
Environments? M. JEANNE SHOLL, Boston College—There is extensive
behavioral and neurophysiological evidence consistent with
allocentric coding of interobject relations. However, Wang and
Spelke’s (2000) finding that knowledge of object location is easily disrupted
by disorientation is difficult to reconcile with this body of evidence,
leading to their claim that interobject relations are coded egocentrically,
but not allocentrically. A series of experiments is reported
that failed to replicate a disruptive effect of disorientation on represented
object locations, and possible reasons for this failure to replicate
are explored.
4:50–5:05 (123)
Cognitive Modeling of an Analytic Strategy for Cardinal Direction
Judgments. LEO GUGERTY, WILLIAM RODES, & JOHNELL
BROOKS, Clemson University—Cardinal direction judgments are a
type of spatial judgment that requires coordinating information in exocentric
and egocentric spatial reference frames. Researchers have suggested
that people coordinate reference frames when making cardinal
direction judgments by using a mental rotation strategy (Gunzelmann,
Anderson, & Douglass, 2004) or an analytic strategy that minimizes
mental rotation (Gugerty & Brooks, 2004). Here, we present evidence
for the analytic strategy. We trained 7 participants on the analytic strategy,
had them make 200 practice cardinal direction judgments using
this strategy, and then measured their response times on 150 further
judgments using the strategy. Response time data from the final 150
trials were used to validate an ACT–R model we developed of the analytic
strategy. The response times generated by this model fit well
with how human response times varied with viewer heading and with
the location of objects in the 3-D scene.
5:10–5:25 (124)
Gender Differences in Object Location Memory: A Meta-Analysis.
DANIEL VOYER, University of New Brunswick, ALBERT POSTMA,
Utrecht University, BRANDY BRAKE, University of New Brunswick,
& JULIANNE IMPERATO-MCGINLEY, Weill Medical College of
Cornell University—The goal of the present study was to quantify the
magnitude of gender differences in object location memory tasks.
Fifty effect sizes (d) drawn from 23 studies were included in a metaanalysis
using a hierarchical approach. Effect sizes were partitioned
by age of the sample, specific test used (object identity memory, conventional
object location memory, variations of the conventional
task), and scoring method to achieve homogeneity. Significant gender
differences in favor of females were obtained in all clusters, except
in participants under the age of 13 years and with measures of
distance. In addition, year of birth was negatively related to magnitude
of gender differences. Implications of these results for future
work and for theoretical interpretations are discussed.
Touch and Perception
Civic Ballroom, Friday Afternoon, 4:30–5:30
Chaired by Frank H. Durgin, Swarthmore College
4:30–4:45 (125)
Rubber Hands Feel the Touch of Light. FRANK H. DURGIN, NA-
TALIE B. DUNPHY, LAUREL E. EVANS, SUSAN J. KLOSTER-
MANN, & KRISTINA D. SIMMONS, Swarthmore College—We have
found that when the light of a laser pointer is drawn across a rubber